| Matter of Murchison v New York State Div. of Parole |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 00073 [91 AD3d 1005] |
| January 5, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| In the Matter of Charles Murchison, Appellant, v New York State Division of Parole, Respondent. |
—[*1]
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Marlene O. Tuczinski of counsel), for
respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McGrath, J.), entered March 18, 2011 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole imposing a time assessment following the revocation of petitioner's parole.
In 1989, petitioner was convicted of multiple crimes and he was sentenced to a lengthy period of incarceration. He was subsequently released to parole supervision, but was charged with violating its terms. At the parole revocation hearing, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge of bringing persons to the parole office without permission inasmuch as he had his girlfriend and her two young children accompany him to an appointment. Respondent, in turn, agreed to recommend a time assessment of 12 months. The Board of Parole, however, declined to adhere to this recommendation and imposed a time assessment equivalent to petitioner's maximum expiration date. Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the time assessment as excessive. Following joinder of issue,[FN*] Supreme Court dismissed the petition and [*2]this appeal ensued.
"The Executive Law does not place an outer limit on the length of [the time] assessment, and the Board's determination may not be modified upon judicial review 'in the absence of impropriety' " (Matter of Bell v Lemons, 78 AD3d 1393, 1393-1394 [2010], quoting People ex rel. Grimmick v McGreevy, 141 AD2d 989, 990 [1988], lv denied 73 NY2d 702 [1988]). Under the circumstances presented here, we cannot conclude that the Board engaged in impropriety. Petitioner's criminal record reveals that he committed brutal sexual assaults against two young women, ages 13 and 17, using force. Moreover, he was prohibited from having contact with persons under 18 years of age as a condition of his parole, but admittedly did so by being in the presence of his girlfriend's two minor children who he brought along with his girlfriend to the parole office without authorization. In view of the foregoing, we do not find that the time assessment was excessive (see Matter of Davis v New York State Bd. of Parole, 81 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2011]).
Peters, J.P., Rose, Malone Jr., McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.