| Malul v Azulay |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 50022(U) [38 Misc 3d 1208(A)] |
| Decided on January 4, 2013 |
| Supreme Court, Queens County |
| McDonald, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Charles Malul,
Plaintiff,
against Maimon Ziv Azulay, ZIV COMPLEX, INC., and MATANAH M.H., LLC, Defendants. |
The following papers numbered 1 to 27 were read on this motion by defendant, MATANAH M.H., LLC, for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212 granting summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff's complaint and vacating the lis pendens on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action against said defendant; and the amended cross-motion of plaintiff, SHALOM MALUL, for an order pursuant to CPLR 2215 and 3025 granting plaintiff leave to amend the complaint:
Papers Numbered
MATANAH Notice of Motion-Affidavits-Exhibits.............1 - 6
Plaintiff's Notice of Cross-Motion-Exhibits..............7 - 11
Plaintiff's Affirmation in Opposition...................12 - 16
AZULAY Affirmation in Opposition to Cross-Motion....... 17 - 19
AZULAY Affirmation in Support of Co-Defendant's Motion..20 - 23
MATANAH Reply Affirmation...............................24 - 27
_____________________________________________________________
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In this action for a constructive trust, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary
duty, and fraud, related to the sale of [*2]certain
properties in Rosedale, Queens, defendant Matanah M.H. LLC, moves for an order
granting summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint against it on the ground
that the complaint fails to state a cause of action against defendant Matanah.
According to the plaintiff's complaint, dated March 2, 2010, in the Fall of
2006, plaintiff Malul and defendant Azulay established a limited liability company
known as Ziv Complex LLC (ZCL), for the purpose of acquiring and developing vacant
land located on Hook Creek Boulevard in Rosedale, Queens. Pursuant to the agreement,
each party owned 50% of the LLC and the partners agreed to equally share the profits or
losses of the venture. On December 26, 2006, ZCL borrowed two million dollars from
Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc. and purchased land which eventually was subdivided into 16
separate parcels, each improved with a two-family house. Plaintiff asserts that in addition
to lending his credit to obtain the loan from Rosenthal & Rosenthal he made substantial
investments of approximately $900,000 from his own funds which was used for the
development and improvement of the Hook Creek properties.
Subsequently, two of the houses were sold to third parties with the net
proceeds divided equally between plaintiff and Azulay. However, plaintiff contends that
on August 28, 2008, defendant Azulay deeded four properties to himself from ZCL for
no consideration and refused to share the rental income being collected from the tenants
of each property. Plaintiff also asserts that Azulay refinanced the mortgages on the four
properties netting over $100,000 which he has also not shared with the plaintiff. Plaintiff
further asserts that on December 18, 2009, Azulay and ZCL, without plaintiff's
knowledge or consent, negotiated a purchase and assignment of the mortgages against
the remaining ten properties to defendant Matanah. Plaintiff asserts that Matanah is
aFiduciaryn entity controlled by Azulay and in which Azulay has a substantial interest.
Plaintiff alleges that on December 22, 2009, Azulay, without plaintiff's knowledge or
consent, caused ZCL to convey the ten houses to Matanah yielding net proceeds to ZCL
of at least $500,000. Plaintiff alleges that Azulay has refused to share rental income from
those properties and has refused to share any profits or consideration in connection with
the sale of the properties to Matanah.
Plaintiff asserts that Azulay and ZCL breached their promise to plaintiff to
share the profits of the partnership and as a result, defendants Matanah, Azulay and ZCL
have breached their fiduciary duty and have been unjustly enriched. In addition, plaintiff
alleges that Matanah aided, abetted and conspired with [*3]Azulay and ZCL to violate their fiduciary duties by
purchasing the ten houses knowing that the acquisition of the properties was part of a
scheme by Azulay and ZCL to divert and misappropriate plaintiff's partnership
opportunities. The complaint also states that on information and belief Matanah is
Azulay's alter ego. Plaintiff alleges that Matanah's acquisition of the properties was
fraudulent and was promulgated to deprive plaintiff of his profit from the sale of the
properties and as a result plaintiff seeks a constructive trust and a judgment against
Matanah invalidating the deeds.
Plaintiff commenced the instant action by filing a summons and complaint
and lis pendens on fourteen properties on March 3, 2010. Matanah served its answer on
April 30, 2010, denying the allegations in the complaint but admitting that Matanah did
purchase both the mortgage and the ten properties for good and valuable consideration.
The answer contains an affirmative defense stating that Matanah was a bona fide
purchaser for value and as a result the complaint fails to state a cause of action against it.
Plaintiff filed a note of issue on March 14, 2012. The case is on the calendar in the trial
scheduling part on February 5, 2012.
Matanah now moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the
ground that no valid cause of action has been pled against Matanah. In support of its
motion, defendant submits an affidavit from Michael Goldman, managing member of
Matanah, dated June 19, 2012, stating that the transaction in which Matanah purchased
the properties "was an arms length, bona fide transaction for which full consideration
was tendered, wholly independently from either co-defendant." Goldman states that
plaintiff has presented no factual support for its conclusion that Matanah is partly owned
and/or controlled by Azulay and ZCL. He states that Matanah is controlled by the
Koralashvili family and that there is no connection between that family and the
co-defendants. Goldman states that ZCL was unable to sell the remaining ten properties
and that Rosenthal & Rosenthal was going to foreclose on its loan unless the mortgages
were satisfied for three million dollars. Matanah negotiated an agreement with Azulay to
satisfy the mortgages and to pay ZCL an additional sum of $500,000 in consideration for
which Matanah would receive deeds to the ten houses. At the closing on December 22,
2009 the mortgages were satisfied by payment from Matanah directly to Rosenthal &
Rosenthal. In addition, Matanah paid the sum of $500,000 to various entities for the
benefit of the seller. Goldman annexes copies of the checks and a closing statement and
states that Matanah is a third-party who purchased the property for three and a half
million dollars in a bona fide [*4]transaction and that it is
not involved in the partnership dispute between Azulay and Malul. Thus, Goldman
alleges that there is no factual basis for the claims against Matanah contained in the
complaint and as such the causes of action for a constructive trust, unjust enrichment,
breach of fiduciary duty and fraud should be dismissed on the basis that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action.
Specifically, Matanah asserts that the causes of action for unjust enrichment
and breach of fiduciary duty do not set forth any factual allegations against Matanah.
Counsel asserts that the plaintiff's claims for damages arise soley from his business
relationship with Azulay and that Matanah never transacted any business with the
plaintff. Further, counsel claims that there is no fiduciary relationship between Matanah
and the plaintiff and that the claim for unjust enrichment is related to the alleged failure
of Azulay to divide the partnership profits with Malul. Counsel asserts that the cause of
action for a constructive trust has no relation to Matanah as it also arises out of the
partnership between Azulay and Malul. Counsel also claims that there should be no
constructive trust asserted against the ten properties as Matanah acquired title for
valuable consideration and that the only claim in the complaint regarding Matanah is that
Matanah is an entity controlled Azulay. Counsel contends that the plaintiff's dispute has
no basis in the real estate but rather he is seeking the proceeds from the sale. Therefore,
counsel states that the plaintiff's recourse, if any, lies in recouping his share of the funds
from the purchase of the properties from Azulay and there is no basis for a cause of
action for a constructive trust against the properties.
With respect to the cause of action for fraud and misconduct, Matanah
alleges that the allegations of a conspiracy between Matanah and Azulay are wholly
unsubstantiated and based only upon information and belief. Counsel asserts that he has
submitted documentation verifying the genuineness of the subject transaction, the wholly
independent source of the funds utilized, and the lack of connection between Matanah
and Azulay. Counsel also submits a document dated September 9, 2008, signed by
Malul, in which he claims that Malul waived any claim to the sale of the ten houses by
Ziv Complex to Matanah. The document signed by Malul states as follows:
"To Whom It May Concern: I, Shalom Malul, hereby state that I have no
claim and/or ownership over Ziv Complex LLC or its entities. Maimon Ziv Azulay has
100% sole ownership and is the responsible party for thus stated LLC."
[*5]
Counsel states that this document was
presented to Matanah at the closing and substantiates Azulay's claim that Azulay and
ZCL were legally entitled to transfer title free and clear and without the need to obtain
the plaintiff's consent.
Counsel for Azulay, Robert P. Johnson, Esq., submits an affirmation in
support of Matanah's motion for summary judgment stating that the cause of action for
breach of fiduciary relationship must be dismissed as the plaintiff has not established a
fiduciary relationship between Malul and Matanah. Counsel asserts in this regard that
Matanah never transacted any business with Malul. Counsel also aserts that the plaintiff
does not have standing to maintain the action in his individual capacity as he is a member
of an LLC (citing Baron v
Rocketboom, LLC, 57 AD3d 269 [1st Dept. 2008]). Counsel claims that the
suit, by a member of the limited liability corporation against the third party may only be
brought in a derivative capacity. Lastly, counsel claims that pursuant to the signed
statement set forth above, plaintiff surrendered his interest in ZCL in September 2008
(citing Katz v Katz, 55
AD3d 680 [2d Dept. 2009]), and therefore has no standing to seek damages from the
sale of the property belonging to ZCL. Defendant contends that as Malul has no interest
or valid claim against the properties, he also has no standing to file a lis pendens (citing
Yonaty v Glauber, 40
AD3d 1193 [3d Dept. 2007]).
In opposition, Shalom Malul submits an affidavit dated July 18, 2012,
stating that he and Azulay owned ZCL in equal shares. He states that in 2006 they
obtained acquisition and construction financing through Rosenthal and Rosenthal to
purchase and develop vacant land on Hook Creek Boulevard. He states that in addition to
the mortgage he gave personal guarantees on the and invested $900,00 consisting of
funds, materials, labor, and sevices toward the developmentof the 16 house tract. Malul
states that on September 10, 2009, Rosenthal & Rosenthal commenced a foreclosure
action against the remaining ten homes as well as foreclosing on its mortgages on other
parcels in Laurelton and Flushing Queens owned by other corporations formed by
Azulay and Malul. Malul states that prior to the sale to Matanah he and Azulay reached a
deal with Fairway Capital Partners in which Fairway would satisfy the Rosenthal &
Rosenthal mortgages for three million dollars. However, Malul states that subsequently
Matanah made a private deal with Azulay to purchase the mortgage and the deeds to the
ten houses without Malul's knowledge or consent. Plaintifff claims that the workout plan
with Fairway was aborted without his knowledge and a secret private deal was abruptly
reached between Azulay and Matanah only a short time before the closing. Plaintiff
claims that at the time of the [*6]closing Matanah was
aware of the fraud perpetrated on Malul as Goldman was aware of the ZCL operating
agreement identifying Malul as a 50 per cent owner of ZCL. Malul also disputes the
validity of the purported waiver stating that he signed it under threats of physical assault
by Azulay. In addition, Malul claims that Matanah knew the waiver was invalid because
he and Azulay signed certain promissory notes in September 2009 and in January and
February 2010, subsequent to the date of the purported waiver, and prior to the closing,
in which Malul signed as a managing member of Ziv Complex. Malul contends,
therefore, that Matanah's clandestine purchase of the ZCL properties was part of a
scheme to fraudulently transfer partnership property so as to defeat, hinder, and delay the
plaintiff's rights to the Hook Creek properties and his share of the proceeds.
Plaintiff also cross-moves to amend the complaint to discontinue its cause of
action against defendant Ziv Complex LLC and to add Ziv Complex LLC as a plaintiff.
Plaintiff also seeks to assert new causes of action for a judgment declaring the transfers
to Matanah and Azulay void ab initio, for breach of contract, for tortious interference
with contract, for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, for aiding
and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, for fraudulent conveyance pursuant to Debtor
Creditor Law § 276, and to quiet title under RPAPL Art 15.
In addition, in opposition to the moton to dismiss, Malul asserts that the
causes of action for fraud, constructive trust, breach of fiduciary duty and unjust
enrichment are sufficiently supported by the documents submitted showing that Azulay
and the Matanah principals were neighbors and friends, and that there was a hurried
consummation of the subject transactions both of which create inferences that the
transactions were not arms length. Mall contends that the pleadings are sufficient and
raise questions of fact as to whether Matanah received the properties with actual
knowledge that Malul was a member of Ziv Complex and whether the transfer was
fraudulent as it was made with the intent to defeat plaintiff's right to proceeds of the
transaction. With respect to the cause of action for fraud plaintiff alleges that he has
submitted sufficient evidence to rase a question of fact as to whether Matanah was aware
of Malul's partnership in Ziv complex at the time of the property transfers and whether
the so called waiver was valid in view of Malul's continued role with Ziv subsequent to
his signing the purported waiver. With respect to unjust enrichment and breach of
fiduciary duty counsel, citing Klein v Gutman, 12 AD3d 348 [2d Dept. 2004], contends
that the Second Department has held that third parties who participate with a fiduciary in
breach of trust [*7]may be liable despite the absence of a
fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and the third party. In Klein, supra.
the Court stated that "one who participates with a fiduciary in a breach of trust is liable
for the full amount of damages to the injured party." Thus, counsel states that there are
questions of fact as to whether the transaction was at arms length, whether Matanah
acquired the properties with actual knowledge Azulay lacked authority to convey the
realty without Malul's consent, whether Matanah acquired the properties with the intent
to defraud Malul.
With respect to standing, plaintiff asserts that Matanah waived the issue of
standing as it was not asserted as an affirmative defense in its answer nor was it the
subject of a pre-answer motion to dismiss (citing Citibank, N.A. v Swiatkowski, 98 AD3d 554[2d Dept.
2012]).
Upon review and consideration of the defendant's motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's complaint, plaintiff's affirmation in opposition and cross-motion and
defendant's reply thereto, this court finds as follows:
It is well settled that in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action the pleadings must be liberally construed. The sole criterion is whether
from the four corners of the complaint factual allegations are discerned which taken
together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law (see Leon v Martinez, 84
NY2d 83 [1994]; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268 [1977]; Lupski v County of Nassau, 32
AD3d 997 [2d Dept. 2006]; Rochdale Vil. v Zimmerman, 2 AD3d 827 [2d Dept. 2003];
Bovino v Village of Wappingers Falls, 215 AD2d 619 [1995]). The facts pleaded
are to be presumed to be true and are to be accorded every favorable inference, although
bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by the record are not
entitled to any such consideration (see Morone v. Morone, 50 NY2d 481 [1980];
Gertler v Goodgold, 107 AD2d 481 [1985], affirmed 66 NY2d 946
[1985]). Where evidence is submitted by the movant in support of the CPLR 3211 (a)(7)
motion, the court must determine whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of
action, not whether he or she has stated one (see Simos v Vic-Armen Realty, LLC, 92 AD3d 760 [2d Dept.
2012]; Fishberger v Voss,
51 AD3d 627 [2d Dept. 2008]; Columbo v Chase Manhattan Automotive Fin.
Corp., 297 AD2d 327 [2002]).
With respect to standing, this Court finds that defendant waived its defense
that the plaintiff does not have standing to bring the action. Because the issue of standing
was not asserted as an affirmative defense by Matanah in its answer nor was it the subject
of a pre-answer motion to dismiss, the defense was waived [*8](see Bank of NY v Alderazi, 99 AD3d 837 [2d Dept. 2012]; Citibank, N.A. v Swiatkowski,
98 AD3d 555 [2d Dept. 2012]; CitiMortgage, Inc. v Rosenthal, 88 AD3d 759 [2d Dept.
2011]).
With respect to the motion for summary judgment this Court finds that the
plaintiff has submitted evidence which sufficiently supports the causes of action for
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment and constructive trust.
To recover damages for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, a
plaintiff must plead and prove that a fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff was breached, that
the defendant "knowingly induced or participated in the breach," and that the plaintiff
sustained damages as a result of the breach (see Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d
113 [2003]; Roni LLC v
Arfa, 15 NY3d 826 [2010]; Global Mins. & Metals Corp. v Holme, 35 AD3d 93
[2006]). A person knowingly participates in a breach of fiduciary duty only when he
provides substantial assistance to the primary violator(see Velazquez v Decaudin, 49
AD3d 712 [2008]; Caprer v
Nussbaum, 36 AD3d 176 [2006]). Substantial assistance occurs when a
defendant affirmatively assists, helps conceal or fails to act when required to do so,
thereby enabling the breach to occur (Monaghan v Ford Motor Co., 71 AD3d 848 [2010]).
Here, this court finds that the complaint and supporting affidavits
sufficiently set forth allegations which raise a question of fact as to whether Goldman
had knowledge or should have been on constructive notice that that Azulay and Malul
were partners in Ziv Complex and that Malul's consent was required for the sale. Further,
Malul's purported waiver of his interest in Ziv Complex relied upon by Goldman was of
questionable validity in view of the fact that Malul was still signing promissory notes on
behalf of Ziv Complex subsequent to the date of the purported waiver and prior to the
closing with Matanah. In addition, proof submitted is sufficient to support plaintiff's
causes of action for fraud and constructive trust and for an order setting aside the deeds.
Because the financing plan with Matanah was arranged hastily and without the
knowledge of Azulay's business partner, there is a question of fact as to whether Azulay
was intentionally attempting to sell the properties without the knowledge of his partner,
whether Matanah was aiding Azulay in the alleged fraud and breach of fiduciary duty
and whether Goldman had knowledge that the partnership properties were being
transferred knowing Azulay lacked the authority to convey the properties without Malul's
consent. There is also a question as to whether Matanah had constructive notice or had a
duty to make further inquiry as to whether Malul still had a viable interest [*9]in Ziv Complex at the time of the closing and whether the
sale of the properties required plaintiff's consent.
Therefore the pleadings sufficiently plead a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty, constructive trust, unjust enrichment and fraud. The defendant failed to
make a prima facie showing that the transaction was in fact arms length as asserted by
Matanah as questions of fact have been raised as to whether Matanah received the
properties with knowledge that the transfer was fraudulent as to Malul. Further, as the
alleged fraudulent conveyance is based upon the improper transfer of real property to
Matanah, in breach of a fiduciary relationship, and as the sale affects the title to the
properties, the cause of action for a unjust enrichment and constructive trust are also
sustained (see Watson v
Pascal, 65 AD3d 1333[2d Dept. 2009] Lipton v Lipton, 5 AD3d 356 [2d Dept. 2004]) and
defendant's motion for an order cancelling the notices of pendency is denied (see Nastasi v Nastasi, 26 AD3d
32 [2d Dept. 2005]).
The plaintiff's cross motion for leave to amend the complaint subsequent to
filing a note of issue is denied. Here, the plaintiff seeks to add several causes of action
and to change Ziv Complex, who is represented by opposing counsel from a defendant to
a plaintiff after the plaintiff has filed a note of issue and certified the matter ready for
trial. The plaintiff has failed to provide a reasonable excuse for unreasonably delaying
this application (see Alrose
Oceanside, LLC v Mueller, 81 AD3d 574 [2d Dept. 2011]; Fischer v RWSP Realty, LLC,
53 AD3d 595 [2d Dept. 2008]; Navarette v Alexiades, 50 AD3d 869 [2d Dept. 2008]; Morris v Queens Long Is. Med.
Group, P.C., 49 AD3d 827 [2d Dept. 2008]; Trataros Constr., Inc. v New York City School Constr. Auth.,
46 AD3d 874 [2d Dept. 2007]; Cohen v Ho, 38 AD3d 705 [2d Dept. 2007]; Comsewogue Union Free Sch.
Dist. v Allied-Trent Roofing Sys., 15 AD3d 523 [2d Dept. 2005]).
Accordingly, for all the above stated reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the motion of MATANAH M.H. for an order granting
summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it and the cross-motion of the
plaintiff, SHALOM MALUL, for leave to serve an amended complaint are denied.
Dated: January 4, 2013
Long Island City, NY
______________________________
ROBERT J. MCDONALD [*10]
J.S.C.