| Union Sq. Park Community Coalition, Inc. v New York City Dept. of Parks & Recreation |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 50110(U) [38 Misc 3d 1215] |
| Decided on January 25, 2013 |
| Supreme Court, New York County |
| Engoron, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Union Square Park
Community Coalition, Inc., ASSEMBLYMEMBER RICHARD N. GOTTFRIED, CAROL
GREITZER, EDITH SHANKER, GEOFFREY CROFT, WILLIAM BOROCK and
MARGARET GONZALEZ, Plaintiffs,
against New York City Department of Parks and Recreation, ADRIAN BENEPE, in his Official Capacity as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation, THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CHEF DRIVEN MARKET, LLC and URBAN SPACE HOLDINGS, INC., Defendants. |
In compliance with CPLR 2219(a), this Court states that the following papers, numbered 1 to 4, were used on this motion by plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction and cross-motion by defendants to dismiss or for summary judgment:
Papers Numbered
Moving Papers 1
Cross-Moving Papers 2
Reply Papers (Plaintiffs) 3
Reply Papers (Defendants) 4
[*2]
Upon the foregoing papers, the instant motion is
granted and the instant cross-motion is denied.
Contrary to understandable belief, New York City's Union Square is not so-named
for the Northern side in the Civil War or for the Labor Movement, but because it is situated at the
junction of what is now Broadway and Fourth Avenue. Although it may not have the national
and international renown of its uptown half-siblings Herald Square and Times Square, it has a
jewel in its crown that they lack: a green oasis within its midst. Though small and crowded, and
thus quintessentially like the island on which it is situated, the eponymous park has its ardent
adherents. To borrow from Daniel Webster, though it may be little, "there are those who love it."
Some of those who profess to love it, including a few long-time neighbors, lunch-hour users, and
a member of the New York State Assembly, now sue to prevent the City and its Parks
Department from authorizing a restaurateur to open an eating and drinking establishment in the
Pavilion, apparently the second iteration of an open air, colonnade structure that has anchored the
north end of the park since the 1800's.
Background
Manhattan's Union Square Park consists of 3.6 acres [FN1] of dedicated municipal parkland situated
between 14th and 17th Streets and Union Square East (essentially a section of Broadway) and
West (essentially an extension of University Place). "In 1815, by act of the state legislature, this
former potter's field became a public commons for the city, at first named Union
Place."[FN2] In 1872
Frederick Law Olmsted and Calvert Vaux, by then well-known as the designers of Central Park,
replanted the foliage.[FN3]
Listed on the National and State Registers of Historic Places, and a National Historic
Landmark because of its significance in American labor history, Croft Moving Affidavit ¶
14, dyed-in-the-wool New Yorkers know Union Square Park as the City's "soapbox," the
trans-Atlantic equivalent of London's Hyde Park's "Speakers' Corner." "The park has historically
been the start or the end point for many political demonstrations."[FN4] The North Plaza is still oft used by speakers
and protesters. See Plaintiffs' Exh. 22 (photographs of recent North Plaza mass protests);
Croft Reply Affidavit ¶¶ 25-26. Indeed, during the 2004 Republican National
Convention, the City diverted protests from Central Park (ostensibly to protect the sod) to the
North Plaza by denying a permit for the former.
The Pavilion has been a park fixture at its present site for over a hundred and
twenty-five years. In 1882 it served as the reviewing stand for the nation's first Labor Day Parade
(Plaintiffs' Exh.1), [*3]and since then it has been a rostrum or
backdrop for political and social activists such as Emma Goldman and Paul Robeson (Croft
Moving Affidavit ¶ 5; Plaintiffs' Exh. 1). It has often seen service as a bandstand.
The Pavilion and its environs have long been associated with childhood and
recreational, particularly playground, use. An early map (plaintiffs say circa 1935) (Plaintiffs'
Exh. 1A) of Union Square quaintly labels the Pavilion as "Band Stand & Childrens [sic]
Playroom." In 1983 an official-looking sign posted on the playground's perimeter (Plaintiffs' Exh.
2A) proclaims, "This Area Reserved for Children & Guardians Only." Plaintiffs have submitted
letters (Plaintiffs' Exh. 2)[FN5] recalling the Pavilion area as a magnet for local
children's playgroups in or about the 1970's (see also Greitzer Moving Affidavit ¶
8). In more recent times, the Pavilion has been used for such exotic activities as tango lessons, a
Portuguese film festival, "Mommy & Me Yoga," and at least one (not-so-exotic) rock & roll
band. Croft Moving Affidavit ¶ 30; Plaintiffs' Exh. 21.
What is appropriately called a "sunken courtyard" lies immediately south of the
Pavilion. From approximately 1994 to approximately 2008, pursuant to a series of permits, an
outdoor café named "Luna Park" operated there (but not in the Pavilion itself). A children's
playground currently occupies the courtyard. See Defendants' Exh. 2 (photographs of the
courtyard pre-playground); Plaintiffs' Exh. 19 (photographs of the playground in the courtyard,
with the Pavilion in the immediate background).
The Pavilion itself is the only significant space in the park that provides shelter from
the elements (e.g., Shanker Moving Affidavit ¶ 21). Immediately prior to the events
here at issue, the Pavilion was renovated, and lately it has been utilized (some might say
"underutilized") by defendant New York City Department of Parks and Recreation ("Parks
Department") as office and storage space.
The neighborhood surrounding Union Square is largely commercial in character, but
in recent decades has seen a significant residential influx, symbolized by the vast Zeckendorf
Towers, which replaced the old S. Klein "On the Square" Department Store overlooking the
Park's south-east corner. Area residents include many children; a Babies "R" Us occupies 24-30
Union Square East.[FN6]
Restaurants abound;[FN7]
"There are currently more than 150 eating establishments, bars and markets within a two block
radius of the park,[FN8]
including 18 facing it directly." Croft [*4]Moving Affidavit
¶ 10. The neighborhood is as short on playgrounds as it is long on restaurants, with only
two in the entire Community Board 5 District, Croft Moving Affidavit ¶ 11. Nobody
disputes the neighborhood's dearth of play space.
Recent Developments
The North End of the Park and the Prior Litigation
In 2004, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg announced plans to convert the
Pavilion into a restaurant. In a March 21, 2005 letter (Plaintiffs' Exh. 3) defendant Adrian
Benepe, then, as now, Commissioner of the Parks Department, updated the co-chairs of plaintiff
Union Square Park Community Coalition ("USCC"[FN9]) on the Department's plans. On April 21, 2008,
six USCC members commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding against the City on various
grounds, including that the conversion was an alienation of parkland that, pursuant to the "Public
Trust Doctrine," required State legislative approval. On or about April 28, 2008 Justice John
Stackhouse temporarily restrained defendants (Plaintiffs' Exh. 4) from proceeding with the
project. In a 16-page decision dated May 7, 2008 (Plaintiffs' Exh. 5), Justice Jane Solomon
preliminarily enjoined the project, conditioned on petitioner's posting a $100 undertaking, noting
(at p. 11) that "petitioners' argument that approval by the New York State Legislature ultimately
will be required is persuasive, and it may well succeed when ripe." Union Sq. Community
Coalition v New York City Dept. of Parks and Recreation, 2008 NY Slip Op. 31309(U) (Sup
Ct, NY County). Almost a year later, in a "Decision, Order and Declaratory Judgment" dated
March 27, 2009 (Plaintiffs' Exh. 6), Justice Solomon ruled, inter alia, that the parkland
alienation claim was unripe, and she dismissed the petition.
The Concession Agreement
The City's plans proceeded apace. In a self-described "License Agreement"
("Concession Agreement") dated March 26, 2012 (Plaintiffs' Exh. 8), released publicly in early
May, the City authorized defendant Chef Driven Market, LLC ("Chef"), a private, for-profit
entity, to operate a seasonal restaurant in the Pavilion and a year-round food kiosk nearby.
Defendants claim (Kloth Cross-Moving Affidavit ¶ 16), without attribution, but without
contravention, that the kiosk and restaurant would "together occupy less than 2.1% of the park,
and less than 8.2% of the North Plaza." The restaurant would seat some 200 people and operate
from April 15 through October 15, 7:00 AM until midnight.[FN10] After dinner hours the restaurant would
become something of a nightclub. An "outbuilding" would house restrooms, and underground
space, complete with electricity, running water, and ventilation ducts, would house the kitchen.
The restaurant and bar would spill out onto the North Plaza, where some or all of the tables
would be for paying patrons only. The operator would have the right to host "special events"
(i.e., private functions), closing the Pavilion even to members of the public willing to pay
for food and drink.
[*5]
Although only vaguely referenced in the
agreement, as a practical matter, the restaurant proposal is contingent upon Chef's obtaining a
liquor license for the establishment. Croft Moving Affidavit ¶ 37. The bar area is
envisioned for the south side of the Pavilion (Defendants' Exh. 17), adjacent to the children's
playground in the sunken courtyard. According to defendants (Kloth Cross-Moving Affidavit
¶ 44), "The visual barrier between the playground and the Restaurant Concession required
by Manhattan Community Board Five [and Chef's liquor license application, Cross-Moving
Memo at 11-12] would impede the view of children in the sunken playground of the restaurant,
but would not impede diners' viewscape of the park." Plaintiffs scoff at this assertion (Croft
Reply Affidavit ¶¶ 2-8).
Initially, food prices would top out at $33.95 for entrees, $14.95 for appetizers and
desserts, and $17.95 for eggs at brunch, with increases tied to the Consumer Price Index (or
Parks Department approval). Plaintiffs claim that a full meal could easily cost $100 per
person.[FN11] At the low
end, breakfast and brunch bagels and croissants (or would it just be coffee or tea?) would be
available for as little as $1.95 or $2.95. Concession Agreement Exh. C(3). So in theory, paupers,
as well as plutocrats, could patronize the place.
The concessionaire is obligated to pay the City an annual fee, starting at $300,000 for
the first year and rising annually to $453,777 in the 15th year, or 10% of annual gross receipts,
whichever is greater. Concession Agreement ¶ 4.1(a). As required by the City Charter, this
money would go to the City's general fund, rather than to any particular or general park purpose.
As of June 2012, the concessionaire hoped to be "in business" as of April 2013.
The South End of the Park
Since about 1997, for the last six or seven weeks of every year, defendant Urban
Space Holdings, Inc. has, pursuant to permits granted by the Parks Department, operated a
"Holiday Market" on the park's South Plaza (see infra).
The Instant Action
Plaintiffs commenced the instant action on May 18, 2012 (see Complaint,
Defendants' Exh. 1). The first cause of action claims that the Concession Agreement violates the
Public Trust Doctrine because it alienates dedicated parkland for a non-park purpose without
State legislative approval. The second cause of action claims that the Concession Agreement
violates the Public Trust Doctrine because it is a lease, and thus per se an alienation of dedicated
parkland, whether or not for a park purpose, without State legislative approval. The third cause of
action claims that the Holiday Market on the South Plaza violates the Public Trust Doctrine
because it alienates [*6]dedicated parkland for a non-park
purpose without State legislative approval. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief and
attorney's fees.
The Instant Motion and Cross-Motion
Plaintiffs now move, pursuant to CPLR Article 63, on their first two causes of action
only, for, simply put, a preliminary injunction restraining defendants from altering the Pavilion to
accommodate a restaurant and/or bar, from granting any further approvals for the project, and
from actually operating such an establishment, all unless the State Legislature approves the plan.
Defendants oppose plaintiffs' motion and now cross-move to dismiss or for summary
judgment.[FN12]
Discussion
Preliminary Injunctions
The New York standard for granting a preliminary injunction is well established: a
movant must show (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury absent the
granting of a preliminary injunction; and (3) a balancing of the equities that favors the movant's
position. Aetna Ins. Co. v Capasso, 75 NY2d 860, 862 (1990); W.T. Grant Co. v
Srogi, 52 NY2d 496, 517 (1981). Furthermore, a preliminary injunction is a "drastic"
remedy, and the movant must make a "clear showing" of each of these elements. Faberge
Intl., Inc. v Di Pino, 109 AD2d 235, 240 (1st Dept 1985). "If key facts are in dispute, the
relief will be denied." Id. Here, the dispute is legal, rather than factual.
Likelihood of Success
The antecedents of legal protection of parkland have been traced at least as far back
as Ancient Rome. David C. Slade, et al., Putting the Public Trust Doctrine to
Work (2d ed. 1997),[FN13] at 1. In New York, the municipal sale of
public parkland without State legislative approval has long been prohibited. See Brooklyn
Park Commrs. v Armstrong, 45 NY 234, 243 (1871):
the city took the title to the lands for the public use as a park, and held it in trust for that purpose. * * * Receiving the title in trust for an especial public use, it could not convey without the sanction of the legislature .
A park is a pleasure ground set apart for recreation of the public, to promote its health and enjoyment. * * * [Parks] facilitate free public means of pleasure, recreation and amusement and thus provide for the welfare of the community.
* * * [They] must be kept free from intrusion of every kind which would interfere in any degree with [their] complete use for this end.
parkland is impressed with a public trust, requiring legislative approval before it can be alienated or used for an extended period for non-park purposes.
It is thus clear that municipally-owned property that has been dedicated to use as a public park is held in trust for the public at large and may not be diverted to other uses or sold without express legislative authority. The same principle of a trust for the public prevents the municipality from taking action which operates to exclude the public at large from such a public park and to limit use of the public park to local inhabitants unless the municipality has been granted express legislative authority to do so. To hold otherwise would be to permit the municipality to achieve a result which violates the public trust principle since as to those who are excluded from the public park the exclusionary policy is as much a diversion of use as would be the case if the municipality changed the use of the park or sold it.
Parties' Arguments
As befits debate about a contentious public issue (involving Manhattan real estate,
no less), the parties have submitted the subjective opinions of some public officials, and some
private citizens, addressing the matter at hand. According to plaintiff State Assemblymember
Richard N. Gottfried (Moving Affirmation ¶ 4), whose new district encompasses Union
Square Park, "restaurants [in parks] . . . are essentially private commercial uses that exist in great
numbers outside the parks and which invariably displace traditional park uses." Gottfried
bemoans (id. ¶ 10) the idea of using "the Pavilion for a commercial restaurant,
rather than as a place where children can play and be protected from the weather and adults can
enjoy sitting and relaxing without having to pay for an expensive meal."
In testimony opposing an earlier version of the current plan,[FN15] Gottfried and co-Legislators
Thomas K. Duane (Senate) and Deborah J. Glick (Assembly) wrote as follows:
The increasing privatization of our parkland is an abdication of the City's responsibility to maintain and improve our parks and to prevent the harm that commercialization brings. It is not right for the public to be asked to accept trade-offs like this in exchange for park improvements. Parks should be supported by the City. We should not have to sell off pieces of our parks to pay for them.
a Restaurant Concession in the Pavilion is a beneficial use of the Park that will enhance the park experience for visitors and generally promote public parks purposes. In [deciding to grant the concession], I considered the character of the Park, the location and character of the Pavilion and surrounding area, and the benefits to the public of a Restaurant Concession in the Park.
An outdoor dining opportunity in Union Square Park provides a unique and special experience for the user public .
Offering food and beverages in public parks is a long-standing and widely accepted use of parkland, going back to the original 1858 design for Central Park. Many parks throughout the City offer a variety of food and beverage options to park-goers.
In my judgment a Restaurant Concession in the tranquil setting of Union Square Park offers
a unique experience and dining opportunity for park users and is consistent with the Charter
mandate that the Parks Department improve parks for the beneficial use of the public.
Jennifer Falk, Executive Director of non-party Union Square Partnership, has
submitted an affidavit essentially saying that the proposed restaurant would be the culmination of
the vast improvements to the north end of the park that her organization and others have helped
accomplish.
Of course, the question is not what one particular Legislator or Commissioner or
neighbor or advocacy group (or judge, for that matter) would like to see; the question is whether
the City defendants acted within the scope of their power in entering into the Concession
Agreement without State legislative approval.
Paradigms
In this Court's view, a park restaurant could fulfill a park purpose pursuant to one of
two paradigms. The first, what could be called the "refreshment" paradigm, is a facility in which
one can quench thirst and/or hunger after several hours of ball playing or hiking or just soaking
up the sun, without having to leave the park's environs. See Gushee v City of New York,
42 AD 37, 41 (1st Dept 1899) ("in the control and management of the public parks of a great city
it is perfectly proper to furnish not only such innocent amusements as may enhance the pleasure
of those who resort to the parks, but such opportunities for rest and refreshment for themselves
and [*10]their animals as may be required"). The second, what
could be called the "dining" paradigm, is a facility in which one can dine al fresco in a
pastoral setting, simultaneously enhancing the meal and one's appreciation of the park. An
obvious example is Central Park's Boathouse Café.[FN16] Given the small size of Union Square Park,
considerably too small for ball fields or hiking trails, and the ready availability of refreshment
right across the street (no matter which street), the present proposal clearly does not fit within the
first paradigm. Further, based on the general ambience to which the proposal aspires, defendants
obviously have the second paradigm in mind.
Case Law
Not surprisingly, park restaurant proposals, of both paradigms, have had a mixed
record in the courts. Instructive is Williams v Hylan, 126 Misc 807, 813-15 (Sup Ct, NY
County) (preliminarily enjoining the City from leasing space in Battery Park for two refreshment
stands), affd 217 AD 727 (1st Dept 1926):
Battery Park is one of the group of small parks of the City covering an area of twenty-one acres.[FN17] * * * The streets contiguous to [the park] contain more than twenty stores selling the same class of merchandise as the lessee proposed to vend . As a consequence, it would appear that means for refreshment are now amply provided for, and no impelling reason is shown why it is necessary to furnish additional facilities, especially by the erection of permanent structures in a small park apparently already overcrowded.
A serious question has also been raised as to
the effect upon the playground activities of the children of the community by the erection of the
proposed buildings. * * * The rights of the [children] to the use of their playground are
unquestionably paramount to those of the owner of the place of refreshment .
Upon appeal after trial, the First Department found the proposal inconsistent with
park purposes, in part because of the easy availability of nearby refreshment and the proposed
establishment's propinquity to a children's playground. Williams v Hylan, 223 AD 48, 51
(1st Dept 1928), affd sub nom Williams v New York, 248 NY 616 (1928).
Williams and Blank v Browne, 217 AD2d 624, 629-30 (2d Dept 1926)
(prohibiting sale of refreshments available nearby), confirm that the "refreshment" paradigm
could not sustain the instant proposal.
[*11]
The "dining" paradigm was eloquently sustained
in 795 Fifth Ave. Corp. v City of New York, 40 Misc 2d 183, 191-92 (Sup Ct, NY
County 1963) (approving construction of large, for-profit restaurant facility [that was never
built]),[FN18] affd
15 NY2d 221 (1965). According to Justice Jacob Markowitz (apparently quite the bon
vivant):
food and drink are available at numerous traditional restaurants, but the savor of a meal or evening coffee, a snack or an apéritif, in the park setting is a unique one. Anyone who has enjoyed food and drink on the plazas and pavilions of Europe, or, for that matter, in other park settings will recognize this. The very nature and character of the important satisfactions which the [proposed restaurant] promises are intrinsically related to its park location, and this, rather than its attraction primarily to park users, qualifies it as a legitimate park facility.
Plaintiffs concede that those who come to a park to relax amidst the rural surroundings and to gaze in quiet contemplation at the grass and upon the flowers and the other natural ornaments not normally found elsewhere in the city are using the park for park purposes. Thus, plaintiffs' contention that people sitting in a cafe-restaurant in the park, gazing at the very same scenery, are not using the park for park purposes, is unpersuasive.
The site itself was not used by human beings except for purposes that I wouldn't want to mention in this court. You cannot sit on it. You cannot play on it. The trees are scraggly .... There was a very steep bank of earth on which no children would play and no adults could sit, it is mud.
Further Analysis
The Pavilion is long and narrow, and its potential al fresco attributes are
limited. Diners inside looking south, the marquee view, towards the park's interior, to the extent
that they could see past the Pavilion's small round columns and large rectangular supports
(Defendants' Exh. 17), and the bar or bar areas, would have to contend with the barrier required
by the Concession Agreement and Chef's liquor license application.[FN19] At best, by craning their necks, patrons might
see some treetops. Inside diners looking north would see a paved plaza, beyond which would be
traffic and the high-rise commercial buildings fronting the north side of 17th Street (Plaintiffs'
Exh. 19, at 2). Diners looking east or west would not see much of anything, other than the
Pavilion's thick rectangular supports, with a slice of green in between, beyond which would be
typical Manhattan buildings. Diners on the plaza part of the proposed restaurant would see hardly
any foliage at all. Thus, patrons would not, as Justice Markowitz would have it,
id. at 192, be able to "gaze in quiet contemplation at the grass and upon the flowers and
the other natural ornaments."
Commissioner Benepe's description of the park as "tranquil" is dubious. For all its
charms, when one thinks of Union Square Park, "tranquil" is not the first word that comes to
mind. The entirety is only one block wide (and three blocks long), meaning that from anywhere
within the park one is at most a half block away from the teeming streets of "The City that Never
Sleeps," including such major thoroughfares as Broadway and 14th Street. Similarly overstated is
defendants' reference (Cross-Moving Memo at 40) to "the lush, verdant foliage of the Park."
Everyone who lives, works, shops, and, yes, dines in the area is grateful for the trees and other
flora in the park, but nobody would mistake it for Central Park's Ramble.[FN20]
Plaintiffs argue (Moving Memo at 1) that a Pavilion restaurant would "effectively
expand the surrounding private commercial district — with its high density of eating and
drinking establishments — into the park itself." As Justice Solomon mused (Moving Exh.
5, at 10), "In light of the concentration of restaurants of all kinds surrounding Union Square Park,
it is not clear what benefit will be provided by another one inside this park." Operation of a
Pavilion restaurant and the Holiday Market would surround the more pastoral aspects of the park
at both [*13]ends, albeit at different times of the year. Defendants'
argument (Cross-Moving Memo at 35, 37) that the presence of other refreshment options in the
vicinity of a proposed park restaurant is irrelevant is a misreading of the 795 Fifth Ave.
Corp. holdings. There, the plaintiffs, who were nearby commercial property owners, argued
that the proposed "cafe-restaurant" would be "a subsidized tax-free business which would
compete with privately owned tax-paying businesses nearby." Id. at 185. The Court found
this to be a political, not a legal, issue. Id. at 187.[FN21] Here, plaintiffs have proved beyond a
peradventure of a doubt that a restaurant is not necessary to insure that park participants do not
go hungry or thirsty.
Defendants urge that because, until recently, Luna Park operated in the sunken
courtyard, a restaurant in the Pavilion would essentially be a continued, rather than a new, use.
The Croft Reply Affidavit (¶¶ 15-24) convincingly delineates the many significant
distinctions between the two facilities, one departed and one proposed. In any event, nobody ever
legally challenged Luna Park's existence, rendering it at least largely, and probably completely,
irrelevant to the issues presented here.
Defendants claim (Cross-Moving Memo at 34-35) that "the overall space available
for children's playgrounds has dramatically increased as part of the larger renovation of which the
Restaurant Concession was a component." However, the instant lawsuit is not a referendum on
whether Union Square Park is better off for the recent changes to its northern end. Despite the
old adage that "you take the good with the bad," this Court does not see a restaurant (and what
might be considered an upscale one at that) as integral to such improvements as new paving,
lighting, and shrubs, and a new children's playground.
Both sides agree with Justice Markowitz that one test of "park purpose" is "whether
the facility concerned offers substantial satisfactions to the public, which would only be possible
in a park setting." 40 Misc 2d at 191. Most people would say that eating dinner in a restaurant
within a park offers "substantial satisfactions." Of course, eating dinner in a restaurant anywhere
offers "substantial satisfactions." So the key phrase is, "only be possible in a park setting." From
defendants' perspective, you can only dine in a restaurant in a park if, well, there's a restaurant in
the park in which to dine. From plaintiffs' perspective, there are many other restaurants around
this park, and there are many other parks around with restaurants. The question here is whether
this particular restaurant, in this particular setting, in this particular park, offers a "park meal," or
just "a meal in a park." Again, this Court finds that plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are
likely to succeed in demonstrating that a meal in a restaurant in the Pavilion, however lovely,
would be a generic experience, not a unique park experience. Even assuming Pavilion diners
could see trees, which is questionable, the oxymoronic "semi-unique" would be a more accurate
description; diners at outdoor cafés across Union Square Park West have a fine panoramic
view (Plaintiffs' Exh. 20) of the park's wonderful foliage, albeit at a somewhat greater distance
and [*14]separated by a lane or two of traffic.
Plaintiffs' vision of a Pavilion sans restaurant is highly persuasive:
the Pavilion could be used for ping pong, chess, checkers, craft and art work, table games, dancing and practice for the presentations to the community, community meetings, holiday and special programs, film screenings, tutoring, musical programs, or perhaps an information resource center for young and older residents related to health and financial issues, and other special needs support for senior citizens and people with disabilities.
The threatened alienation or alteration of parkland in and of itself is recognized as irreparable injury warranting the grant of temporary injunctive relief. (State of New York v City of New York, 275 AD2d 740; Smith v State, 153 AD2d 737; Bass Building Corp. v Village of Pomona, 142 AD2d 657).
Starting a week before Thanksgiving and continuing for the next six weeks, a sizeable part of the south plaza is turned into a shopping mall. An assemblage of booths the size of a small tent city is erected and hawkers sell incense, scarves, ornaments, soaps, rings, bracelets, pendants, teas, candies, sweaters, hats, dresses, gloves, puzzles, toys, house wares and other merchandise of the kind that is sold in thousands of other places. The City even removes tables, chairs and otherwise permanent park benches to accommodate this commercial activity. The Holiday Market is the very antithesis of park use. It is pure, crass commercialism, which has as its only excuse for usurping public park space that it brings at least $1,000,000 to the City every year.
Arthur F. Engoron, J.S.C.