Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, Second District (Stephen L. Ukeiley, J.), entered October 7, 2011. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,437.79.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff commenced this small claims action to recover for damage caused to her automobile when a snowplow engaged in snow removal operations collided with her parked car. At a nonjury trial, plaintiff's mother testified that she had witnessed the snowplow "barreling down" the street and going through a stop sign before it hit plaintiff's car. The snowplow operator contended that he was going slowly and that the snowplow had skidded on ice. Following the trial, the District Court, crediting the testimony of plaintiff's mother, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,437.79.

Appellate review of a small claims judgment is limited to a determination of whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UDCA 1807). As a general rule, a court's determination following a nonjury trial "should not be disturbed unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence, especially when the findings of fact rest in large measure on considerations relating to the credibility of witnesses" (Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544, 544-545 [1990]). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to [*2]issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court has the opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125 [2000]).

In order to recover damages for the accident, plaintiff was required to show, under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b), that the snowplow operator had exhibited a "reckless disregard" for the safety of others (see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Town of Babylon, 9 Misc 3d 128[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51528[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005], citing Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455 [2000]; see also Primeau v Town of Amherst, 5 NY3d 844 [2005]; Rockland Coaches, Inc. v Town of Clarkstown, 49 AD3d 705 [2008]). Recovery under the reckless disregard standard of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) requires more than a showing of ordinary negligence. Rather, there must be proof that "the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow and has done so with conscious indifference to the outcome" (Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d at 466 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

In the instant case, the District Court apparently found plaintiff's version of the facts to be more credible than defendant's version, and no reason is shown for this court to disturb the District Court's factual determination. As plaintiff satisfied her burden of showing that the damage to her vehicle was caused by the snowplow operator's reckless disregard of a known or obvious risk (cf. Sorrentino v Village of Lynbrook, 35 Misc 3d 128[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50588[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012]), we find that the judgment in favor of plaintiff rendered substantial justice between the parties (see UDCA 1807).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
Nicolai, P.J., Iannacci and LaSalle, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: January 30, 2013