People v Fuentes
2013 NY Slip Op 03509 [106 AD3d 1279]
May 16, 2013
Appellate Division, Third Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, June 26, 2013


The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Olvin Omar Fuentes, Appellant.

[*1] Gail B. Rubenfeld, Monticello, for appellant.

James R. Farrell, District Attorney, Monticello (Bonnie M. Mitzner of counsel), for respondent.

Garry, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Sullivan County (LaBuda, J.), rendered November 23, 2010, which resentenced defendant following his conviction of the crimes of assault in the first degree and assault in the second degree (two counts).

In 2001, defendant was convicted following a jury trial of the crimes of assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree (two counts), reckless endangerment in the first degree, endangering the welfare of a child and criminal possession of a weapon and thereafter sentenced to concurrent prison terms aggregating 25 years. Subsequently, the People moved for resentencing due to County Court's failure to include a mandatory term of postrelease supervision in connection with the determinate prison terms imposed upon defendant's convictions of assault in the first degree and assault in the second degree (two counts). Following several hearings, the court resentenced defendant to the original prison terms followed by terms of postrelease supervision of five years in connection with the assault in the first degree sentence and three years in connection with the assault in the second degree sentences. Defendant appeals.

The sentencing statute in effect at the time of defendant's conviction authorized the sentencing court to impose a period of postrelease supervision of between 2½ and 5 years upon defendant's determinate sentence for the class B violent felony offense of assault in the first degree, and a period of postrelease supervision of between 1½ and 3 years upon defendant's [*2]determinate sentence for the class D violent felony offense of assault in the second degree (see Penal Law § 70.45 [former (2)]). As the record reveals that County Court was not aware of its ability to exercise its discretion to impose such lesser periods of postrelease supervision, we reverse and remit for a new resentencing (see People v Whitmore, 103 AD3d 928, 929 [2013]; People v Henry, 78 AD3d 861, 862 [2010]).

Peters, P.J., Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, resentence vacated, and matter remitted to the County Court of Sullivan County for resentencing.