DECISION AND ORDER

EVELYN LAPORTE, J.

The defendant, LEON A. VAN DE CRUZE, is charged with Operating a Motor Vehicle While Impaired (VTL § 1192 [1]); Operating a Motor Vehicle wile Intoxicated (VTL § 1192 [3]); Consumption or Possession of Alcoholic Beverages in Certain Motor Vehicles (VTL § 1227); Reckless Driving (VTL § 1212); Leaving the Scene of an Accident Without Reporting (VTL § 600 [1][a]); Unlawfully Fleeing a Police Vehicle (PL § 270.25); Failure to Have Proof of Financial Security (VTL § 319 [1]); and Criminal Mischief in the Third Degree (PL § 145.00 [3]). He moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument on the ground that the complaint is facially insufficiency and alternatively, on the ground that his right to a speedy trial has been violated under CPL § 30.30 due to the fact that many charges in the complaint still contain hearsay and have not yet been converted pursuant to CPL § 170.30. For that reason, the defendant also moves [*2]to dismiss the complaint for facial insufficiency.

The complaint clearly states that the deponent, Police Officer Diery Louis observed the defendant to be operating a motor vehicle and that when the officer visually examined the defendant, he found him to be exhibiting such classic signs of intoxication as slurred speech, red and watery eyes, odor of alcohol on breath, disheveled appearance and an unsteady gait. That, coupled with the information that he received from Mark Henry that the defendant had just driven his car over a double yellow line, causing a collision is enough to make out a prima facie case as to both of these VTL charges. Prima facie evidence is evidence which, if uncontradicted, is sufficient to establish a fact. Prima facie evidence does not mean conclusive evidence, but rather evidence which creates a rebuttable presumption (see, People v. Gristina, 186 Misc 2d [*4]877, [2001]). Because the instant accusatory instrument contains factual allegations sufficient to establish reasonable cause that defendant violated VTL § 1192 .3, and 1192.1 the People are entitled to an opportunity to rebut the presumption, set forth in section 1195.2 (b), at trial (People v. Blair, 98 NY2d 722, [2002]). Therefore, this branch of the defendant's motion to dismiss for facial insufficiency is denied.

Nowhere in the complaint does it state whether the defendant was carrying insurance on his vehicle. Therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of Failure to Have Financial Security is granted.

VTL § 1227 (1) defines Consumption or Possession of Alcoholic Beverages in Certain Motor Vehicles as follows:

The drinking of alcoholic beverages or the possession of an open [emphasis added] container containing an alcoholic beverage, in a motor vehicle located upon the public highways or right-of-way public highway is prohibited. Any operator or passenger violating this section shall be guilty of a traffic infraction.

Nothing in the complaint states that the bottle of vodka recovered from the defendant's car was open. It is not illegal in New York State to transport vodka in one's vehicle. Therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of Consumption or Possession of Alcoholic Beverages in Certain Motor Vehicles is granted.

Unlawfully Fleeing a Police Vehicle is defined under (PL § 270.25) as follows:

A person is guilty of unlawful fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle in the third degree when, knowing that he or she has been directed to stop his or her motor vehicle by a uniformed police officer or a marked police vehicle by the activation of either the lights or the lights and siren of such vehicle, he or she thereafter attempts to flee such officer or such vehicle by driving at speeds which equal or exceed twenty-five miles per hour above the speed limit or engaging in reckless driving as defined by section twelve hundred twelve of the vehicle and traffic law.

The complaint does not allege that the defendant drove in excess of the speed limit after the police officer turned on his flashing lights, nor does it state that the defendant engaged in any [*5]reckless conduct (as defined and discussed above) after the officer turned on his flashing lights. This court will not presume that the fact that the defendant continued to drive for four block indicates that he engaged in reckless conduct/during that particular time. Therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of Unlawfully Fleeing a Police Vehicle is granted.

VTL § 600 (1)(a) prescribes Leaving the Scene of an Accident Without Reporting as follows:

Any person operating a motor vehicle who, knowing or having cause to know that damage has been caused to the real property or to the personal property, not including animals, of another, due to an incident involving the motor vehicle operated by such person shall, before leaving the place where the damage occurred, stop, exhibit his or her license and insurance identification card for such vehicle, when such card is required pursuant to articles six and eight of this chapter, and give his or her name, residence, including street and number, insurance carrier and insurance identification information including but not limited to the number and effective dates of said individual's insurance policy, and license number to the party sustaining the damage, or in case the person sustaining the damage is not present at the place where the damage occurred then he or she shall report the same as soon as physically able to the nearest police station, or judicial officer.

The complaint states that the defendant was involved in a car accident with one Mark Henry. There is a supporting deposition from Mark Henry attesting to that fact. And, according to the complaint, the defendant admitted to the arresting officer that he had been involved in an accident and had left the scene. The defense argues that the defendant's admission alone can not be used to corroborate any of the charges against him.

However, in People v. Suber, 2012 NY LEXIS 985; 2012 NY Slip Op 3573, the Court of Appeals ruled that the corroboration of a defendant's admission is not a component of the prima facie requirement for an information.

The court held:

First, we have been careful to note that the prima facie showing for an indictment refers to legally sufficient evidence that is competent — i.e., evidence that is not "inadmissible under any circumstances because [it is] subject to a per se exclusionary rule" (People v Swamp, 84 NY2d at 732; see People v Gordon, 88 NY2d at 96; People v Oakley, 28 NY2d 309, 312, 270 N.E.2d 318, 321 N.Y.S.2d 596 [1971]; see generally People v Grant, 17 NY3d 613, 616, 959 N.E.2d 479, 935 N.Y.S.2d 542 [2011]; People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275, 804 N.E.2d 392, 772 N.Y.S.2d 228 [2003]; People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 525-526, 705 N.E.2d 1209, 683 N.Y.S.2d 168 [1998]; People v Hetrick, 80 NY2d 344, 349, 604 N.E.2d 732, 590 N.Y.S.2d 183 [1992]). The prima facie case for an information, in contrast, excludes only a particular type of incompetent evidence — hearsay — without restricting the People from utilizing other types of proof in order to commence a criminal proceeding (see CPL 100.40 [1] [c]).

Second, and more relevant to this appeal, the precise language that the Legislature chose when the Criminal Procedure Law was adopted unmistakably establishes that corroboration was intended to be a component of the prima facie case for an indictment but not an information. Contrary to the specific reference to the corroboration rule in the statutes that pertain to indictments (see CPL 70.10 [1]; 190.65 [1]), the text of the information provision references "[n]on-hearsay allegations . . . establish[ing], if true, every element of the offense and the [*6]defendant's commission thereof" (CPL 100.40 [1] [c]). This statute governing informations does not state, directly or inferentially, that this type of accusatory instrument must corroborate an accused's admission. Since clear and unequivocal statutory language is presumptively entitled to authoritative effect (see e.g. People v Ballman, 15 NY3d 68, 72, 930 N.E.2d 282, 904 N.Y.S.2d 361 [2010]; People v Kisina, 14 NY3d 153, 158, 897 N.Y.S.2d 684 [2010]; People v Garson, 6 NY3d 604, 611, 848 N.E.2d 1264, 815 N.Y.S.2d 887 [2006]), CPL 100.40 (1) does not mandate corroboration of an admission in an information. Hence, the prima facie case requirement for an information "does not rise to the level of legally sufficient evidence that is necessary" to set forth a facially valid indictment or "survive a motion to dismiss based on the proof presented at trial" (People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 230, 906 N.E.2d 381, 878 N.Y.S.2d 653 [2009]).

Therefore, it is clear that a defendant's admission need not be corroborated in order to convert a criminal court complaint into an information. See also, People v. Williams, 2012 NY Misc. LEXIS 2499; 2012 NY Slip Op 50959U, New York County. Hence, this court finds that the charge of Leaving the Scene of an Accident Without Reporting is facially sufficient. The defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of Leaving the Scene of an Accident Without Reporting is denied.

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Dated: June 18, 2012EVELYN J. LAPORTE

Brooklyn, New YorkJudge of the Criminal Court