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Albert Kemberle, Inc. v Vintage Collision Inc.
2011 NY Slip Op 50569(U) [31 Misc 3d 1211(A)]
Decided on March 7, 2011
District Court Of Suffolk County, Second District
Hackleling, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected in part through April 14, 2011; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on March 7, 2011
District Court of Suffolk County, Second District


Albert Kemberle, Inc., Plaintiff,

against

Vintage Collision Inc. and MICHAEL PERSICO, Defendants.




BAC 10662-10

C. Stephen Hackleling, J.



Upon the following papers numbered 1 to6read on this

application for an assessment of damages and a default judgment

Notice of Inquest and supporting papers1,2;

Filed papersExhibits 3Summons and complaint 4

Affidavits of service of summons and complaint 5,6;

(and after hearing counsel in support of and opposed to the motion) it is,

ORDERED that this application is denied and this action is dismissed.

The Plaintiff seeks judgment against the defendants, who have defaulted in appearance. Pursuant to New York CPLR § 3215(f), (hereafter "CPLR"), the proof submitted to obtain a default judgment must include proof of the facts constituting the claim, the default and the amount due. The Plaintiff has submitted the affirmation of counsel, a copy of the summons and verified complaint, and copies of the affidavits of service of the summons and complaint.

Obtaining District Court Personal Jurisdiction

The Plaintiff served the codefendant corporation by delivering the summons and complaint to the Secretary of State pursuant to New York BCL § 306(b),(hereafter "BCL"). Service of district court process must be made in conformity with Article 4 of the New York Judiciary Law Uniform District Court Act. Although the methods of service applicable to supreme court practice have been adopted for district court practice; service of a district court summons may be made only within one of the districts covered by this court unless a specific statute provides an exception (UDCA §§ 403, 2300(b)). Service on a corporation pursuant to BCL § 306 constitutes an exception to UDCA § 403, but a restriction exists. Pursuant to BCL § 306(c), for courts of limited jurisdiction, of which district court [*2]

is one (see NYS Constitution, Article VI, § 16; UDCA § 2300), service

of process pursuant to BCL § 306 is permissible only "if the office of the domestic or foreign corporation is within the territorial jurisdiction of the court." The territorial jurisdiction of this court consists solely of the five western towns of Suffolk County (see UDCA § 2300; 22 NYCRR § 212.2(a)).

Nothing in the plaintiff's papers reflects that the codefendant corporation has an office within the five western towns of Suffolk County. Indeed, according to the summons, said corporation is located in Staten Island. As service on the defendant pursuant to BCL § 306(b) is unauthorized, the attempted service here is unauthorized and invalid (See Rosman v. Clark,27 AD2d 839, 278 NYS2d 39[2d Dept 1967]). As a consequence, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that service of process has been made in an authorized manner, as required (CPLR 306(a)), and this action must be dismissed with respect to this defendant.

With respect to codefendant Persico, the summons and complaint were served on him at his residence in Nassau County. As the summons and complaint were served outside the territorial limits of this court, the basis for jurisdiction must be alleged in the pleadings (Stylecraft Interiors, Inc. v. Sheppard, NYLJ, Mar.14, 1995,at 29,col 5 [App Term, 2d Dept]). Facts are required "establishing that the acts and omissions complained of took place within Suffolk County" (Young v. American Office Interiors, Inc., 15 Misc 3d 144(A), 841 NYS 2d 824 [App. Term, 2d Dept 2007]). In addition, because this court is limited to the five western towns of Suffolk County, the allegations of jurisdiction must not be merely that the cause of action arose in Suffolk County, but that it arose within one of the five western towns. The summons contains a statement that defendant transacted business with plaintiff, but nothing reflects that he transacted business in one of the five western towns.

Apart from these defects, the basis for the assertion of long arm jurisdiction over a Nassau resident, as relevant here, is his transaction of business within a district of this court (UDCA § 404(a)(1)). The business transacted must be that of defendant. In this case, however, any business that was transacted in one of the districts of this court was that of plaintiff, not defendant, and so no basis for asserting long arm jurisdiction pursuant to UDCA § 404 has been shown. In addition, the papers lack an affidavit demonstrating plaintiff mailed defendant an additional copy of the summons (CPLR § 3215(g)(3)(i),(ii)).

Dated:

J.D.C.

Decision to be published on line. Yes