| People v Nunez |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 52175(U) [33 Misc 3d 1230(A)] |
| Decided on December 7, 2011 |
| Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, New York County |
| Kotler, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
The People of the State
of New York,
against Roberto Nunez, Defendant. |
Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219 [a], of the papers considered in the
review of this (these) motion(s):
[*2]
PapersNumbered
Def's n/m, AG affirm 1
ED affirm in opp 2
LYNN R. KOTLER, J.:
The defendant is charged with trademark counterfeiting in the third degree in
violation of PL § 165.71 and failure to disclose origin of a recording in the second degree in
violation of PL § 275.35. He now moves to dismiss the information for facial insufficiency.
The People oppose the motion. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.
To be sufficient on its face, a misdemeanor information must contain factual
allegations of an evidentiary character demonstrating reasonable cause to believe the defendant
committed the offenses charged (CPL §§ 100.15[3]; 100.40[1][b]; 70.10). These facts
must be supported by non-hearsay allegations which, if true, establish every element of the
offenses charged (CPL § 100.40[1][c]). An information which fails to satisfy these
requirements is jurisdictionally defective (CPL § 170.30 and § 170.35; People v
Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 [1987]; People v Dumas, 68 NY2d 729 [1986]).
In reviewing an accusatory instrument for facial sufficiency, "[s]o long as the factual
allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are
adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense ...," the
court should give it "a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v. Casey, 95
NY2d 354, 360 [2000]). Moreover, the Court of Appeals has held that at the pleading stage, all
that is needed is that the factual allegations are sufficiently evidentiary in character and tend to
support the charges (People v Allen, 92 NY2d 378, 385 [1998]).
The information alleges that on June 16, 2011 at 16:15 hours in front of 2676 7th
Avenue, New York, New York, the defendant was observed by Police Officer Ray Fuller
displaying and offering for sale approximately one hundred and forty movie digital video discs
("DVDs"). PO Fuller states that he saw the defendant standing for approximately five minutes
immediately behind a bag on the ground and the above-described merchandise was offered for
sale thereon and inside said bag. PO Fuller states that the defendant was the only person who
[*3]was uninterruptedly in the immediate proximity to the
merchandise unprotected during the entire period of his observation. PO Fuller also saw two
people approach the defendant, examine the DVDs and engage in conversation with the
defendant.
PO Fuller is informed by Bonnie Peters ("informant"), an authorized representative
of the Motion Picture Association of America, that based upon informant's training and
experience,
the DVDs fail to disclose the origin of their recordings when said discs bear the
following traits: (i) the discs are in DVD-R format as opposed to replicated, (ii) the titles have
not been released in DVD format, (iii) the discs do not contain a title, (iv) the discs do not
contain a region code, (v) the discs do not contain a studio logo, (vi) the package artwork is
photocopied, and (vii) the discs do not contain identifiable origination numbers (IFPI).
PO Fuller examined the DVDs and states that the DVDs seized from the defendant
do in fact bear the following traits, contain recorded video, and fail to disclose the origins of their
recordings. Finally, PO Fuller is informed by informant that the trademarks "are in use and
registered."
The People have also provided an affidavit signed by the informant, which indicates
that "Paramount, Dreamworks and Warner Brothers state that the trademark is currently in use
and registered at the United States Patent Trademark Office in Washington D.C. This affidavit is
valid unless revoked or superseded in writing."
The defendant moves to dismiss the trademark counterfeiting charge, arguing that
the information fails to describe the trademarks in question, and relatedly, to allege that the
counterfeit trademarks are identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, the genuine
trademarks. The defendant also moves to dismiss the the failure to disclose origin of a recording
charge, arguing that the people have failed to allege the necessary elements with respect thereto
as well. The People's opposition to this motion consists of one paragraph which does not
substantively address any of the defendant's arguments raised in this motion.
Discussion
Trademark Counterfeiting in the Third Degree
Under PL § 165.71, a person is guilty of trademark counterfeiting in the third degree when, with the intent to deceive or defraud some other person or with the intent to evade a lawful restriction on the sale, resale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods, he or she manufactures, distributes, sells, or offers for sale goods which bear a counterfeit trademark, or possesses a trademark knowing it to be counterfeit for the purpose of affixing it to any goods.
Under PL § 165.70 (1), a trademark is defined as any word, name, symbol, or [*4]device, or any combination thereof adopted and used by a person to identify goods made by a person and which distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others which is in use and which is registered, filed or recorded under the laws of this state or of any other state or is registered in the principal register of the United States patent and trademark office. By virtue of the definition of a trademark, the People must allege as a necessary element of PL § 165.71 that the genuine trademark in relation to the counterfeit mark is active and duly registered (People v. Wu Cheng, 4 Misc 3d 377, 379 [Crim Ct, NY Co 2004]). The term "counterfeit trademark" is defined under PL § 165.70 (2) as "a spurious trademark or an imitation of a trademark that is: (a) used in connection with trafficking in goods; and (b) used in connection with the sale, offering for sale or distribution of goods that are identical with or substantially indistinguishable from a trademark as defined in subdivision one of this section."
Even when viewing the factual allegations in a light most favorable to the People, the complaint is facially insufficient. There is no description of the genuine trademarks contained on the DVDs in the accusatory instrument. There is no description of the counterfeit trademarks or any comparison of them to the genuine trademarks. These are all necessary elements and their absence is fatal to the sufficiency of this accusatory instrument (see also People v. Chen, 30 Misc 3d 1205(A) [Dist Ct. Nass Ct 2011]; People v. Jobe, 20 Misc 3d 1114(A); cf. People v. Guan, 2003 WL 21169478 [App Term 1st Dept 2003]). Simply stating that the defendant was selling 140 DVDs is not enough to establish trademark counterfeiting in the third degree.
Accordingly, the first count, PL § 165.71, is hereby severed and dismissed.
Failure to Disclose Origin of a Recording
Under PL § 265.35, a person is guilty of failure to disclose origin of a recording in the
second degree when:
for commercial advantage or private financial gain, he knowingly advertises or offers
for sale, resale, or rental, or sells, resells, or rents, or possesses for such purposes, a recording the
cover, box, jacket or label does not clearly and conspicuously disclose the actual name and
address of the manufacturer or the name of the performer or principal artist. The omission of the
actual name and address of the manufacturer, or the omission of the name of the performer or
principal artist, or the omission of both, shall constitute the failure to disclose the origin of a
recording.
The Court has reviewed the accusatory instrument, and also finds that the second count is
facially insufficient. The accusatory instrument lists seven factors identified by the informant,
and upon which PO Fuller relied when he examined the DVDs and based his determination that
the defendant failed to disclosed the origins of the DVDs' recordings. Those [*5]criteria are repeated below:
the discs are in DVD-R format as opposed to replicated
the titles have not been released in DVD format
the discs do not contain a title
the discs do not contain a region code
the discs do not contain a studio logo
the package artwork is photocopied
the discs do not contain identifiable origination numbers
To sustain the charge of PL § 265.35, the People must allege that the DVDs' cover, box
or label did not clearly and conspicuously disclose the actual name and address of the
manufacturer or the name of the performer or principal artist. None of the factors
identified by the informant and relied upon by PO Fuller relate to either of these necessary
elements of PL § 265.35. Otherwise, the complaint is conclusory as to this count and does
not contain any facts which would support the charge. Therefore, this count is also facially
insufficient and must be dismissed.
Conclusion
In accordance herewith, it is hereby:
ORDERED that the defendant's motion to dismiss for facial insufficiency is granted
and the information contained in docket number 2011NY048610 is hereby dismissed.
Any requests for relief not expressly addressed herein have nonetheless been
considered and are hereby expressly denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
Dated:December 7, 2011So Ordered:
New York, New York
______________________
Hon. Lynn R. Kotler, J.C.C.