Defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from that portion of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Robert R. Reed, J.), dated July 12, 2010, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff, as limited by his brief, cross-appeals from so much of the aforesaid order as denied his cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Per Curiam.

Order (Robert R. Reed, J.), dated July 12, 2010, modified to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint; as modified, order affirmed, with $10 costs. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Defendants made a prima facie showing that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law � 5102(d) as a result of the April 2008 motor vehicle accident. In support of their summary judgment motion, defendants submitted the affirmed medical reports of an orthopedic surgeon, radiologist and neurologist, who found that plaintiff had recovered from sprain and strain injuries without any permanence or disability (see Zhijian Yang v Alston, 73 AD3d 562, 563 [2010]). Defendants' neurologist attributed plaintiff's decreased range of motion to "voluntary" conduct and "poor effort" (see Colon v Vincent Plumbing & Mech. Co., 85 AD3d 541, 542[2011]). Defendants' radiologist affirmed that plaintiff suffered from preexisting degenerative conditions that were consistent with his age, weight and unrelated to the underlying accident (see id.; Soho v Konate, 85 AD3d 522 [2011]; Porter v Bajana, 82 AD3d 488 [2011]).

In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Plaintiff's opposing papers are devoid of any competent medical evidence of his treatment, its extent or duration(see Thompson v Abbasi, 15 AD3d 95, 99[2005]; Bent v Jackson, 15 AD3d 46, 48 [2005]). Nor did plaintiff present medical evidence supporting his claim that he was unable to perform "substantially all" of his usual and customary daily activities for at least 90 of the 180 days [*2]immediately following the accident (Insurance Law � 5102[d]). Plaintiff's claimed inability to continue working in the same manner as before the accident was not documented and, in any event, is not dispositive of the existence of a 90/180-day category injury (see Rosa-Diaz v Maria Auto Corp., 79 AD3d 463, 464 [2010]; Weinberg v Okapi Taxi, Inc., 73 AD3d 439 [2010]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: October 26, 2011