Fielack Elec. Corp. v Shipper (2011 NY Slip Op 52210(U))

Fielack Elec. Corp. v Shipper

2011 NY Slip Op 52210(U) [33 Misc 3d 142(A)]

Decided on December 5, 2011

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Fielack Electric Corp., Respondent,

against

Robert Shipper, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, Second District (Norman Janowitz, J.), entered February 24, 2010. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $2,727.33 and dismissed defendant's counterclaim.

Plaintiff commenced this commercial claims action to recover the sum of $2,727.33 for electrical repairs performed at defendant's house. Defendant counterclaimed to recover the cost of electrical repair work he had paid to another electrician to complete plaintiff's job. After a nonjury trial, the District Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $2,727.33 and dismissed the counterclaim. Upon a review of the record, we find that the judgment provided the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (UDCA 1804-A, 1807-A; see Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]).

The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as the trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess the credibility of the witnesses (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]). The deference accorded to a trial court's credibility determinations applies with even greater force to judgments rendered in the Commercial Claims Part of the court, given the limited standard of review (see UDCA 1807-A; Williams, 269 AD2d at 126). As the record supports the District [*2]Court's determination, we find no reason to disturb the judgment.