Bluth v Bluth
2012 NY Slip Op 05711 [97 AD3d 772]
July 25, 2012
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, August 22, 2012


Ellen Bluth, Respondent,
v
Harvey Bluth, Appellant.

[*1] Steven Greenfield, West Hampton Dunes, N.Y., for appellant.

Sager and Gellerman, Forest Hills, N.Y. (Audrey M. Sager of counsel), for respondent.

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment dated September 18, 2006, the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Jackman-Brown, J.), dated April 19, 2011, as denied that branch of his motion which was to vacate so much of an order of the same court dated February 28, 2011, as appointed a neutral appraiser to value (a) his enhanced earnings capacity due to his medical license, certifications, and additional professional training and (b) the plaintiff's enhanced earnings capacity due to her teaching degrees and certification.

Ordered that the order dated April 19, 2011, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly appointed a neutral appraiser to value his enhanced earnings capacity due to his medical license, certifications, and additional professional training, since the enhanced earnings capacity due to the license, certifications, and additional training is a marital asset which potentially has a residual economic value independent of the value of his medical practice (see McSparron v McSparron, 87 NY2d 275, 285-286 [1995]). The Supreme Court also properly directed the neutral appraiser to conduct a valuation of the plaintiff's enhanced earnings capacity due to her teaching degrees and certification.

There is no merit to the defendant's contention that the doctrine of law of the case barred the Supreme Court from appointing an appraiser to value his enhanced earning capacity due to his medical license, certifications, and additional professional training (see Light v Light, 64 AD3d 633, 634 [2009]; Kopsidas v Krokos, 18 AD3d 822, 823 [2005]).

The defendant's remaining contention is without merit (see 22 NYCRR 202.18; Pryba v Pryba, 70 AD3d 1109, 1109-1110 [2010]). Angiolillo, J.P., Belen, Chambers and Austin, JJ., concur.