| Adler v Lewis |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 51630(U) [32 Misc 3d 1238(A)] |
| Decided on August 31, 2011 |
| Supreme Court, Queens County |
| McDonald, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Nicole Adler and
Steven Adler, Plaintiffs,
against Daniel A. Lewis and Fresh Meadow Country Club, Inc., Defendants. |
The following papers numbered 1 to 16 were read on this motion by the defendant FRESH MEADOW COUNTRY CLUB, INC., for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212(b) granting summary judgment in favor of said defendant and dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint and all cross-claims:
Papers Numbered
Notice of Motion-Affidavits-Exhibits.................1 - 8
Affirmation in Opposition-Affidavits-Exhibits........9 - 13
Reply affirmation...................................14 - 16
_____________________________________________________________
This is an action for damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff, Nicole
Adler, on July 20, 2008, when she was struck by an automobile on the premises of the Fresh
Meadow Country Club, Inc. ("FMCC"/"the Club"). At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was
standing at the rear of her vehicle, in a valet drop-off area, unloading items from her trunk when
co-defendant Daniel A. Lewis's vehicle pulled up behind the plaintiffs' vehicle, stopped, and then
rolled forward making contact with the plaintiff.
[*2]
The plaintiff commenced an action by the filing
of a summons and verified complaint on August 21, 2008. The plaintiff brought a cause of action
for negligence against both Mr. Lewis and FMCC. Issue was joined by service of defendant
FMCC's verified answer on October 22, 2008. The Adlers settled their claim against Mr. Lewis
pursuant to a stipulation dated May 9, 2011.
In her verified bill of particulars dated September 2, 2010, supplemental verified bill
of particulars dated October 9, 2009, and second and third supplemental verified bills of
particulars dated September 2, 2010 and December 14, 2010, the plaintiff contends that
defendant FMCC was negligent, inter alia, in failing to prohibit and/or restrict defendant Lewis
from operating a motor vehicle on its premises when it knew or should have known that Lewis
was likely to cause injury to others; in failing to control the conduct of Lewis when it had the
opportunity to control said person and when it was reasonably aware of the need for such control;
in failing to restrict and or limit defendant Lewis's use of a motor vehicle on its premises when it
had the ability to do so; and in allowing defendant Lewis to operate his vehicle when it knew or
should have known that doing so was a risk to the general public and more particularly
plaintiff/pedestrian. The plaintiff claims that the defendant had actual and constructive
knowledge of Lewis's poor driving record in that it was aware that defendant Lewis, while
previously operating a vehicle on its premises had struck other objects prior to the accident
herein.
Plaintiff, Nicole Adler, alleged that as a result of the accident she sustained an acute
lateral meniscal tear of the right knee and tear of the posterior horn of the medial meniscus for
which she was required to undergo a lateral meniscectomy of the right knee on November 28,
2008 and arthroscopic surgery on June 30, 2010. In addition, the plaintiff claims she sustained a
disc herniation at L4-L5, disc bulging and disc protrusion at L5-S1 and L4-L5 and partial tear of
the plantar fascia.
Examinations before trial of the plaintiff, Nicole Adler and defendant Lewis were
taken on January 8, 2010. The deposition of Leslie Young-Zeoli, a comptroller employed by
FMCC was taken on April 8, 2010, and the deposition of non-party witness Jeffery Saporta was
taken on May 19, 2010. The depositions of Jose Nunez, Jose Florez and Robin Castillo, valets
employed by FMCC, were taken on October 12, 2010, and the deposition of Allan Kaplan, past
president of FMCC was taken on February 4, 2011.
In her deposition, Nicole Adler, age 44, states that on July 20, 2008, she, her
husband, and her two children were guests of her brother, Russell Poses, who was a member of
the Club. When they arrived at approximately 1:30 p.m. they drove up a ½ mile long
driveway to the clubhouse. The valet drop-off is located directly in front of the clubhouse
entrance under a large awning. Plaintiff testified that after her husband pulled up in front of the
clubhouse, the valet opened her door so she could get out and she went to the back of the car to
unload the trunk. Defendant Lewis's vehicle then pulled up behind her. Less than a minute after
she began [*3]unloading the trunk Ms. Adler was struck in the
back of her right knee by the front bumper of Mr. Lewis's car. The impact caused her to fall to
the ground. She testified that Lewis came over and said he was sorry and that he thought his car
was in park. She stated that there were several witnesses to the accident including the valets,
members of the club, the passenger in Lewis's car and her two children who were seated inside
her vehicle. The police arrived within five minutes and she told them that she was unloading her
trunk when she was struck by Lewis's vehicle. She left the scene in an ambulance and was treated
in the emergency room for pain to her right ankle which she twisted when she fell. The plaintiff
also testified that subsequently she was told by her brother, Russell Poses, that the valets were
aware that the person who hit her had a poor driving record, that they ran when he drove up and
that he had previously struck another car on the premises of the Club. In addition, Poses told her
that Lewis had been told not to use the valet parking but to park his own car. She did not know
who gave this information to her brother.
Leslie Young-Zeoli, the comptroller at FMCC, testified that her responsibilities
include maintaining the financial management of the Club and overseeing the payroll. She
testified that members and guests can either park their own cars or utilize the services of the
valets. The valet attendants are employees of the Club. She testified that the incident in question
was recorded by a surveillance camera system. She stated that when she watched the video she
"saw an SUV pull up and stop. I saw only the back end of the car, the truck, and I believe a male
and female got out, open the trunk. As they are getting out, a car stops behind them, six feet
behind, maybe more, comes to a full stop. As they are opening the trunk, that car moves slowly
into them." She testified that the valet in charge on that day was Jose Nunez. Ms. Zeoli testified
that Mr. Lewis was a member of the Club but that he ceased his membership in 2009. She stated
that to her knowledge the Club has never suspended a member's privileges although the bylaws
permit suspension for not being current on bills. She was not sure if it permitted suspension for
inappropriate behavior. When asked if Mr. Lewis has ever had any other accidents on the
premises of the Club, she responded that to her knowledge he did not and she also stated that he
never struck any of the valet attendants with his vehicle. She also testified that she had never
heard of anyone ever being struck by a vehicle on the grounds of the club. She stated that the first
time she learned of the accident was when she received a call from the Club's insurance agent.
Co-defendant, Daniel A. Lewis, testified that on the day of the accident he had gone
to the Club to have lunch with his daughter, Elizabeth Gershon, who was a passenger in his
vehicle at the time of the accident. When asked if he had ever struck a vehicle on the grounds of
the Club prior to the accident in question, he stated that a year or two prior to this accident he had
backed up his vehicle and struck another vehicle. He stated that the prior accident took place in
front of the clubhouse and that he paid the owner of the other vehicle $300.00 to repair the
damage. Mr. Lewis testified that he had never struck another person at the club nor had he ever
struck any objects there. He testified that no one from the Club had ever instructed him prior to
the July 8th accident not to drive his vehicle up to the valet area, no one from the club had ever
made complaints to him about the manner in which he operated his vehicle, and no one from the
Club ever told him that he was required to park his own vehicle on the grounds. He also stated
that none of the valets had ever told him that they did not want him pulling up to the valet area
prior [*4]to this accident. Further, Lewis testified that his driving
privileges at the club had never been suspended and he had never been the subject of disciplinary
action at the Club.
With respect to the incident in question, he stated that he observed the plaintiff exit
her vehicle on the passenger side and he "saw her walk around to the back of her car and I had
stopped mine, and I just took my eye off what I was doing and she was right in front of me, and I
had not put it into park." Defendant stated that his car made contact with her a few seconds after
he stopped his vehicle. When he realized his vehicle was moving he put his foot on the brake but
it was too late. He said his car was rolling at less than 5 miles per hour when it struck Ms. Adler.
Jeffrey Saporta, a member of the Club stated that he was a witness to the accident.
He stated that at the time of the accident he was standing by a bench waiting for the valets to
retrieve his car from the parking lot. He stated that he observed, "a woman, a young woman and
man, had an SUV, and they were unloading something from the back of the SUV. He stated it
was stopped under the awning in front of the clubhouse. Saporta stated that while they were
unloading the trunk, another car pulled up behind it. He stated that, "it slowed down, it came to a
momentary stop and then it lurched forward. It made contact with the woman pinning her against
the SUV." He stated that he went over to Lewis and "I noticed that he was-—he looked
confused and I told him to put the car in park and stop the vehicle." He stated that after the
accident one of the valets stated to him, "this is not the first incident that the driver of the car had
on the premises." He also questioned another valet and confirmed that Lewis had been involved
in prior incidents. However, he did not have any personal knowledge of these prior incidents
regarding when they took place or any other details as to the names of any people involved.
Saporta testified that he observed the plaintiff screaming and he believed that she had fallen to
the ground. He stated that he was present when the police arrived and he told the police, "that
someone was, a young woman was getting materials out of the back of her car when this car
approached her and stopped, and then lurched forward and hit her." He did not fill out any reports
in connection with this incident.
Jose Nunez, the manager of valet parking at FMCC, was deposed on the premises of
the club on October 12, 2010. He testified that both members and guests have the option of either
parking their own vehicles or using the valet service. He stated that the valets had the option of
directing that cars wait in a side by side manner in the valet area or one behind the other. He
stated that he was working on the day of the accident but that he was working in the upper
parking lot and not in the valet parking area. He stated that Jose Florez, Rafael Hernandez and
Efran Peralta were also working as valets on that date. He stated that Jose Florio radioed him
over a walkie-talkie that there had been an accident and that he should come up to the valet area.
When he arrived on the scene he observed the two cars, one behind the other and the plaintiff,
who was crying, was seated in the rear of her vehicle. He saw Mr. Lewis with his daughter seated
in his vehicle. He stated that prior to the accident, to his knowledge, Mr. Lewis had utilized the
valet service over 100 times and he had never seen him park his own car in either the upper or
lower parking lot. Florez told Nunez that he had been helping the plaintiff take things out of the
trunk when he felt something and then looked and saw Lewis's car. When asked how he would
[*5]characterize Lewis's driving ability he stated that it was
"good." He also stated that he had never heard that Mr. Lewis had hit other vehicles on the
grounds prior to this accident. Further, he testified that no other valet had ever told him Lewis
was a bad driver. In addition, Nunez testified that he was never told by any other valet attendant
that they were scared of the way that Mr. Lewis operated a vehicle. He stated that he remained at
the scene for 30-60 minutes until the police arrived and the vehicles were moved. He stated that
he retrieved the video and showed it to the general manager, Brett Morris, on the day of the
accident. He did not personally observe the accident and did not speak to either the plaintiff or
the defendant at the scene.
The deposition of Jose M. Florez, another valet attendant at the Club was also taken
at the Club on October 12, 2011. He stated that on the date of the accident, he was working
parking cars in the front of the Club. He states that he never directs the vehicles where to pull up
and that the patrons either pull up behind each other or create two or three lines side by side. On
the day of the accident he stated, "I was helping the woman taking things out of her trunk when a
car that was coming from behind was getting closer and closer and it stopped, but then it started
up again." Florez testified that he was behind the vehicle with Ms. Adler when the Lewis's
vehicle struck her from behind. He stated, "[I] turned around and looked when I sensed that he
was getting closer, but then he hit her and I, myself, took the woman from there and I stepped to
the side and I sat her on the ground because her husband didn't." He stated that prior to the
accident, he did not know who Mr. Lewis was and he did not speak to Mr. Lewis at the scene. He
stated that he had never heard after the accident that other valet attendants considered Mr. Lewis
to be a bad driver.
Robin Castillo, was also a valet attendant on the day of the accident. He testified that
he was standing under the green awning waiting for vehicles to pull up and observed that
accident unfold. In describing the accident he stated, "[I] saw the SUV that arrived. It parked
underneath the awning. They opened the back part, like the trunk, I believe they were going to
the pool, so they were taking out things for the pool. The other vehicle arrived, stopped, but then
continued." He stated that Lewis's vehicle stopped about 20 feet away. It traveled about 5 feet
and then stopped again. Then he saw that it hit the other car and the he observed the plaintiff in
between both vehicles. He said the vehicle was moving very slowly went it struck her. He stated
that he didn't remember if he tried to stop the Lewis vehicle or to warn the lady. When asked why
he didn't shout to her he stated that, "[I] didn't think he was going to hit her." Castillo testified
that he knew Mr. Lewis as a member and had seen him operate his vehicle many times before
and considered him a normal driver for his age in that he drives slowly. He stated that he did not
consider Lewis to be a dangerous driver prior to the accident and never heard anyone complain
about Lewis's ability or inability to drive. He never heard that Lewis was a bad driver from
anyone and he was not aware that Lewis had a prior accident at the Club.
In his affidavit dated June 20, 2011, Milagros Perez, plaintiffs' counsel states that
summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint against FMCC is warranted as there is no
evidence in the record that FMCC was negligent in any way or that their action or inaction was a
proximate cause of Ms. Adler's accident. Counsel claims that Mr. Lewis's negligence in failing to
[*6]put his car in park and allowing it to roll into Ms. Adler was
an independent act which FMCC could not have anticipated. In addition, counsel argues that
there is no evidence in the record that the Club had notice either actual or constructive that Mr.
Lewis was a "poor driver" who was prone to operating his vehicle in a dangerous manner.
Counsel contends that in order to impose liability on a landowner, actual or
constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition must be shown. Here, there is no claim of a
dangerous condition on the premises per se or that any acts on the part of FMCC employees were
negligent. Rather, the plaintiff, in her bill of particulars claims that FMCC was negligent based
on their knowledge that Lewis, while operating his vehicle, had struck other objects on its
premises prior to the accident and that despite this knowledge they failed to protect the plaintiffs
and other persons at the Club by prohibiting or restricting Lewis from operating a motor vehicle
on their property.
In order to impose liability on FMCC, plaintiff would have the burden of showing
that the defendant was on notice that Lewis was a poor driving risk, that they should have
restricted his driving privileges because of that risk, and that their failure to restrict his driving
privileges was a proximate cause of the accident. Counsel for FMCC contends that the record is
clear, based upon the deposition testimony of the parties and non-party witnesses, that FMCC did
not have notice prior to the incident that Lewis posed a driving risk and moreover, that the
accident in question was caused solely by Lewis's independent unforseeable act. Counsel
contends that Lewis's act in permitting his vehicle to roll into the plaintiff in the valet area was
the sole proximate cause of the accident as there is no evidence in the record that he was
motioned forward or directed by any of the valet attendants prior to the accident. Further, counsel
argues that the plaintiffs' contention that the Club should have revoked or restricted the driving
privileges of the defendant based upon a history of poor driving is unsupported by the record.
Counsel argues that the only prior accident that Lewis was involved in that is reflected in the
record is the one prior accident that Lewis himself admitted to in which he backed his vehicle
into another vehicle near the valet area. There was no testimony that that accident was ever
reported to the Club or that any employee from the Club was aware of that prior accident.
Further, counsel contends that there was no evidence of notice of Lewis's prior accident as none
of the witnesses who testified provided any testimony to substantiate the claim that FMCC was
aware of Lewis' so called poor driving ability or that he was a hazard to other members or guests
because of his poor driving ability. None of the valets or members who were deposed were aware
of any prior accidents. In conclusion, FMCC argues that plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima
facie claim against FMCC as there is no proof in the record other than the hearsay statements of
Nicole Adler's brother and of Mr. Saporta that the valets believed that Lewis had a prior accident
and was known to be a poor driver.
In opposition, Michael J. Wells, Esq., counsel for the plaintiffs, argues that FMCC,
as a landowner, has the obligation to act in a reasonable manner to prevent harm to those on its
property. Counsel argues that FMCC had actual knowledge that Mr. Lewis was a poor driver who
had operated his vehicle in a negligent fashion prior to the accident. Counsel claims that FMCC
[*7]had notice based upon the deposition testimony of non-party
witness Jeffrey Saporta who stated that one of the valet's at the scene told him, "this is not the
first incident that the driver of the car had on its premises." Saporta also testified that he did not
know which valet made that statement and could not describe the individual other than to state he
was male. Saporta stated that he also questioned another valet after the accident and confirmed
that Lewis had other incidents. He did not personally know how many prior incidents Lewis was
involved in and he did not know which valet imparted that information to him. Counsel also
notes that Mr. Lewis, himself, admitted he had struck another vehicle on one occasion a year or
two prior to the accident. Thus, counsel claims that these evidentiary facts support a finding that
employees of FMCC were aware that Lewis was a poor driver and therefore raises a question of
fact as to actual notice on the part of the Club. Further, counsel claims that based upon the
testimony of former FMCC's President Allen Kaplan, that the Club's bylaws permitted them to
suspend the privileges of their members for inappropriate conduct. In view of the bylaws, counsel
contends that the Club was negligent in failing to restrict Lewis's driving at the Club and that
there is a question of fact as to whether the failure to remedy the danger to the persons on their
premises by restricting Lewis's driving was a proximate cause of the accident.
In support of their opposition, FMCC submits a copy of the deposition testimony of
Jeffrey Saporta, as summarized above, and a copy of the deposition testimony of Allen Kaplan,
which was taken on February 4, 2011. In this regard the copy of the transcript of Kaplan's
deposition testimony submitted to the Court contains only the odd numbered pages of his
deposition and as such has no probative value. Counsel also submits a copy of the Club's bylaws
from 2007 which states in part at page 5 section 2, that a member's privileges may be suspended
for inappropriate conduct. Said section states in part that "any member or member of his or her
family guilty of any conduct unbecoming a gentleman, or lady, as the case may be, or any
member who shall violate the BY-Laws rules or regulations...may be disciplined, suspended or
expelled by a two-thirds vote of the Board of Governors present at any meeting of the
Board...The Board of Governors shall be the sole judge of what constitutes misconduct or
conduct unbecoming a gentleman or lady, and what constitutes a violation of the By-Laws, rules
and regulations of the Club..."
The proponent of a summary judgment motion must tender evidentiary proof in
admissible form eliminating any material issues of fact from the case. The failure of the moving
party to make such a prima facie showing requires denial of the motion regardless of the
insufficiency of the opposing papers (see Sheppard-Mobley v King, 10 AD3d 70[2d Dept. 2004]). Once the
movant's burden is met, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish the existence of a
material issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986];
Zuckerman v New York,49 NY2d 557[1980]).
"A property owner, or one in possession or control of property, has a duty to take
reasonable measures to control the foreseeable conduct of third parties on the property to prevent
them from intentionally harming or creating an unreasonable risk of harm to others" (Jean v [*8]Wright, 82 AD3d 1163[2d Dept. 2011] quoting Jaume
v Ry Mgmt. Co., 2 AD3d 590 [2d Dept. 2003]).
This duty arises when there is an ability and opportunity to control such conduct, and
the defendant is reasonably aware of the necessity for such control (see Jaume v. Ry Mgmt.
Co., supra; D'Amico v Christie, 71 NY2d 76; Hillen v Queens Long Is. Med. Group, P.C., 57 AD3d 946 [2d
Dept. 2008]; Cutrone v Monarch Holding Corp., 299 AD2d 388 [2d Dept. 2002]). "A
property owner cannot be held to a duty to take protective measures unless it is shown that he
either knows or has reason to know from past experience "that there is a likelihood of conduct on
the part of third persons....which is likely to endanger the safety of the visitor'" (Jean v
Wright, supra., quoting Nallan v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 NY2d 507 [1980]).
Although there is no allegation in this case that Lewis's acts were intentional, the basis of
plaintiff's complaint is that because Lewis was a poor driver he was a known danger to the safety
of individuals on the premises.
Upon review and consideration of the defendant's motion, the plaintiff's affirmation
in opposition, and the defendant's reply thereto, this court finds that FMCC established, prima
facie, that FMCC did not have actual or constructive notice of Mr. Lewis's allegedly poor driving
record or of his prior accident on the premises. The deposition testimony submitted by FMCC
which consisted of Ms. Adler's testimony as well as the testimony of four employees of the Club
and an independent eyewitness was sufficient to demonstrate that the management and
employees of the Club had no reason to believe that Mr. Lewis was a driving risk. Therefore, the
Club demonstrated, prima facia, that the conduct of Mr. Lewis was not foreseeable.
There is no dispute that Ms. Adler was struck by Mr. Lewis's vehicle. Lewis
apologized to Ms. Adler at the scene and admitted his negligence when he explained that he had
taken his foot off of the brake when he arrived in the valet area because he thought the car was in
park when it actually was still in drive. Although he tried to stop the car by pressing on the brake
when his daughter warned him that the car was rolling, he stated that he stepped on the brake too
late. Mr. Lewis also conceded that he had a minor accident at the Club a year or two prior to this
incident when he backed into another vehicle causing about $300 worth of damage. He paid for
the damage himself and that incident was not reported to the Club. All of the witnesses employed
by the Club including Ms. Zeoli and valets, Jose Nunez, Jose Florez, and Robin Castillo testified
that they were not aware of Lewis's prior accident nor did they have knowledge of any other
accidents that he was involved in. The only testimony regarding prior accidents was from Mr.
Saporta who testified that an unidentified valet told him Lewis had a reputation as a bad driver.
However, Saporta was not personally aware of any prior incidents involving Lewis and could not
provide the details of any prior accidents.
Therefore, this Court finds that FMCC demonstrated that they had no notice that
Lewis had a poor driving record or that they were aware of any prior incidents that would tend to
show that it was foreseeable that he was likely to cause injury to another individual on the
premises of the Club. Thus FMCC showed that there was no basis in the record for them to have
had a reason [*9]to restrict Lewis's driving privileges. Thus the
Club demonstrated, prima facie, that it was not liable for the injury sustained by Ms. Adler as it
could not protect members and guests of the Club from an alleged danger of which it had no
notice.
In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a question of fact as to whether FMCC had
notice of and should have been aware that Lewis was a poor driver and that his prior record
formed the basis to have restricted his driving privileges under the Club's bylaws. The deposition
testimony of Saporta to the effect that an unknown valet told him that Lewis was a poor driver
without providing the basis for that conclusion is not legally sufficient to establish the
forseeability of the act or that the failure to suspend or restrict Lewis's driving privileges was a
proximate cause of the accident. Further Ms. Adler's testimony that her brother told her that
Lewis had a poor record is insufficient to raise a question of fact as that statement is hearsay and
as Poses did not submit a factual affidavit to support his statement that the valets were aware of
Lewis's poor driving ability. None of the deposition testimony submitted raises a question of fact
as to whether it was forseeable based upon any prior conduct by Lewis that his driving posed a
danger to the individuals on the premises of the Club or that the Club had a basis to restrict his
privileges.
Further, there was no evidence to contradict Lewis's testimony regarding the one
prior accident he testified to as being minor in nature and causing only $300 in property damage
and no testimony that there were any prior complaints made to FMCC regarding Lewis's driving
ability. There was no direct proof that the Club was aware of this prior accident, and even if it
were, the facts of the prior accident do not substantiate the plaintiffs' claim that the defendant
was a "poor driver" and do not substantiate the hearsay testimony that the valets would run when
he drove up or that he was required to park his own vehicle. In fact, the hearsay testimony of
Saporta and Adler was belied by the testimony of the three valets and the Comptroller all of
whom testified that they had no knowledge upon which to conclude that Lewis was a poor driver.
Thus the plaintiffs' argument that FMCC had notice of the poor driving record based upon the
hearsay statements of Saporta and Poses is unavailing, absent evidence that the defendant was a
dangerous driver.
Accordingly, the deposition testimony submitted by the plaintiffs does not raise a
question of fact as to the forseeability of the act or that the failure to suspend or restrict Lewis's
driving privileges was a proximate cause of the accident. Here, liability may not be imposed on
FMCC as they merely furnished the condition for the occurrence of the event and there was no
question of fact raised that FMCC's actions or lack of action was a proximate cause of the
accident (see Peralta v Manzo, 74
AD3d 1307 [2d Dept. 2010]; Shatz z v Kutshers Country Club, 247 AD2d 375 [2d
Dept. 1998]). It is clear that the sole proximate cause of the accident was Lewis's independent
conduct in failing to properly put his car in park.
Accordingly, for all of the above-stated reasons it is
ORDERED, that the motion by defendant FRESH MEADOW COUNTRY CLUB,
INC., [*10]for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and
all cross-claims against it is granted, and it is further
ORDERED and the Clerk of Court is authorized to enter judgment accordingly.
Dated: August 31, 2011
Long Island City, NY
______________________________
ROBERT J. MCDONALD
J.S.C.