The following papers numbered 1 to 5 read on this motion by the plaintiff for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.Papers Numbered

Order to Show Cause - Affidavits - Exhibits................................................................. 1-2

Answering Affidavits - Exhibits.................................................................................... 3-5

The plaintiff commenced this action for a declaratory judgment that it owes no first party benefits which might accrue or be assigned to defendant under the no-fault law, Article 51 of the Insurance Law, based upon allegations that the defendant has engaged in a large-scale illegal scheme involving staged accidents and fraudulent billing practices.

At this juncture, the plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the further prosecution of any suits, arbitrations, or other proceedings by the defendant against the plaintiff for causes of action or claims arising under Article 51 of the Insurance Law pending the outcome of this action. The branch of the motion for a temporary restraining order was previously granted pending the determination of the request [*2]for preliminary injunctive relief.

"The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until a decision is reached on the merits" (Icy Splash Food & Beverage, Inc. v Henckel, 14 AD3d 595, 596 [2nd Dept. 2005]). The decision of whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction, moreover, lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (Arcamone-Makinano v Britton Prop., Inc., 83 AD3d 623, 625 [2nd Dept. 2011]). In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury in the absence of a preliminary injunction, and (3) a balancing of the equities in the movant's favor (CPLR 6301; Nobu Next Door, LLC v. Fine Arts Hous., Inc., 4 NY3d 839, 840 [2005]; Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v. Marchese, 96 AD3d 791 [2nd Dept. 2012]; Dover Gourmet Corp. v. Nassau Health Care Corp., 89 AD3d 979 [2nd Dept. 2011]).

In the present action, the Court finds that, while the allegations of fraudulent and potentially criminal conduct asserted in the verified complaint are quite disturbing, the plaintiff fails to meet its burden on this motion because it has not submitted any evidence to support its claims. The plaintiff's complaint was verified by a no-fault claims representative for its third-party administrator for claims, who is not a person with knowledge of the factual allegations asserted in the complaint, and no supporting affidavit from someone with personal knowledge of the evidentiary facts has been submitted (see, Juseinoski v Board of Educ. of City of NY, 15 AD3d 353 [2nd Dept. 2005], on remand, 2005 WL 5643779, 2005 NY Slip Op. 30079(U) [Sup Ct Queens County 2005]). The plaintiff thus has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.

Although this Court previously granted a preliminary injunction in Autoone Ins. Co., v Manhattan Heights Medical, P.C. , (24 Misc 3d 1229(A), 2009 WL 2357009, 2009 NY Slip Op. 51663 (U) [Sup Ct Queens County 2009] [decision by the undersigned]), a matter involving similar allegations to those asserted herein, there is a clear distinction between that case and the one at hand. There, the movant submitted sufficient proof of entitlement to a preliminary injunction through the submission of its verified complaint, an affidavit from an investigator for the plaintiff insurance company, and deposition and examination transcripts which demonstrated, prima facie, a likelihood of success on the merits by proving the veracity of its allegations. In that case, the movant also met the other requirements for establishing that a preliminary injunction should be issued.

In stark contrast, in the case at bar, the only submission offered by the plaintiff on this motion, is the plaintiff's verified complaint, containing a mere laundry list of bald allegations that are not accompanied or supported by any evidentiary proof. The plaintiff, thus, has fallen far short of meeting its burden on this motion (cf., People by Abrams v. Apple Health [*3]and Sports Club, Ltd. Inc., 174 AD2d 438 [1st Dept. 1991] [injunction would issue to prevent health club operators' illegal conduct, even without proof of irreparable injury], aff'd, 80 NY2d 803 [1992] [evidence that alleged owner was eventual sole director of health club, had actual knowledge of health club's fraudulent activities, and participated in health club's illegal business dealings created substantial likelihood that grounds for holding alleged owner liable would be established]).

Accordingly, the motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.

The temporary restraining order previously imposed is discontinued.

The foregoing constitutes the decision, order, and opinion of the Court.

______________________________Hon. Charles J. MarkeyJustice, Supreme Court, Queens County

Dated: Long Island City, New York

July 26, 2012