Velasquez v Laskar (2012 NY Slip Op 50434(U))

Velasquez v Laskar

2012 NY Slip Op 50434(U) [34 Misc 3d 158(A)]

Decided on March 7, 2012

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Jose A. Velasquez, Respondent, —

against

Bernadit Laskar and SIRAJUL I. LASKAR, Appellants.

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (William A. Viscovich, J.), entered September 28, 2010. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $2,932.

Plaintiff commenced this small claims action to recover the sum of $3,932 for engineering services allegedly rendered to defendants. Following a nonjury trial, the Civil Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $2,932. On appeal, defendants contend, among other things, that they informed plaintiff of their intention to cancel the contract within the first three business days, as provided for in General Business Law § 771.

The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as the trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to evaluate their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, [*2]184 AD2d 564 [1992]). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]).

The provisions of General Business Law § 771 do not apply to the contract for engineering services involved herein. In any event, defendants failed to establish that they notified plaintiff of their intention to cancel the contract in writing within the three-day period provided for in General Business Law § 771. As we find that the judgment provided the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of
substantive law (CCA 1807; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams, 269 AD2d at 126), the judgment is affirmed.