Wolff v Glick
2012 NY Slip Op 07992 [100 AD3d 875]
November 21, 2012
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, December 26, 2012
As corrected through Wednesday, December 26, 2012


Thomas Wolff, Appellant,
v
Julie E. Glick et al., Respondents.

[*1] Carl F. Lodes, Carmel, N.Y., for appellant.

Julie E. Glick and Janine Prete, Patterson, N.Y., respondents pro se (one brief filed).

In an action, inter alia, to impose a constructive trust upon a business, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (Nicolai, J.), dated September 15, 2010, as, upon a decision of the same court dated July 26, 2010, made after a nonjury trial, is in favor of the defendants and against him dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

"In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, the power of this Court is as broad as that of the trial court, and we may render a judgment we find warranted by the facts, bearing in mind that in a close case, the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses" (Rowe v Kingston, 94 AD3d 852, 853 [2012]; see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983]). "In order to obtain the remedy of a constructive trust, a plaintiff generally is required to demonstrate four factors: (1) a fiduciary or confidential relationship between the parties, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer of some asset in reliance upon the promise, and (4) unjust enrichment flowing from the breach of the promise" (Mei Yun Chen v Mei Wan Kao, 97 AD3d 730, 730 [2012]; see Sharp v Kosmalski, 40 NY2d 119, 121 [1976]). Applying these principles, we discern no basis to disturb the Supreme Court's determination. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the plaintiff's cause of action to impose a constructive trust.

The plaintiff's remaining contentions, made in connection with the remaining causes of action, are without merit. Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Chambers, JJ., concur.