Appeals from (1) an order of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Fred J. Hirsh, J.), entered December 14, 2010, and (2) a judgment of the same court entered January 13, 2011. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendants'

motion to set aside the jury verdict and for a new trial on the issue of damages. The judgment, upon the jury verdict, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $6,867.65. [*2]

ORDERED that the appeal from the order entered December 14, 2010 is dismissed, as the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501 [a]); and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Insofar as relevant to this appeal, plaintiff law firm asserted four causes of action, including one for quantum meruit to recover the principal sum of $6,867.65 for legal services rendered in connection with its representation of defendants. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on the quantum meruit cause of action in the sum of $6,867.65. By order entered December 14, 2010, the District Court denied defendants' motion to set aside the jury verdict and for a new trial on the issue of damages. A judgment was subsequently entered on January 13, 2011 awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $6,867.65.

A verdict should not be set aside as against the weight of the evidence "unless the jury could not have reached the verdict on any fair interpretation of the evidence" (Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129, 134 [1985]), and "great deference must be given to the fact-finding function of the jury" (id. at 136). The question of whether plaintiff provided legal services to defendants and whether defendants were aware that this work was being done on their behalf came down to the jury's resolution of the credibility of the witnesses, which the jury was in the best position to resolve. In reviewing the record to ascertain whether the verdict was based upon a fair interpretation of the evidence, we find that the record contains sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have concluded that plaintiff had provided legal services and that defendants had accepted them. Thus, contrary to defendants' contention, it was not unreasonable or irrational for the jury to have found that plaintiff was entitled to recover under a quantum meruit theory, and it cannot be said that the jury's verdict in favor of plaintiff was not supported by sufficient evidence or that it should be set aside as against the weight of the evidence.

A trial court has broad discretion in determining the materiality and relevance of proffered evidence (see Caplan v Tofel, 58 AD3d 659 [2009]). In our opinion, the District Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in excluding the admission into evidence of a confession of judgment in order to impeach plaintiff's witness's credibility, as it was irrelevant and collateral to any issue in the case.

While defendants seek review of the District Court's oral dismissal of their third-party complaint, this dismissal was never embodied in either the order entered December 14, 2010 or the judgment. Therefore, the dismissal of the third-party complaint is not properly before this court at this juncture (cf. CPLR 5501 [a]; 5513). Defendants' remaining arguments lack merit.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Nicolai, P.J., Iannacci and Tolbert, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: May 13, 2013