—[*1] Richard A. Stoloff, Monticello, for appellants.

Tuczinski, Cavalier, Gilchrist & Collura, P.C., Albany (Andrew W. Gilchrist of counsel), for respondent.

Stein, J. Appeal from that part of a judgment of the Supreme Court (Gilpatric, J.), entered March 28, 2011 in Sullivan County, which granted petitioner's application, in, among other things, a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review the imposition by respondents of fees associated with the reactivation of petitioner's expired building permits.

Petitioner is the owner of real property located in the Town of Mamakating, Sullivan County on which a number of entities operate commercial businesses. Between 1999 and 2005, petitioner obtained six commercial building permits from respondent Town of Mamakating and its building inspector, respondent Mary Grass, for construction work on the property. All of the permits expired before petitioner obtained certificates of occupancy from the Town,^[FN1] and [*2]petitioner did not seek renewal of the permits prior to their expiration. In March 2008, respondents notified petitioner that the permits had expired, that no request had been made for final inspections as was required in order to obtain certificates of occupancy and that the failure to obtain such certificates would result in a violation being issued. Respondents further advised petitioner that, once the permits expired, petitioner would be required to "re-apply for the permit[s] and pay the full amount." In 2009, respondents sent petitioner an order to remedy with respect to each expired permit and ultimately notified petitioner that, in order to cure the violations, petitioner would be required to renew all the expired permits, for which respondents imposed a total fee of $10,620. Petitioner paid the fee under protest and thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking reimbursement thereof and a declaration that respondents had no legal basis to justify the assessment of the fee based on cost of construction. Supreme Court granted the CPLR article 78 petition and denied the request for declaratory judgment. Respondents now appeal from the judgment insofar as it granted the CPLR article 78 petition.

Initially, we concur with respondents that the instant proceeding was untimely. Town of Mamakating Code § 199-64 (G) provides that "[a]ny applicant who disputes any fee statement presented to him [or her] may bring a proceeding in the Supreme Court . . . pursuant to [CPLR article 78], within 30 days after presentation of such disputed fee statement." We disagree with Supreme Court's determination that the term "fee statement" is inapplicable to a bill for general building department fees, such as those charged by respondents here.^[FN2] Although respondents did not provide a copy of the fee statement presented to petitioner, a reasonable inference may be drawn that such a statement was presented on or before March 17, 2010—the date on which petitioner paid the disputed fees—and petitioner has not denied respondents' assertion of that fact. Inasmuch as this proceeding was not commenced within 30 days of that date, it is time-barred.

In any event, we find the petition to be without merit. In reviewing respondents' determination, we may not substitute our judgment for theirs (see Matter of Eastern Niagara Project Power Alliance v New York State Dept. of Envtl. [*3]Conservation, 42 AD3d 857, 861 [2007]) or interfere with their interpretation of a relevant statute or regulation unless that interpretation is arbitrary and capricious and without a rational basis (see Matter of Peckham v Calogero, 12 NY3d 424, 431 [2009]). The burden is on petitioner to establish that respondents' interpretation of the Town of Mamakating Code was without sound basis in reason or without regard to the facts (see Matter of Finch, Pruyn & Co. v Mills, 297 AD2d 406, 407 [2002]).

Pursuant to the Town of Mamakating Code, every building permit issued by the building inspector in connection with a commercial building expires if the work authorized by the permit has not been completed within two years of the date of issuance; however, upon the expiration of such period, the building inspector has the discretion to renew the permit for an additional two-year period (see Town of Mamakating Code § 199-61 [F] [8]). As relevant here, respondents' fee schedule requires payment of a $200 application fee for an initial permit, plus a fee based on cost of construction.^[FN3] The fee schedule also sets forth separate fees for the renewal of a building permit prior to its expiration and for the reactivation of an expired permit. The former requires a payment of either $100 or $200, while the latter refers to the payment of a $100 application fee and a fee based on cost of construction. It is respondents' imposition of the cost-based fee that petitioner challenges.

Petitioner asserts that Grass should have charged only $100 or $200 for the renewal of their permits. In the alternative, petitioner argues that to reactivate the permits, respondents were authorized to impose either the $100 fee or the fee based on cost of construction, but not both. In our view, Grass' insistence on the payment of both fees to reactivate petitioner's expired building permits was rational given the plain language of the statute. Petitioner's building permits had long expired when it sought to renew and/or reactivate them.^[FN4] Thus, even if Grass had the discretion to merely extend the permits, she did not abuse such discretion in refusing to do so. Nor can we say, viewing the fee schedule as a whole, that respondents' interpretation of the fee schedule as requiring payment of both the $100 fee and the fees based on cost of construction in order to reactivate the building permits was irrational, arbitrary or capricious.

The parties' remaining contentions have been reviewed and are either academic or without merit.

Spain, J.P., Lahtinen, Malone Jr. and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as granted the petition; petition dismissed; and, as so modified, affirmed.