| Fairmont Ins. Brokers, Ltd. v Schwab |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 50619(U) [39 Misc 3d 1215(A)] |
| Decided on April 22, 2013 |
| Supreme Court, Kings County |
| Schmidt, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Fairmont
Insurance Brokers, Ltd., Petitioner,
against Gabriel Schwab; AARON I. FREILICH; and G & A BUSINESS CONSULTING, LLC, Respondents. |
Petitioner Fairmont Insurance Brokers, Ltd. moves by verified petition pursuant to CPLR 7510 and CPLR 7514 to confirm the arbitration award, dated September 3, 2012, issued by the Rabbinical Court of Boro Park (the Beth Din) against Gabriel Schwab (Schwab), Aaron I. Freilich (Freilich), and G & A Business Consulting, LLC (collectively, Respondents).
For the following reasons, Petitioner's motion is granted.
I.Background
On April 1, 2006, Schwab and Freilich each entered into separate but identical Associate Insurance Producer Agreements with Petitioner (the Agreements). See Petition, Ex. C. Under the Agreements, Schwab and Freilich were subject to restrictive covenants, which would be triggered upon termination of the Agreements. Id. ¶ 24. In addition, Petitioner lent Respondents in excess of $165,000.00, that has not been paid.
As a result of certain alleged breaches of the Agreements by Respondents,Petitioner commenced an action against Schwab and Freilich (the Action). See Index No. 12160/2010.
Thereafter, the parties agreed to submit the Action to arbitration. Each of the parties executed an agreement to arbitrate, dated May 5, 2011 (the Arbitration Agreement), by which they agreed "to refer all disputes and matters in controversy whatsoever between them [in any way connected or arising out of the above mentioned controversy] to a Beth Din panel consisting of Rabbis Reuven P. Alt, Shmuel C. Gurwitz, Usher B. Landau for a final and binding determination ...." See Petition, Ex. D. The Arbitration Agreement also provides that "[t]he Beth Din shall have jurisdiction over all matters related to their dispute(s) until the final decision [*2]is made..." Id. Subsequently, the Beth Din convened and held seven evidentiary hearings.
On September 3, 2012, the Beth Din issued a ruling (the September 3rd Ruling),
signed by the Beth Din, which was arrived at by the consent of the parties. See
Petition, Exs. A and B. In the preamble, the Beth Din enumerates the disputes that were
to be resolved by the arbitration and to which its ruling was directed: "compliance with
an employment contract that the parties signed on April 26, 2006 of the civil calendar,
monies lent the [Respondents] by the [Petitioner]; and claims by both parties for legal
fees incurred, and the related." Id. In resolving these issues, the September 3rd
Ruling provides the following rulings:
1.The [Respondents]must pay the [Petitioner] the amount of $145,000 for
the loan.
2.The [Petitioner] must pay the [Respondents]the amount of $38,041.68 for
brokerage.
Aside of this, the [Petitioner] do[es] not owe the [Respondents]brokerage fees.
3.The [Petitioner] must pay the [Respondents]the amount of $7,500.00 for
legal fees.
4.The [Respondents]must pay the [Petitioner] two thirds of the loss caused
through their
negligence. According to the claims of the [Petitioner], the loss to date is
$12,590.00, and it is on the [Petitioner] to provide an [sic] detailed calculation of the loss. According to the claims of the [Petitioner], the maximum loss is $50,000.00.
they transferred the health insurance of the Agri Corp. to a different agent, they
cannot be held financially liable for it.
In total, the [Respondents] owe the [Petitioner] $107,851.65 [FN1]
7.The [Petitioner] cannot prevent the [Respondents] from working as
insurance agents.
8.The [Respondents] must not solicit any clients currently with the plaintiff,
for a period of eighteen months starting today.
9.All other claims of the parties were dismissed.
10.If there will be any doubt related to this Rabbinical Court Ruling, it will
be decided by this Rabbinical Court only.
See Petition, Ex. B (bolded emphasis in original).
On October 24, 2012, Petitioner commenced this confirmation proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75, as against Respondents, to confirm the September 3rd Ruling.
Following the issuance of the award, Respondents allege that they unsuccessfully
[*3]attempted to negotiate a payment schedule for
payment of the $107,851.65, at which time Respondents contacted the Beth Din and
asked them to resolve the negotiation dispute. See affirmation of Gabriel
Schwab, dated February 13, 2013, ¶ 5. The Beth Din contacted Petitioner on
November 5, and 14, 2012 to schedule a hearing with regard to this matter. Id.,
Ex. A ( e-mails from Beth Din to Petitioner). Petitioner refused to appear.
II.Discussion
CPLR 7510 provides that a "court shall confirm an award upon application of a party made within one year after its delivery to him, unless the award is vacated or modified upon a ground specified in section 7511." CPLR 7510. Pertinent to this discussion, an arbitration award may be set aside on the ground that the arbitrator "exceeded his power or so imperfectly executed it that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." CPLR 7511 (b) (1) (iii). An award will not be vacated "unless it is violative of a strong public policy, is totally irrational, or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power." Hausknecht v Comprehensive Med. Care of New York, P.C., 24 AD3d 778, 779 (2d Dept 2005). Where no such grounds exist, a "judgment shall be entered upon the confirmation of an award." CPLR 7514 (a).
Petitioner moves to confirm the September 3rd Ruling, primarily on the ground that the application is timely, as it has been made within one year of the Beth Din's September 3rd Ruling.
In opposition, Respondents assert the September 3rd Ruling was not a final ruling as to the subject matter of the parties dispute because it did not include a structured payment plan for payment of the $107,851.65 award. As such, the award is incomplete and not ripe for confirmation. To support this argument, Respondents maintain that the Beth Din was not divested of its jurisdiction over this issue upon the issuance of its ruling. In support, Respondents rely on paragraph 10 of the September 3rd Ruling, which provides that: "[i]f there will be any doubt related to this Rabbinical Court Ruling, it will be decided by this Rabbinical Court only." See Petition, Ex. B. Respondents also point to the Arbitration Agreement, which provides, in part, that:
The Beth Din shall have jurisdiction over all matters related to their dispute(s) until
the final decision is made and it shall be the decision of the panel as to whether a matter
is related to the dispute or not The Beth Din is authorized to add to, amend, change or
clarify a decision as in the Beth Din's discretion is necessary.
See Petition, Ex. D.
However, Respondents' reliance on the aforementioned provisions is misplaced. The Beth Din's reservation of jurisdiction to resolve disputes relating to its September 3rd Ruling does not deprive the award of its finality and definiteness for the purposes of CPLR 7511. See Matter of Meisels v Uhr, 79 NY2d 526, 536 (1992) (concluding that award that disposed of controversy submitted was not rendered non-final by the fact that the arbitration tribunal retained jurisdiction to resolve any disputes which might arise as the parties undertook to execute award). Significantly, an award is deficient and subject to vacatur "only if it leaves the parties unable to determine their rights and obligations, if it does not resolve the controversy submitted, or if it creates a new controversy." Bd. Of Educ. Of Amityville Union Free School Dist. v Amityville Teacher's Ass'n, 62 AD3d 992, 993-994 (2d Dept 2009). [*4]
The award in this case, as set forth in the September 3rd Ruling, comprehensively determined the parties' rights and obligations with respect to what monies were owed and how the restrictive covenants contained in the Agreements were to be effectuated, leaving no uncertainty. Thus, the award was not lacking finality or definiteness, regardless of whether or not the Beth Din continued to retain jurisdiction.
Moreover, the September 3rd Ruling has all of the characteristics of a final decision. Notably, the September 3rd Ruling provides that: "[a]fter signing an arbitration agreement and performing an Agav Suder binding procedure {to adhere to the ruling} whether it is based on Jewish law or on a compromise; and hearing the parties' arguments, the following Rabbinical Court Ruling was issued by us ." See Petition, Ex. B.[FN2] Indeed, paragraph 9 of the September 3rd Ruling provides that: "[a]ll other claims of the parties were dismissed." Id. In this court's view, the Beth Din's Ruling is express and unambiguous with regard to its finality.
Nevertheless, during the parties' appearance before the court on February 20, 2013, Respondents were provided with an opportunity to make a final supplemental submission. As directed by the court, this submission was to be limited to informing the court of the existence of a case standing for the proposition that, under New York law, an arbitration panel is not divested of its jurisdiction upon its issuance of an arbitration award. However, Respondents' letter, dated March 8, 2013, fails to provide the requested authority.
Even if the Court were to consider Respondents' March 8th Letter, Respondents' assertion therein, made in reliance upon an undated e-mail purportedly sent from the Beth Din, stating, "the method of payments is an integral part of the award to be determined by the Bais Din," is untenable. See Respondents' March 8th Letter. As an initial matter, and as previously stated, simply because the Beth Din retained jurisdiction to clarify its rulings, does not make an award indefinite and non-final for the purposes of CPLR 7511. Furthermore, under the circumstances, it would be assumed that something of such importance as the timing of payments would have been made explicit in the Beth Din's Ruling. However, this purported "integral part of the award" is not referenced either in the Ruling or was referenced as a subject of the parties' dispute.
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds the September 3rd Ruling to be a final ruling as to the parties' disputes and the application by Petitioner to confirm the award is granted.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Petitioner's application
pursuant to Article 75 of the CPLR is granted in its entirety and judgment is entered
confirming the arbitration award in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Petitioner have,
and the Kings County Clerk is hereby directed to enter, judgment against Respondents
Gabriel Schwab, Aaron I. [*5]Freilich and G & A
Business Consulting, LLC, jointly and severally, in the principal amount of $107,851.65;
and it is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Respondents are enjoined from soliciting any of Petitioner's clients for a period of eighteen months commencing September 3, 2012 through and including April 3, 2014; and it is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Petitioner cannot prevent
Respondents from working as insurance agents.
Dated: April 22, 2013
ENTER:
_______________________
J.S.C.