| Ferguson v Ferguson |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 50371(U) [38 Misc 3d 1233(A)] |
| Decided on February 26, 2013 |
| Supreme Court, Queens County |
| Jackman-Brown, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Camille
Ferguson, Plaintiff,
against Larry Ferguson, Defendant. |
Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219(a), of the following papers numbered 1 to 7 read on this Order to Show Cause, dated February 1, 2012 and duly submitted on October 2, 2012. considered in the review of this motion seeking an Order: (1)granting to the Plaintiff pendente lite custody of the parties' unemancipated child, to wit: Tiarra, born July 8, 1994; (2) granting to Plaintiff exclusive use and occupancy of the parties' residence in Newnan, Georgia, pendente lite; (3) directing Defendant to pay all of the carrying charges and expenses related to the parties' residence located in Newnan, Georgia, including but not limited to, monthly mortgage, include real estate taxes and homeowner's insurance, home owner's association fees, gas electric, fuel oil, water, cable, alarm system, cell telephone and home telephone, lawn and horticultural care, household repairs, and appliance repairs or replacement, if necessary, directly to the vendors and as non-taxable maintenance; and (4) awarding to the Plaintiff temporary child support for the parties' unemancipated child, to wit: Tiarra, born July 8, 1994, pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines, and (5) directing Plaintiff to pay temporary non-taxable maintenance pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236, as revised; (5) directing Defendant to maintain medical, dental, and hospitalization insurance for the Plaintiff and the infant issue of the marriage, and to pay all [*2]unreimbursed, uncovered and uninsured medical, dental, pharmaceutical, optical, psychological and psychiatric expenses incurred by the Plaintiff and the infant child, as well as the deductibles there; (7) directing Defendant to pay for the child's educational and extracurricular expenses, including but not limited to, all expenses related to Tiarra's college testing and application fees, the expenses related to graduation from high school at the end of the 2011/2012 school year, including but not limited to, her senior dues, senior picture, senior yearbook, senior trip, prom dress and other prom expenses, and expenses related to her anticipated attendance at college; (8) directing Defendant to maintain life insurance for the benefit of Plaintiff and the parties' unemancipated daughter; (9) directing Defendant to pay interim counsel fees in the sum of $10,000.00 to the Plaintiff's attorney pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237, as revised and (10) for such other and further relief as to this Court seems just, proper and equitable.
PAPERS NUMBERED
PapersExhibits
Order to Show Cause - Exhibits and Affidavits Annexed41277A-J
Answering Affidavits- Exhibits Annexed5A-D
Reply Affidavit-Exhibits Annexed41431A-C
Upon the papers listed above, this Order to Show Cause is hereby decided in accordance with this Decision/Order.
Plaintiff commenced the instant proceeding with the filing of a Summons with
Notice and Verified Complaint on September 15, 2011. On June 28, 2012, Plaintiff files
the instant Order to Show Cause seeking an Order: (1)granting to the Plaintiff pendente
lite custody of the parties' unemancipated child, to wit: Tiarra, born July 8, 1994; (2)
granting to Plaintiff exclusive use and occupancy of the parties' residence in Newnan,
Georgia, pendente lite; (3) directing Defendant to pay all of the carrying charges and
expenses related to the parties' residence located in Newnan, Georgia, including but not
limited to, monthly mortgage, include real estate taxes and homeowner's insurance, home
owner's association fees, gas electric, fuel oil, water, cable, alarm system, cell telephone
and home telephone, lawn and horticultural care, household repairs, and appliance
repairs or replacement, if necessary, directly to the vendors and as non-taxable
maintenance; and (4) awarding to the Plaintiff temporary child support for the parties'
unemancipated child, to wit: Tiarra, born July 8, 1994, pursuant to the Child Support
Guidelines, and (5) directing Plaintiff to pay temporary non-taxable maintenance
pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236, as revised; (5) directing Defendant to
maintain medical, dental, and hospitalization insurance for the Plaintiff and the infant
issue of the marriage, and to pay all unreimbursed, uncovered and uninsured medical,
dental, pharmaceutical, optical, psychological and psychiatric expenses incurred by the
Plaintiff and the infant child, as well as the deductibles there; (7) directing Defendant to
pay for the child's educational and extracurricular expenses, including but not limited to,
all expenses related to Tiarra's college testing and application fees, the expenses related
to graduation from high school at the end of the 2011/2012 school year, including but not
limited to, her senior dues, senior picture, senior yearbook, senior trip, prom dress and
other prom expenses, and expenses related to her anticipated attendance at college; (8)
[*3]directing Defendant to maintain life insurance for the
benefit of Plaintiff and the parties' unemancipated daughter; (9) directing Defendant to
pay interim counsel fees in the sum of $10,000.00 to the Plaintiff's attorney pursuant to
Domestic Relations Law § 237, as revised and (10) for such other and further relief
as to this Court seems just, proper and equitable. Defendant opposes the instant
applications. On October 4, 2012, both parties appeared with counsel. It should be
further noted that Plaintiff although reside in the State of Georgia with the parties'
children, she sought relief of New York State court for the pending action and the
applicability of pendente lite statue and child support statue of the State of New
York which is not applicable in the State of Georgia. But for the Defendant residing in
New York state there is no other nexus to New York State. After oral argument, the
motion was fully submitted.
Temporary Custody
Plaintiff seeks an Order granting her temporary custody of the child, Tiarra, born
July 8, 1994. New York Domestic Relations Law (hereinafter DRL) § 240 1(a),
provides that in a matrimonial proceeding, the court shall enter orders of custody
regarding the children of the marriage. DRL § 75-a(2) defines a "child" as an
individual who has not attained eighteen years of age. The parties' daughter, Tiarra,
reached the age of 18 years on July 8, 1994. Thus, Plaintiff's application seeking
temporary custody of Tiarra is moot. Accordingly, the application is denied.
Exclusive Use and Occupancy
Initially, Plaintiff sought an Order granting her exclusive occupancy of the
parties' residence in Newnan, Georgia, pendente lite. On October 4, 2012,
Plaintiff withdrew her application, on consent of both parties.
Temporary Maintenance
Plaintiff seeks an Order of temporary non-taxable maintenance pursuant to DRL § 236, as revised. Defendant opposes the application. Defendant argues that Plaintiff is employed full time and has additional self-employment income in the State of Georgia. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff is attempting to reap a financial windfall by application of the temporary maintenance guidelines of the State of New York since there is no equivalent statute in the State of Georgia where Plaintiff resides with the parties' children.
DRL §236 (B)(5-a) provides statutory guidelines to be applied in determining temporary maintenance awards in matrimonial proceedings. Like the Child Support Standards Act, application of the statutory guidelines results in a presumptive award of temporary maintenance. Unless the parties waive the application of the statutory guidelines, the Court must order the presumptive temporary maintenance award unless the court finds that the presumptive award would be unjust or inappropriate. Where the court finds that the presumptive temporary maintenance award would be unjust or inappropriate the court may adjust the presumptive temporary maintenance award upon consideration of the following factors as provided in DRL § 236(B)(5-a)(e)(1). Where the Court finds that the presumptive award of temporary maintenance is unjust or inappropriate and adjust the temporary maintenance award, the court shall set forth the presumptive temporary maintenance award, the factors considered and the reasons the court deviated from the presumptive temporary award in a written order.
Applying the statutory guidelines, the Court must first determine the annual income of the parties. Similar to the Child Support Standards Act, income is defined as gross income reduced by certain statutory deductions including FICA taxes actually paid and locality taxes. The Court [*4]is next required to perform two calculations using the parties' annual incomes, capping payor's income at $524,000.00. The resulting figures of the two calculations are compared. The presumptive award of temporary maintenance is the lesser of the two resulting figures or $0 of the result of the second calculation if less than or equal to $0.
In this proceeding, Plaintiff's 2011 W-2, reflects an annual income of $18,216.19. After statutory deductions in the sum of $765.08 for Social Security taxes and $264.13 for Medicare taxes, Plaintiff's income is calculated in the sum of $17,186.98. Plaintiff also earned an additional $8,914.70, from a second job, as reported on her 2011 1099 forms. Thus, Plaintiff's annual income is determined in the sum of $25,381.68. Defendant's gross annual income is reported in the sum of $174,166.86, including his income as reported on his 2011 W-2 forms and $6,000.00 of rental income as reported on his Statement of Net Worth. After statutory deductions in the sum of $6,282.03 for Social Security taxes, $2,639.99 for Medicare taxes and $6,000.64, for New York City locality taxes, Defendant's annual income is calculated in the sum of $159,243.34. Thus, Defendant is the payor spouse with an income of $159,243.33 and Plaintiff is the payee spouse with an income of $25,381.68.
For the first calculation, the court is required to subtract twenty percent (20%) of the payee's annual income from thirty percent (30%) of the payor's annual income. In the instant matter, thirty percent (30%) of Plaintiff's income is $47,773.02 and twenty percent (20%) of Defendant's income is $5,076.34. Thus, the result from the first calculation is $42,696.67.
For the second calculation, the Court is required to subtract the payee's annual income from forty percent (40%) of the parties combined annual income. The parties' combined annual income is $184,625.02. Forty percent (40%) of the parties' combined parental income is $73,850.00. The payee's (or Plaintiff's) income is $25,381.68. Thus, the result of the second calculation is $48,468.33.
The guideline amount for temporary maintenance is the lower of the resulting figures from the required calculations. Therefore, the presumptive temporary maintenance award is $42,696.67 annually, or $3,558.06 monthly, or $1,642.18 bi-weekly, or $821.09 weekly.
Considering the circumstances of this case and of the respective parties, the Court
finds that the amount of maintenance would be unjust and inappropriate and
will adjust the award accordingly, in consideration of the factors as enumerated in DRL
§ 236(B)(5-a)(e)(1). Specifically, the Court adjusts the presumptive temporary
maintenance award considering factors: (g) the existence and duration of a premarital
joint household or a pre-divorce separate household and (q) any other factor which the
court shall expressly find to be just and proper.
The statute provides that the Court may consider the existence of a pre-divorce separate household to determine if the presumptive temporary maintenance award is unjust or inappropriate. It is undisputed that Plaintiff and the parties' children relocated to Georgia in 2007, while Defendant continued to reside in New York. Although the parties offer opposite rationales for Plaintiff's relocation to the State of Georgia, there is no dispute that Defendant maintained both properties in the State of New York and State of Georgia from 2007 to present. As indicated in Defendant's Statement of Net Worth, Defendant pays both mortgages, home owner's insurances and real estate taxes in the sum of $4,705.00 without any contribution from Plaintiff. However, the utility bills are paid for individually with Plaintiff paying approximately $665.00 monthly for the property in the State of Georgia and Defendant paying approximately [*5]$400.00 monthly for the New York State property. From 2007, Plaintiff has been able to meet her monthly expenses without any bill being delinquent or in default. The parties have maintained their individual life style in separate states as they have chosen to do since 2007.
The statute further provides that the Court may consider any factor which the Court
expressly finds to be just and proper. A review of Plaintiff's Statement of Net Worth
shows that Plaintiff met monthly expenses without incurring any debt. Significantly,
Plaintiff argues that she has little income and is unable to meet her monthly expenses
since 2007. However, Plaintiff did not avail herself for approximately five years of the
judicial system in Georgia or New York to seek financial assistance from Defendant.
There was no explanation provided by Plaintiff for her delay given that she was in need
of financial assistance. Now Plaintiff commenced the instant proceeding to seek relief as
provided under DRL §236. Upon considering the circumstances of this case,
Plaintiff's application seeking temporary maintenance is denied.
Temporary Child Support
The Court now turns to the branch of Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause seeking an award of temporary child support for the parties' unemancipated child pursuant to the Child Support Standards Act (hereinafter "CSSA"). Defendant opposes the application. The parties have two children. The youngest is now 18 years of age. Defendant argues that Plaintiff commenced this proceeding within New York State to take advantage of the New York State statue which provides for later termination of child support until the age of 21. In the State of Georgia, the child support obligation terminates at the age of 18. Although the children have emancipated under the State of Georgia child support statute, Defendant argues that he continues to provide financial support for the children which continued from 2007 to present although the children reside in the State of Georgia. Although the youngest child is working, Defendant purchased a car for her and pays the monthly car note in the sum of $245.00. He also gives the child a monthly allowance of $120.00.
DRL § 236 (B)(7)(a) provides that the Court may award temporary child support. The statute further provides that when the Court has information regarding the income and assets of the parties, the Court may make an award of temporary child support pursuant to the CSSA as codified in DRL § 240 1-b(a). The CSSA provides a numeric formula for calculating child support awards.
The Court must calculate each party's annual income. Annual income is defined as gross income as reported on the party's most recent tax return reduced by FICA, including Social Security and Medicare taxes, New York City locality taxes actually paid and other statutory deductions. The parties' incomes are then combined to calculate the combined parental income. The parties' combined parental income, up to $136,000.00 is multiplied by the applicable child support percentage. The resulting amount is the parties' basic child support obligation, which shall be prorated in the same proportion as each parent's income is to the combined parental income. Where the combined parental income exceeds $136,000.00, the Court shall determine the amount of child support for the amount of the combined parental income which exceeds $136,00.00. The Court is required to consider the factors enumerated in DRL § 240 1-b (f) and/or the applicable child support percentage. The factors enumerated in DRL § 240 1-b (f) are as include the financial resources of the parties and the child; the physical and emotional health of [*6]the child and his/her special needs and aptitudes; the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage or household not been dissolved; the tax consequences to the parties; the non monetary contributions that the parents will make toward the child's care and well-being; the parents' educational needs; a determination that the gross income of one parent is substantially less than the other parent's gross income; the needs of the non-custodial parent's children from whom the non-custodial parent is providing support but are not subject to the instant action and whose support is not deducted from the non-custodial parent's income in determining income; expenses incurred by the non-custodial parent in exercising visitation; and any other factor the Court determines relevant in each case.
Where the Court finds that the non-custodial parent's pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is unjust or inappropriate, the Court shall direct the non-custodial parent to pay such amounts of child support as the Court finds just and appropriate. The Court shall set forth, in a written decision, the factors it considered, the presumptive child support obligation and the reasons that the Court did not order the presumptive child support obligation. To determine whether a non-custodial parent's pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is unjust and inappropriate, the Court shall consider the factors in DRL § 240 1-b (f).
The parties' incomes have been determined as, $25,381.68 and $159,243.34, respectively.The combined parental income is calculated in the sum of $184,625.02. The applicable child support percentage is seventeen percent (17%) as the parties have one (1) child under the age of 21 years. Multiplying the applicable child support percentage, of seventeen percent (17%) by the combined parental income up to $136,000.00, results in a basic child support obligation of $23,120.00. Defendant's pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is eighty-six percent (86%) of the obligation, as his proportionate share of the combined parental income is eighty-six percent (86%). Accordingly, Defendant's annual child support obligation, up to the first $136,000.00 of the combined parental income is $19,883.20 annually or $1,656.93 monthly.
The sum by which the combined parental income exceeds $136,000.00 is $48,625.02. The excess combined parental income in the sum of $48,625.02 multiplied by the applicable child support percentage results in the amount of $8,266.25. Defendant's pro rata share of this sum is $7,108.98, annually. Assuming, arguendo, that the Court applied the applicable child support percentage to the excess income, Defendant's basic child support obligation is the sum of $26,992.18 annually or $2,249.35 monthly.
The Court finds the Defendant's presumptive child support obligation, both on income up to $136,000.00 and on the sum which exceeds $136,000.00 to be unjust and inappropriate. The Court now considers the factors enumerated in DRL § 240 1-b (f). The child is currently attending college and is employed. Plaintiff has fewer financial resources than Defendant, but Defendant bears the financial responsibility for the parties' real properties, located in Georgia and New York. The parties have not submitted evidence that the child has special needs or aptitudes. Neither party has presented evidence regarding tax consequences. It is undisputed that both parties make non-monetary contributions to the child. The affidavits of both parties indicate that both parties celebrate significant events in the child's life, such as birthdays and graduations. Plaintiff attends college. It is unclear if Defendant attended college or obtained a college degree. Defendant failed to submit evidence regarding extraordinary expenses incurred while visiting the child. [*7]
Finally, the Court considers the factors it deems
relevant. It is well settled that, "in high income cases, the appropriate determinate under
DRL § 240 (1-b)(f) for an award of child support where parental income exceeds
the sum of $130,000 should be based on the child's actual needs and the amount required
for the child to live an appropriate lifestyle, rather than the wealth of one or both parties"
(Levesque v Levesque, 73
AD3d 990, 990 [2010]). In the instant proceeding, although the parties separated in
2007, Defendant continued to contribute to the expenses of Plaintiff and the parties'
children. Both the subject child and the parties' emancipated daughter received
automobiles as gifts from Defendant. Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant paid
expenses for the child, including her prom expenses and graduation expenses.
Furthermore, Plaintiff has not submitted evidence regarding the financial needs of the
child. Although Plaintiff alleges that she is unable to pay the children's expenses without
Defendant's financial assistance, she does not dispute that Defendant pays certain
expenses and failed to submit evidence to substantiate her claim. Notably, despite
Plaintiff's current claims, she did not avail herself of the legal system in Georgia or New
York seeking child support since her relocation in 2007. By Plaintiff inaction suggest
that there was sufficient income to manage her household expenses.Accordingly,
Plaintiff's application seeking temporary child support is denied with leave to renew at
trial.
Carrying Charges and Expenses of Georgia Residence
Plaintiff seeks an Order directing Defendant to pay all of the carrying charges and expenses related to the parties' residence located in Newnan, Georgia, including but not limited to, monthly mortgage, including real estate taxes and homeowners insurance, home owner's association fees, gas electric, fuel, oil, water, cable, alarm system, cell telephone and home telephone, law and horticultural care, household repairs, and appliance repairs or replacement, if necessary direct to the vendors and as non-taxable maintenance. Defendant opposes the application. Defendant argues that he pays certain expenses related to the Georgia residence, including the mortgage, property taxes, homeowner's insurance and home owner's association dues. Defendant requests that he continues the status quo.
It is undisputed that Defendant pays the mortgage expenses, real estate taxes, homeowner's insurance, and home owner's association fees on the parties' residence in Georgia and in New York. Considering the lifestyle of the parties, since their separation in 2007, Defendant shall maintain the status quo payments. Plaintiff's application for an Order directing Defendant to pay all the carrying charges and expenses related to the Georgia property is denied. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant shall continue to pay the mortgage, real estate taxes, homeowner's insurance and home owner's association fees related to the parties' residence located in Newnan, Georgia. Defendant shall continue to pay the cellular telephone bills as agreed in his affidavit in opposition. Defendant shall continue to provide the youngest child with a monthly allowance of no less than $120.00. Defendant shall continue to maintain the car payments for the child's 2012 Toyota Corolla automobile; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendant shall continue to pay the mortgage, real estate
taxes, homeowner's insurance, home owner's association fees and all other carrying
charges and utility bills related to the parties' residence located in Queens, New York.
[*8]Medical Insurance
Plaintiff seeks an Order directing Defendant to maintain medical, dental and hospitalization insurance for Plaintiff and the infant issue of the marriage, and to pay all unreimbursed, uncovered and uninsured medical, dental pharmaceutical, optical, psychological and psychiatric expenses incurred by the Plaintiff and the infant child, as well as the deductibles thereon. In his affidavit in opposition, Defendant consents to continue to insurance coverage for Plaintiff and the parties' children. Plaintiff's application seeking an Order directing Defendant to maintain medical coverage is granted on consent. It is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant is directed to maintain the medical coverage for Plaintiff and the parties' unemancipated child that were then effect prior to the commencement of this proceeding.
Plaintiff further seeks an Order directing Defendant to pay all unreimbusred health expenses incurred by Plaintiff and the parties' unemancipated child. Considering the circumstances of this case and the parties' lifestyle after Plaintiff's relocation to Georgia in 2007, Plaintiff's application seeking an Order directing Defendant to pay all unreimbursed health expenses of Plaintiff and the parties' unemancipated child is denied. It is hereby
ORDERED, that each party shall be responsible for his/her own
unreimbursed health expenses. The parties shall share the unreimbursed health expenses
for the parties' unemancipated child in equal proportion of 50/50%.
Child's Graduation Expenses
The Court now turns to the branch of Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause seeking an Order directing Defendant to pay for the child's educational and extracurricular expenses, including, but not limited to, all expenses related to the youngest child's college testing and application fees, the expenses related to her graduation from high school at the end of the 2011/2012 school year, including but not limited to, her senor dues, senor picture, senior yearbook, senior trip, prom dress, and other prom expenses, and expenses related to her anticipated attendance at college.
The child graduated from high school and Defendant paid for the child's extracurricular expenses, including the child's prom expenses and senior trip. Accordingly, Plaintiff's application seeking an Order directing Defendant to pay the child's extracurricular expenses is denied.
Regarding the child's college expenses, DRL § 240 1-b (c)(7) provides that the Court may direct a non-custodial parent to pay for "post-secondary, private, special or enriched education" for a child, in consideration of the circumstances of the case, the parties' circumstances and the best interest of the child. If the Court determines that such educational expenses are in the child best interest, the Court shall direct payment of the educational expenses in a manner determined by the Court.
Upon the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court is unable to determine the
child's educational expenses. Although Plaintiff states that the child plans to attend
college and live in the dorms, she failed to submit evidence regarding the child's
educational expenses. In contrast, Defendant states that he purchased an automobile for
the parties' child since it is the child's intent to commute to school. Neither party
presented evidence to substantiate that the child is enrolled in college and actually incurs
educational expenses. Accordingly, Plaintiff's application for an Order directing
Defendant to pay the child's educational expenses is denied with leave to renew [*9]at trial.
Life Insurance
Plaintiff seeks an Order directing that Defendant maintain life insurance for the benefit of Plaintiff and the parties' unemancipated child.
DRL § 236 (B)(2)(b)(5) provides that during the pendency of a matrimonial proceeding, neither party shall change the beneficiaries of any existing life insurance policies and each party shall maintain the existing life insurance policy in full force and effect. Thus, Plaintiff's application is granted to the extent that the parties have any existing life insurance policies. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the parties are directed to maintain all existing life
insurance policies existing at the time of commencement of this proceeding in full force
and effect, until further Order of the Court.
Interim Counsel Fees
Plaintiff seeks an Order directing Defendant to pay interim counsel fees in the sum of $10,000.00 to Plaintiff's attorney pursuant to DRL § 237. Defendant opposes the application and argues that the time records supplied by counsel are incomplete.
DRL 237(a) authorizes the Court to make an award of interim counsel fees and expert expenses in a matrimonial proceeding. The statute includes a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse. In exercising its discretion to award interim counsel fees, the Court shall seek to assure that each party is adequately represented. The Court shall consider the circumstances of the case and of the parties. Each party is required to file an affidavit with the Court detailing the financial agreement between the party and their respective attorney, including the amount of the retainer, the amounts paid and still owed, the attorney's hourly rate, the amounts paid or to be paid to any experts and any additional costs, disbursements or expenses. The Uniform Civil Rules for the Supreme Court and County Court 202.16(k) provides that a motion for counsel fees and expert fees in a matrimonial proceeding must include an affidavit of the movant's attorney stating moneys, if any, received toward legal fees from the movant or any other person on the movant's behalf, the attorney's hourly rate, the amounts paid or amounts to be paid to counsel and any expert, and any additional costs, disbursements or expenses, and money the attorney has been promised by the movant or another person on the movant's behalf.
Turning to the instant Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff's attorney annexed an affirmation, setting forth his hourly rate and retainer. Counsel affirmed that no third party paid or promised to pay Plaintiff's legal fees. A review of the affidavits and exhibits annexed to the instant Order to Show Cause includes conflicting information regarding funds received and payments made. Although Plaintiff's counsel's affirmation indicates that Plaintiff paid an initial retainer of $3,500.00, he further states that Plaintiff incurred the sum of $4,230.37 for legal fees and expenses, but has not fully exhausted the retainer. Additionally, a review of what appears to be a "time sheet" used by Plaintiff's counsel's firm for the purposes of billing, indicates that as of May 1, 2012, Plaintiff's counsel billed Plaintiff in the sum of $4,230.37. However, exhibit "I," which appears to be an invoice for Plaintiff's legal services and fees, shows a credit balance in favor of [*10]Plaintiff in the sum $2,279.63. Furthermore, although Plaintiff's counsel states that copy of invoices for legal services from the date counsel was retained until September 2012 were annexed to his reply papers, said invoices were not annexed. Upon Plaintiff's failure to clearly set forth sums paid by Plaintiff toward counsel fees, and legal fees actually incurred by Plaintiff, the application seeking counsel fees is denied.
All other applications not specifically granted or denied is deemed denied. The above constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
So Ordered,
Dated: February 26, 2013__________________________
Queens, New YorkPam Jackman Brown, JSC