| Gale v St. John's Univ. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 50025(U) [38 Misc 3d 1208(A)] |
| Decided on January 4, 2013 |
| Supreme Court, Queens County |
| McDonald, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Lisa Gale,
Plaintiff,
against St. John's University, Defendant. |
The following papers numbered 1 to 15 were read on this motion by defendant, St. John's University, for an order, pursuant to CPLR 3212, granting summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint:
Papers Numbered
Notice of Motion-Affidavits-Memo of Law................1 - 8
Affirmation in Opposition to Motion....................9 - 12
Reply Affirmation.....................................13 - 15
_____________________________________________________________
___
This is an action for damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff,
Lisa Gale, on June 2, 2010, when she fell off of a ladder as a result of allegedly being
struck by a portion of a metal drop ceiling grid in the rest room of the Campus Center
Building on the Staten Island campus of St. John's University. At the time of the
accident, the plaintiff was removing and replacing stained ceiling tiles as part of her job
duties for her employer, Total Maintenance Systems.
Plaintiff commenced an action against St. John's University by filing a
summons and complaint on February 25, 2011. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant was negligent [*2]in failing to maintain its
premises in a safe condition and despite having actual or constructive knowledge of a
dangerous or defective condition, in permitting defective and deteriorated ceiling tiles to
exist at the premises and in allowing the ceiling to remain in a deteriorated condition. In
her second supplemental verified bill of particulars, the plaintiff states that the accident
occurred as a result of a leaking roof that allowed water to damage the track and tiles in
the men's bathroom of the Campus Center Building at St. John's University. Plaintiff
claims that the defendants had actual and constructive notice of the hazardous condition
in that the condition existed for such period of time that defendants, in the exercise of
due care, should have recognized and remedied it. Plaintiff contends that as a result of
the negligence of the defendant in failing to maintain the ceiling in a safe and proper
condition, plaintiff sustained serious injuries including a cervical and lumbar
derangement and a left knee meniscal injury.
Issue was joined by service of defendant's verified answer with affirmative
defenses on April 18, 2011. Plaintiff filed a Note of Issue and Certificate of Readiness
dated April 26, 2012 stating that all discovery including physical examinations of the
plaintiff had been completed. However, although depositions of the parties were
completed, the plaintiff failed to appear for a court ordered independent medical
examination. On June 26, 2012, Justice Ritholtz so ordered a stipulation which stated that
plaintiff's IME was to be completed by July 14, 2012 and if not so completed that
"plaintiff shall be precluded from offering testimony on the issue of damages at the trial
of the action."
Counsel for defendant now moves for an order granting summary judgment
and dismissing the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the admissible evidence
establishes that at the time of plaintiff's alleged accident, St. John's University, as owner
of the premises where the accident occurred, did not create and had no notice, either
actual or constructive, of the alleged condition that contributed to the plaintiff's accident.
Defendant also states that as the plaintiff was injured while working for a maintenance
company she cannot make a claim for an injury suffered from the condition she was hired
to remedy or hazards inherent in remedying the condition. Counsel also states that as
plaintiff has been precluded from offering any evidence on the issue of damages for her
failure to appear for an independent medical examination, that the plaintiff cannot make
a prima facie case of negligence.
[*3]
In support of the motion, defendant
submits the affidavit of counsel, Melissa Waters, Esq., as well as a copy of the transcripts
of the examinations before trial of plaintiff, Lisa Gale, and defendant St. John's
University by Darren Deans, Director of Facilities.
In her examination before trial, taken on October 26, 2011, Ms. Gale, age
46, testified that on the date of the accident, June 2, 2010, she was employed as a day
porter with Total Maintenance Solutions (TMS). Her duties included checking and
stocking bathrooms and mopping spills as well as changing light bulbs and ceiling tile.
She stated that on the day of the accident her duties were "to change ceiling tile and light
bulbs as needed in the Campus Center." When asked how she knew what tiles to change
she stated, "you went to the buildings that you knew always needed to be changed
because of rain. The Campus Center was one of our buildings that every time it rained,
the ceiling tile became stained. Every time it rained heavy, the ceiling tile would collapse
in the Campus Center men's room." She also stated that TMS inspected the ceiling tiles
and kept a list of the tiles that needed to be replaced due to leaks. She has been replacing
ceiling tiles for six months prior to the accident. She stated that her orders were to
replace any tiles that appeared to be stained. She stated that from 2009-2010 she
personally observed and replaced ceiling tiles that collapsed after it rained more than 12
times. The St. John's security office would make complaints regarding the tiles to TMS
and TMS had the responsibility of changing the tiles. She used an eight foot aluminum
ladder owned by St. John's to change the tiles. The tiles, which she described as light had
to be cut with a box cutter to fit into the metal grid that was suspended from the ceiling.
She would use the old tile as a template to cut the new tile. She stated that on the date of
the accident she was replacing ceiling tiles in the bathroom that were both stained and
wet when a piece of the metal trim fell on her head and startled her causing her to fall off
the ladder. At the time she was on the fourth rung of the ladder.
The plaintiff testified that she fell on her left side hitting her left hip, left
knee, and left shoulder on the floor. She stated that she did not know why the trim fell
but that the ceiling was in poor condition. She stated, however, that she never
complained to anyone about that particular piece of trim before and she never heard of
anyone having experiences with metal trim dislodging prior to the accident. In addition,
she stated that she had replaced the same tiles two and a half weeks prior to the accident
and did not have any trouble at that time with the grid or trim work that held up the
ceiling tile. After [*4]she fell was first seen by a school
nurse and then left the scene in an ambulance which transported her to the emergency
room at Richmond University Hospital.
on November 18, 2011, Darren Deans, Director of Facilities for St. John's
University testified at an examination before trial. He stated that the Manager of
Facilities at the Staten Island Campus in 2010 was Ram Paray. He also stated that Debra
Penya a facilities coordinator was employed by TMS. Mr Deans stated that he was
present on the Staten Island Campus on the date of the plaintiff's accident. He stated that
he was talking to Debra Penya at the time that a TMS worker came over to inform her
that Lisa Gale had been involved in an accident. He walked over to the men's room
where the accident occurred but stayed in the doorway. He observed the plaintiff on the
floor being attended to by Public Safety. He did not observe any ceiling bars missing or
falling down. He did not observe leaks or other damage to the ceiling. He stated that he
was never made aware of leaks in the ceiling of the mens room where the plaintiff had
her accident.
In support of the motion, counsel for St. John's argues that plaintiff cannot
establish that St. John's breached its duty of care in the absence of evidence that St John's
created, or had actual or constructive notice of a defective condition at the premises.
Counsel states that plaintiff testified that she herself had replaced the same tile she was in
the process of replacing dozens of times including as recently as two weeks prior to the
accident without incident and without any complaints having been made regarding the
metal trim by herself or anyone else. In addition, the defendant argues that there was no
proof presented that anyone from St. John's had been given actual notice of the allegedly
defective grid and that there was no proof as to how long the defective condition existed
prior to the plaintiff's accident. Counsel argues that the defect was not visible and
apparent and was not discoverable upon reasonable inspection.
Further, counsel argues that the plaintiff cannot recover for an injury she
sustained from a condition or defect that she was hired to remedy. Here the plaintiff was
injured in the course of replacing a stained or wet ceiling tile which was the condition
she was remedying as part of the scope of her employment. Citing Waiters v Northern
Trust Co. Of New York, 29 AD3d 325 [1st Dept. 2006] counsel states that the courts
have held that maintenance worker has no claim for damages for injuries sustained from
a dangerous condition that she was hired to remedy. Further counsel argues that the
employers duty to [*5]provide a safe workplace does not
extend to hazards which are part of or inherent in the very work which the employee is to
perform (citing Consalvo v City
of New York 53 AD3d 521 [2d Dept. 2008]; Imtanios v Sachs, 44 AD3d
383 [1st Dept. 200]; Jackson v Board of Education, 30 AD3d 5 [1st Dept.
2006]).
Lastly, plaintiff argues that because the plaintiff failed to attend an IME she
is precluded, by a prior order of this Court, from introducing testimony regarding
damages. As such counsel argues, the plaintiff is prevented from establishing a prima
facie case (citing Calder v
Cofta, 49 AD3d 484[2d Dept. 2008]; Koslosky v Khorramian, 31 AD3d
16 [2d Dept. 2006]; DuValle v
Swan Lake Resort Hotel LLC, 26 AD3d 616 [3d Dept. 2006]).
In opposition, plaintiff asserts that the defendant has failed to make a prima
facie case in that they have only submitted an affirmation by counsel and have not
submitted an affidavit from the individual who was deposed in this action on its behalf or
from any current employee or anyone with personal knowledge of this matter. Counsel
states that the defendant has not produced any credible or legally sufficient evidence to
prove that St. John's did not have either actual or constructive notice of the condition of
the bathroom floor. Counsel states that defendant had notice of the slippery recurring
condition in the bathroom. Counsel also states that defendant was aware of the recurring
condition of leaks in the ceiling of the bathroom in question. Counsel submits an
affirmation from the plaintiff dated September 30, 2012. In her affidavit the plaintiff
states that on the date of the accident she was changing drop ceiling tiles in the men's
room of the Campus center Building. She states that this particular bathroom had a roof
that constantly leaked and damaged the ceiling tiles inside. She states that the leak was
continuous and she changed the tiles in the room frequently because of the water
damage. She states that while standing on the ladder the grid in the ceiling became loose
because it had been damaged by the water leak. She states that she had made verbal
complaints to the personnel at St. John's and they were aware of the ongoing leak.
A movant for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of
entitlement by demonstrating that there are no material issues of fact (see Alvarez v
Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). Once the movant satisfies this burden, then
the burden shifts to the opposing party to present evidence in admissible form raising a
triable issue of material fact (see Zuckerman v City of NY, 49 NY2d 557
[1980]). All reasonable inferences will be drawn in favor of the non-moving party (see
Dauman Displays v Masturzo, 168 AD2d 204 (1st Dept. 1990). "Where [*6]the court entertains any doubt as to whether a triable issue
of fact exists, summary judgment should be denied" (Daliendo v Johnson, 147
AD2d 312 [2d Dept. 1989]).
Upon review and consideration of the defendant's motion, the plaintiff's
affirmation in opposition, and the defendant's reply thereto, this court finds that the
evidence submitted by the defendant was sufficient to demonstrate, prima facie, that the
defendant did not have constructive notice of defective condition of the metal grid prior
to the plaintiff's accident.
An owner of premises cannot be held liable for injuries caused by an
allegedly defective condition unless the plaintiff establishes that the owner either created
or had actual or constructive notice of the condition (see Betz v Daniel Conti,
Inc., 69 AD3d 545 [2d Dept. 2010]; Roy v City of New York, 65 AD3d 1030 [2d Dept.
2009];Curiale v. Sharrotts
Woods, Inc., 9 AD3d 473 [2d Dept. 2003] citing Gordon v American
Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836[1986]). To constitute constructive notice,
the defect must be visible and apparent, and it must exist for a sufficient length of time
before the accident to permit the defendant an opportunity to discover and remedy it (see
Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, supra; Lee v Bethel First
Pentecostal Church of Am., 304 AD2d 798 [2d Dept. 2003]). Moreover,
constructive notice will not be imputed where a defect is latent and would not be
discoverable upon reasonable inspection (see Lee v Bethel First Pentecostal Church
of Am., supra; Rapino v City of New York, 299 AD2d 470 [2d Dept. 2002]).
Here, St. John's University made a prima facie showing of entitlement to
summary judgment by submitting evidence which established that they neither created
nor had actual or constructive notice of the latent defect which caused the suspended
ceiling grid to detach from the ceiling (see Curiale v. Sharrotts Woods, Inc.,
supra). The admissible evidence submitted by the defendant, including the deposition
testimony of the plaintiff and Mr. Deans, showed that there was no evidence that
defendant had either actual or constructive notice of any defect in the ceiling grid. Mr.
Deans testified that he had not been notified of the condition and the plaintiff herself
testified that she had changed stained ceiling tiles in that area several times, the last time
being two weeks prior to the accident and she had not seen any defect in the grid.
According to the deposition testimony, the defect in the grid was not visible or apparent.
Although it is clear that there was a recurring leaking condition which caused the tiles to
become stained and wet, there was insufficient proof that the grid became loose as a
result of the leaking condition and no proof that the defendant should have [*7]been aware that the grid was in a hazardous condition.
Here, the defect was latent in that it was above the ceiling tiles and does not appear to
have been discoverable by reasonable inspection as the plaintiff herself did not see any
evidence of the deteriorated or loosened grid when she changed the tiles in that location
two and a half weeks prior to the accident. She testified that she did not know why the
grid fell and she did not make a complaint regarding the grid at any time prior to the
accident (see Lal v Ching Po
Ng, 33 AD3d 668 [2d Dept. 2006]).
In opposition to the motion, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact
as to whether the defendant created or had actual or constructive notice of the condition
that caused her to fall from the ladder.
Further, in opposition to the motion, the plaintiff did not address her failure
to attend an independent medical examination. Pursuant to the order of Justice Ritholtz,
dated June 26, 2012, plaintiff was to attend an IME by defendant's designated physician
prior to July 14, 2012 or be precluded from offering testimony with regard to damages at
the trial of the action. Here, defendant affirms that the plaintiff failed to attend such IME
and the plaintiff does not offer any excuse for her default in complying with the court
order. Therefore, the conditional preclusion language in the parties' so-ordered
stipulation became absolute upon the plaintiffs' failure to comply with its terms (see Koslosky v Khorramian, 31
AD3d 716 [2d Dept. 2006]). As the order precluding the plaintiff from presenting
any evidence of damages prevents her from establishing a prima facie case, the
defendant's motion for summary dismissing the complaint is granted (see Wei Hong Hu v Sadiqi, 83
AD3d 820[2d Dept. 2011]; Panagiotou v Samaritan Vil., Inc., 66 AD3d 979 [2d Dept.
2009]; Calder v Cofta, 49
AD3d 484 [2d Dept. 2008]; Echevarria v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 7 AD3d 750 [2d Dept.
2004]).
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted
and the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.
The clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Dated: January 4, 2013
Long Island City, NY [*8]
____________________
ROBERT J. MCDONALD
J.S.C.