Defendants' PARK AVE SOUTH MANAGEMENT and 3053 HULL AVE, LLC motion for an Order pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(5) dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint is granted.

Plaintiff commenced a lawsuit against Defendants alleging "harassment by trying to evict [her] through housing court and the fact that [she] pay[s] the least rent in the building; [*2]endangering [her] ability to remain in section 8 program; by not providing heat for three years and sometime hot water; and overcharging [her] rent." (S & C at ¶ 3.) Prior to this lawsuit, Defendant 3053 HULL AVE., LLC instituted a Landlord/Tenant proceeding against Plaintiff for non-payment of rent. (See 3053 Hull Avenue LLC v. Monroe, L & T Index 72928/09.) Plaintiff submitted an Answer to the suit wherein she claimed that 3053 HULL AVE., LLC. "owe[d] money because of a rent overcharge" and that "[t]here [were] condition in the apartment which need to be repaired and/or service which [3053 HULL AVE., LLC.] has not provided." (Amend Ans at ¶¶ 8, 10.)

The Landlord/Tenant issue went to trial and Judge Madhavan issued a Decision/Order on October 15, 2010. (See 3053 Hull Avenue LLC v. Monroe, Civ. Ct., Bronx County, Oct. 15, 2010, Madhavan, J., Index no. 72928/09.) The judge found that Ms. Munroe did not prove that she was overcharged rent and that her habitability claims were "without merit."

As to the claimed overcharge: Ms. Munroe agreed with 3053 HULL AVE., LLC.'s calculations of the rent she owed for the time periods at issue. She neither rebutted nor disputed 3053 HULL AVE., LLC.'s account of the rent she actually paid for those periods. (Id. at 3.) When these two numbers were compared, "no overcharge lie[d]." (Id.) This is further supported by the fact that Ms. Munroe paid $3,149.26 in rental arrears and that she "conceded that she [still] owed $680.66 for September 2010." (Id. at 1, 2.)

As to Ms. Munroe's habitability claims: The court based its decision, in part, on HPD records showing that none of Ms. Munroe's complaints regarding lack of heat and hot water ever resulted in a violation being issued to 3053 HULL AVE., LLC., and that there was "no cause" for some of these complaints. (Id. at 3.) The court also found that Ms. Munroe's "fuel records , without significantly more, [do not] support an inference of inadequate heat and/or hot water in [her] Apartment." (Id.)

"A party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted against him on the ground that: the cause of action may not be maintained because of collateral estoppel [or] res judicata; or the pleading fails to state a cause of action." CPLR §§ 3211(a)(5), (a)(7). "The doctrine of collateral estoppel is based on the notion that it is not fair to permit a party to relitigate an issue which has previously been decided against him in a proceeding in which he had a fair opportunity to fully litigate the point." Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 NY2d 285, 291 (citations omitted). And the doctrine of res judicata states that, "once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy." O'Brien v. Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 357. [*3]

The Court finds that Ms. Munroe had a "fair opportunity to fully litigate" her lack of heat and hot water, and rent overcharge allegations during the Landlord/Tenant trial. Thus, she is collaterally estopped from pursuing those claims here. Additionally, the Court finds res judicata bars Ms. Munroe from maintaining her causes of action for harassment and "endangering [her] ability to remain in section 8 program," since those allegations flow from the same "transactions" as her overcharge, and lack of heat and hot water claims, which were concluded—in 3053 HULL AVE. LLC's favor—by the Judge Madhavan's October 15, 2010 Decision/Order.

The Court's decision that Ms. Munroe is collaterally estopped from pursuing her causes of action, and that her allegations are barred by the doctrine of res judicata also applies to 3053 HULL AVE. LLC's managing agent, Defendant PARK AVE SOUTH MANAGEMENT. See Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Lopez, 46 NY2d 481, 486 (stating that "collateral estoppel bars not only parties from a previous action from litigating an issue decided therein, but those in privity with them as well") (citation omitted); see also Compton v. D'Amore, 101 AD2d 800, 801 (stating that "[p]arties in privity include those whose interests are represented by a party to the first proceeding").

The foregoing shall constitute the decision and order of this Court.