| Facie Libre Assoc. I, LLC v SecondMarket Holdings, Inc. |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 51545(U) [36 Misc 3d 1229(A)] |
| Decided on August 10, 2012 |
| Supreme Court, New York County |
| Kornreich, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Facie Libre Associates
I, LLC and FACIE LIBRE ASSOCIATES II, LLC, Plaintiffs,
against SecondMarket Holdings, Inc., Defendant. |
This case involves a pre-IPO sale of Facebook stock to plaintiffs, Facie
Libre Associates I, LLC and Facie Libre Associates II, LLC (collectively, Facie Libre). Facie
Libre is suing defendant SecondMarket Holdings, Inc. (SecondMarket) for breach of contract as a
third-party beneficiary, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, intentional misrepresentation,
malpractice, and unjust enrichment. SecondMarket moves to dismiss Facie Libre's claims under
CPLR 3211(a)(1) (documentary evidence), (5) (statute of limitations), (7) (failure to state a
claim) and CPLR 3016(b) (failure to state misrepresentation with particularity). SecondMarket's
motion is granted in part and denied in part for the reasons that follow.
Background
On this motion to dismiss, the facts are taken from the complaint.
In 2009, the Facie Libre entities were organized as Delaware Limited Liability Companies to purchase Facebook shares for investment purposes and to hold the shares until Facebook became a public company. Compl. ¶ 12. On January 25, 2010, Karl Voskuil, a non-party and former Facebook employee, notified Facebook that he intended to sell a percentage of his Facebook shares. ¶ 16. That same day, Facie Libre entered into a Stock Transfer Agreement (STA) with Voskuil to purchase 75,000 shares of Facebook Class B Common Stock at $33 per share for a total purchase price of $2,475,000. ¶ 20. Under the STA, Voskuil was obligated to deliver a counsel's legal opinion (the Legal Opinion) to Facebook to verify that registration is not required under the Securities Act of 1933. ¶ 22.
SecondMarket created and operates an online marketplace website where privately-held
companies' securities are bought and sold. ¶ 7. Voskuil and SecondMarket entered in a
contract (the Intermediary Services Agreement or ISA) whereby SecondMarket would "design,
implement and facilitate the entire transaction, for a fee of $75,000." ¶ 27. Facie Libre
alleges that "the various responsibilities SecondMarket undertook pursuant to its agreement with
Voskuil included designing, implementing and facilitating the entire transaction, obtaining a
Legal Opinion on behalf of Voskuil and delivering it to Facebook, obtaining Facebook's [*2]signatures to authorize the transaction, ensuring that Facebook and
Voskuil complied with all the requisite conditions of closing, and collecting, organizing and
delivering the signatures of all parties on all the transaction documents." ¶ 29. If the parties
failed to execute and deliver all documents and wire transfer the purchase price by the March 26,
2010 deadline, the deal would not close, because Facebook requires parties to consummate the
deal within 60 days after the seller gives notice of sale. ¶ ¶ 26, 27, 30.
According to Facie Libre, SecondMarket was involved in approximately 20 previous
transactions where Facie Libre purchased Facebook shares. ¶ 13. On each of these
occasions, SecondMarket "facilitated the entire transaction," including delivery of the Legal
Opinion. ¶ 14. Facie Libre claims that in this case, SecondMarket once again undertook to
deliver the Legal Opinion. ¶ 29.
On March 5, 2010, SecondMarket's in-house counsel informed Facie Libre and their counsel
that Facebook had authorized the transaction and that she was holding Facebook's signatures in
escrow until Facie Libre paid the purchase price. ¶ 33. SecondMarket instructed Facie Libre
to wire the purchase price to Voskuil the following Monday, March 8, 2010, at which time
SecondMarket would release the signatures. ¶ ¶ 33-35. Facie Libre alleges that they
relied on SecondMarket's representation that all conditions of closing were satisfied, and
instructed their bank to wire the purchase price to Voskuil. ¶ 37.
On March 17, 2010, Facie Libre wired $618,750 to Voskuil, and on March 22, 2010,
Facie Libre wired $1,289,062.50 to Voskuil. ¶ ¶ 38, 39. On March 24, 2010,
SecondMarket reminded Facie Libre and their counsel that they must pay Voskuil the balance of
the purchase price by close of business, Friday, March 26, 2010. ¶ 40. On March 26, 2010,
Facie Libre sent the final wire of $567,187.50 to Voskuil. ¶ 41. Voskuil acknowledged that
he received the purchase price and SecondMarket's in-house counsel congratulated Facie Libre
on closing and purchasing Voskuil's Facebook shares. ¶ 42.
In fact, SecondMarket had not obtained approval from Facebook's counsel because
they did not deliver the Legal Opinion until March 27, 2010, a day after the deadline. ¶
¶ 35, 47. As a result, Facebook refused to consent or acknowledge the closing of the
Voskuil deal.¶ 49.
Facie Libre allege that after March 26, 2010, SecondMarket stone-walled them when they
sought to obtain copies of all the closing documents for evidence that the transaction closed.
¶ 46. Three months after the deal supposedly closed, SecondMarket told Facie Libre that
Facebook refused to approve the stock transfer because it had not received the Legal Opinion
within 60 days as required by company policy. ¶ 53. More than a year after March 26,
2010, Voskuil returned $2,400,000 to Facie Libre (the purchase price minus the fee that Voskuil
paid to SecondMarket). ¶ 58.
Legal Standard
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must "accept the
facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable
inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory."
Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481, 484 (1980); Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40
NY2d 633, 634 (1976); Skillgames,
L.L.C. v Brody, 1 AD3d 247, 250 (1st Dept 2003). CPLR 3026 mandates that
"[p]leadings shall be liberally construed." Skillgames, 1 AD3d at 250."Defects shall be
ignored if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced." Rovello, 40 NY2d at 636.
"However, factual allegations that do not state a viable cause of action, that consist of bare legal
[*3]conclusions, or that are inherently incredible or clearly
contradicted by documentary evidence are not entitled to such consideration."
Skillgames, 1 AD3dat 250. "[T]he criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has
a cause of action, not whether he has stated one." Rovello, 40 NY2d at 636. "The test is
whether the pleadings give adequate notice to the court and the adverse party of the transactions
or occurrences intended to be proved." Stern v Consumer Equities Associates, 160
AD2d 993, 994 (2d Dept 1990).
In assessing a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(1) (documentary evidence), a court may freely consider affidavits submitted by the plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint. Rovello, 40 NY2d at 635-36. When the defendant submits affidavits or other documentary evidence, dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(1) is warranted only if the documentary evidence conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law. Id.
Finally, where a defendant moves to dismiss on statute of limitation grounds, the defendant
bears the initial burden of proving the action is time-barred. Chung v Wang, 79 AD3d 693, 694 (2nd Dept 2010).
Discussion
A.The User Agreement (Statute of Limitations & Limitation of Liability Clause)
SecondMarket requires that parties consent to the terms of a User Agreement
prior to using its website and argues that the terms of the User Agreement preclude the claims in
this case. Specifically, it conternds: (1) the User Agreement sets a one year time limit to bringing
a claim and this action was brought more than a year after March 26, 2010; and (2) the User
Agreement limitations on SecondMarket's liability bars liability on the claims in this case.
The Court rejects both arguments. The User Agreement does not govern the claims in this
case. Facie Libre's claims relate to SecondMarket's alleged failure to timely deliver the Legal
Opinion and Second Market's alleged misrepresentations about whether the deal closed. As
discussed infra, the obligation to deliver the Legal Opinion is governed by the STA, not
the User Agreement. The User Agreement merely governs the use of SecondMarket's website.
Any limitations of liability contained therein relate solely to disputes relating to the website, not
the underlying stock transaction.
B.Breach of Contract-Third Party Beneficiary
"One who seeks to recover as a third-party beneficiary of a contract must
establish that a valid and binding contract exists between other parties, that the contract was
intended for his or her benefit, and that the benefit was direct rather than incidental." Edge Mgmt Consulting, Inc. v Blank,
25 AD3d 364, 368 (1st Dept 2006) (citingState of California Employee's Retirement
System v Shearman & Sterling,95NY2d 427, 435 (2000)).
Facie Libre's third-party beneficiary claim against SecondMarket is dismissed
because the documentary evidence clearly establishes that the contract under which
SecondMarket asserts its claim (the ISA) was not breached. The ISA does not require
SecondMarket to obtain a Legal Opinion and deliver it to Facebook by March 26, 2010. The ISA
only states that Voskuil agrees to pay SecondMarket a fee of $75,000 and that such fee may be
reduced for expenses related to, inter alia, the Legal Opinion. ISA, ¶ 1.1, 1.2.
Nothing in the ISA suggests that SecondMarket had a duty to deliver the Legal Opinion, a duty
that was Voskuil's under the STA. Consequently, Facie Libre's third-party beneficiary claim fails
and is dismissed because the ISA was not breached.
C.Negligence
[*4]
"To sustain a negligence claim a plaintiff must
prove that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, the duty was breached, and the breach was
the proximate cause of the resulting injury." Friedman v Anderson, 23 AD3d 163, 164 (1st Dept 2005). "It is a
well established principle that a simple breach of contract should not be considered a tort unless a
legal duty independent of the contract has been violated." Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v Long
Island R.R. Co., 70 NY2d 382, 389 (1987); see Sergeants Benev. Ass'n Annuity Fund v Renck, 19 AD3d 107,
111 (1st Dept 2005) (claim arising from alleged breach of contract may not be converted into tort
claim absent violation of legal duty independent of that created by contract.).
Facie Libre claims that SecondMarket undertook to deliver the Legal Opinion and
was negligent in this undertaking by failing to deliver it by March 26, 2010. SecondMarket
contends that this is really an allegation of breach of the STA, not negligence. There is no
question that under the STA, the duty to deliver the Legal Opinion was Voskuil's and Voskuil's
alone. Nonetheless, Facie Libre claims that it reasonably relied on SecondMarket to deliver the
Legal Opinion based on the parties' prior dealings in which SecondMarket had performed similar
services for Facie Libre on at least 20 prior occasions. See Compl. ¶ 13. On all of
those occasions, SecondMarket always "obtained and delivered the requisite legal opinions on
behalf of sellers." ¶ 14. In fact, SecondMarket did deliver the Legal Opinion on March 27,
2010, however, such delivery was too late for the deal to close.
Even assuming that SecondMarket had a duty to deliver the Legal Opinion, such
duty was to Voskuil, not Facie Libre, because SecondMarket allegedly contracted with Voskuil
to perform services related to the STA. Nevertheless, none of the agreements in this case (the
STA, ISA, and the User Agreement) impose any duty on SecondMarket to deliver the Legal
Opinion. The negligence claim asserted by Facie Libre seeks to rewrite the STA to transfer
Voskuil's obligation to SecondMarket, who is not a party to the STA. If the parties to the STA
wanted to obligate SecondMarket, they could have indicated so in the STA. Facie Libre cannot
use a negligence claim to alter the obligations of the parties that are clearly governed by contract.
Moreover, even if SecondMarket assumed Voskuil's duty to deliver the Legal Opinion, the
proper cause of action would be a breach of the STA, not negligence, because the duty arises
under a contract (which makes a negligence claim improperly duplicative). See Renck,
19 AD3d at 111. Therefore, the negligence claim is dismissed.
D.Breach of Fiduciary Duty
This claim is dismissed because SecondMarket did not have a fiduciary duty to
Facie Libre. A fiduciary duty is a relationship of higher trust that arises out of an obligation to act
for or give advice to another upon matters within the scope of the relation. EBCI, Inc. v Goldman Sachs, 5 NY3d 11,
31 (2005). A fiduciary relationship is fact specific and grounded in a higher level of trust than
normally is present in the marketplace in an arms-length business transaction. Id.; RNK Capital LLC v Natsource, 76
AD3d 840 (1st Dept 2010). Where the parties have entered into a contract, courts look to the
agreement to find the nexus of the parties relationship and should not ordinarily transport the
parties to the realm of higher duty. ECBI, supra.
Facie Libre claims that they subscribed to SecondMarket's website and relied on
their expertise in connection with the transaction. Facie Libre argues that SecondMarket
breached its fiduciary responsibility by failing to deliver the Legal Opinion on time. However,
Facie Libre's reliance on SecondMarket's expertise does not demonstrate that SecondMarket had
a fiduciary duty to it. "Plaintiff's alleged reliance on defendant's superior knowledge and
expertise . . . [*5]ignores the reality that the parties engaged in
arm's-length transactions pursuant to contracts between sophisticated business entities that do not
give rise to fiduciary duties." Sebastian
Holding, Inc. v Deutsche Bank AG., 78 AD3d 446, 447 (1st Dept 2010). Given that the
parties engaged in an arm's-length transaction governed by contracts, Facie Libre's alleged
reliance on SecondMarket's superior knowledge does not establish a fiduciary relationship.
E.Intentional Misrepresentation
Pursuant to CPLR 3016(b), "[w]here a cause of action or defense is based upon misrepresentation . . . the circumstances constituting the wrong must be stated in detail." Pace v Raisman & Associates, Esqs., LLP, 95 AD3d 1185, 1188-89 (2d Dept 2012). The plaintiff must establish that there was a material misrepresentation, falsity, scienter, reliance, and injury. See Standis-Parkin v Lorillard Tobacco Co.,12 AD3d 301, 303 (1st Dept 2004).
Facie Libre properly pled the elements of intentional misrepresentation in sufficient detail.
Facie Libre claims that SecondMarket told them that the deal had closed on March 26, 2010.
Such a statement is clearly false. Facie Libre claims that SecondMarket knew that such statement
was false and lied to cover-up the fact that the deal did not close. Facie Libre contends that their
reliance on such statement was reasonable because SecondMarket was in the best position to
know if the deal had closed. Finally, Facie Libre has pled an injury that was proximately caused
by such statement because they allege that if SecondMarket would have been truthful about the
fact that the deal had not yet closed: (1) Facie Libre would have been able to remedy the
outstanding obligation (by procuring and delivering the Legal Opinion before the deadline) so
that the deal would have closed; (2) Facie Libre would have received the Facebook stock; and (3)
Facie Libre would have realized the benefit of such stock appreciating in value since the closing.
In sum, Facie Libre's intentional misrepresentation claim has been properly pled and is not
dismissed.
F.Professional Malpractice
Facie Libre withdrew their professional malpractice claim at oral argument.
G.Unjust Enrichment
"To state a cause of action for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must allege that it
conferred a benefit upon the defendant, and that the defendant will obtain such benefit without
adequately compensating plaintiff." Nakamura v Fujii, 253 AD2d 387, 390 (1st Dept
1998).
Facie Libre's unjust enrichment claim is dismissed because it did not confer a benefit on
SecondMarket without being adequately compensated. The benefit allegedly conferred upon
SecondMarket was the $75,000 fee payable under the ISA. However, such fee was paid by
Voskuil, not Facie Libre. SecondMarket has no unjust enrichment claim related to this money
and the claim is therefore dismissed. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion by defendant SecondMarket Holdings, Inc. against
plaintiffs Facie Libre Associates I, LLC and Facie Libre Associates II, LLC is granted on the
causes of action for breach of contract against a third-party beneficiary, breach of fiduciary duty,
negligence, and unjust enrichment, which are hereby dismissed, and denied on the cause of
action for intentional misrepresentation; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties are to appear in Part 54, Supreme Court, New York County, 60
Centre St., rm. 228, New York, NY, for a preliminary conference on August 23, 2012, at 9:30
am.
[*6]
Dated: August 10, 2012ENTER:
__________________________
J.S.C.