Zaman v Shest Hacking Corp.
2012 NY Slip Op 08301 [101 AD3d 707]
December 5, 2012
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, February 6, 2013


Syed Zaman et al., Respondents,
v
Shest Hacking Corp. et al., Appellants.

[*1] Baker, McEvoy, Morrissey & Moskovits, P.C., Brooklyn, N.Y. (Stacy R. Seldin of counsel), for appellants.

Mark E. Weinberger, P.C., Rockville Centre, N.Y. (Marc J. Musman of counsel), for respondents.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schmidt, J.), dated November 2, 2011, as denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff Syed Zaman did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff Syed Zaman (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence to establish, prima facie, that the injured plaintiff did not sustain serious injuries to the cervical or lumbar regions of his spine.

However, in opposition, the plaintiffs submitted evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the injured plaintiff did sustain such serious injuries (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]; Sforza v Big Guy Leasing Corp., 51 AD3d 659, 661 [2008]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Mastro, J.P., Skelos, Chambers and Sgroi, JJ., concur.