Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Donald H. Birnbaum, J.), entered November 25, 2009. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $5,000.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff, an attorney, commenced this small claims action to recover amounts allegedly due and owing for services rendered to defendant, a former client, in connection with plaintiff's legal representation of defendant in a Supreme Court action. At a nonjury trial, it was established that plaintiff had rendered legal services to defendant from January 22, 2002 to April 28, 2003, and that no letter of engagement had been provided or retainer agreement entered into. On May 21, 2003, plaintiff billed defendant for legal services rendered plus disbursements, with an alleged substantial reduction in the fee. Plaintiff billed defendant again on December 20, 2006, without this reduction. Plaintiff submitted documentation itemizing the time he had spent on the legal services he had performed as well as the invoices he had sent to defendant. There is no dispute that defendant had paid plaintiff only $800 and that she was aware that she owed him an additional amount.

Our review is limited to determining whether substantial justice was done between the parties "according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UDCA 1807). Although plaintiff did not provide defendant with a written retainer agreement or letter of engagement, the rule regarding written letters of engagement (22 NYCRR part 1215) did not take effect until March 4, 2002, a few months after plaintiff's representation of defendant had commenced, and the recovery of attorney's fees is not precluded when the attorney-client relationship commenced prior to the effective date of the rule (see Seth Rubenstein, P.C. v Ganea, 41 AD3d 54, 62 n 6 [2007]). Furthermore, contrary to defendant's contention, plaintiff was not obligated to send defendant written "Notice of Client's Right to Arbitrate" (see Rules of Chief Administrator of Cts [22 NYCRR] § 137.6 [a] [1]), as there was no evidence that defendant ever disputed the reasonableness of the fees sought (see Scordio v Scordio, 270 AD2d 328 [2000]). [*2]

The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]).

The determination of reasonable counsel fees was a matter within the sound discretion of the District Court and, on the record presented, it cannot be said that it was an improvident exercise of discretion to award plaintiff the principal sum of $5,000. As substantial justice was done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (UDCA 1804, 1807), there is no basis for this court to disturb the District Court's determination. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Molia, J.P., Tanenbaum and LaCava, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 26, 2011