| Somerset v City of New York |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 50865(U) [39 Misc 3d 1233(A)] |
| Decided on May 10, 2013 |
| Supreme Court, Kings County |
| Velasquez, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Patricia
Somerset, as Executrix of the Estates of Julian Jackson, Deceased, and Leon Khay
Cochran, Deceased; and Francis Aguirre,, Plaintiffs,
against The City of New York, The Board of Education of the City of New York, The New York City School Construction Authority, Keyspan Energy Corporation, and Stephen D. Morales, as Administrator of the Estates of Leonard Walit, Deceased, and Harriet L. Walit, Deceased,, Defendants. Patricia Somerset, as Executrix of the Estates of Julian Jackson, Deceased, and Leon Khay Cochran, Deceased; and Francis Aguirre, Plaintiffs, Stephen D. Morales, as Administrator of the Estates of Leonard Walit, Deceased, and Harriet L. Walit, Deceased, Defendants. Stephen D. Morales, as Administrator of the Estates of Leonard Walit, Deceased, and Harriet L. Walit, Deceased, Plaintiff, The City of New York, The Board of Education of the City of New York, The New York City School Construction Authority, and Keyspan Energy Corporation, Defendants. Noreen Davidsen, Plaintiff, Stephen D. Morales, as administrator of the estates of Leonard Walit, deceased, and Harriet L. Walit, deceased, and Keyspan Energy Corporation, Defendants. Patricia Somerset, as Executrix of the Estates of Julian Jackson, Deceased, and Leon Khay Cochran, Deceased; and Francis Aguirre, Plaintiffs, - - against Stephen D. Morales, as Administrator of the Estates of Leonard Walit, Deceased, and Harriet L. Walit, Deceased, Defendants. Stephen D. Morales, as Administrator of the Estates of Leonard Walit, Deceased, and Harriet L. Walit, Deceased, Plaintiff, - - against The City of New York, The Board of Education of the City of New York, The New York City School Construction Authority, and Keyspan Energy Corporation, Defendants. Noreen Davidsen, Plaintiff, - - against Stephen D. Morales, as administrator of the estates of Leonard Walit, deceased, and Harriet L. Walit, deceased, and Keyspan Energy Corporation, Defendants. |
The Following Papers Read on Three Motions (Keyspan)
and One Cross Motion (the Walits' Estates):
In these actions to recover damages for wrongful death and property damage resulting from a single explosion of natural gas, the following motions and cross motion have been consolidated [*2]for disposition and, upon consolidation and after oral argument:
In actions No. 1, 4, and 5, the separate motions of the defendant Keyspan Energy Corporation (Keyspan) for an order, pursuant to CPLR 3212, granting it summary judgment dismissing all claims and cross claims insofar as asserted against it are denied in each of these actions.
In action No. 1, 3, and 5, the combined cross motion of the defendant Stephen D.
Morales, as administrator of the estates of Leonard Walit, deceased, and Harriet L. Walit,
deceased, for an order, pursuant to CPLR 3212, granting him summary judgment
dismissing all claims and cross claims insofar as asserted against these estates is also
denied in each of these actions.
Background [FN1]
On July 21, 2000,[FN2] a natural gas explosion occurred in the cellar of the brownstone located at 420 State Street in Brooklyn, New York, in the service territory of Keyspan. The explosion (1) completely destroyed this semi-detached brownstone, turning it into a pile of debris, (2) severely damaged the brownstone at 418 State Street to which it was attached, (3) killed the brownstone's co-owners and residents, Leonard Walit and Harriet L. Walit (the Walits), and (4) also killed a co-owner and resident of the adjacent brownstone at 418 State Street, Leon Khay Corcoran, who was then visiting the Walits in their brownstone. The explosion also destroyed (1) all possessions of the brownstone's sole tenant, Noreen Davidsen, who was not at home at the time, and (2) most of the possessions of the co-owner/resident of the brownstone at 418 State Street, Julian Jackson (now deceased), and of another resident of that brownstone, Francis Aguirre.
A post-incident reconstruction of that day's events established that at about 4:45
Natural gas to the brownstone was supplied by a
Keyspan service line which entered the brownstone's cellar through the wall that was
facing the front of State Street. The service line passed through a Keyspan-owned,
diaphragm-type gas meter and then connected by house piping to the Walits' boiler,
hot-water heater, stove, and dryer.[FN6] The meter and the meter piping
(i.e., the inlet piping to the meter) were Keyspan's responsibility to maintain and
repair. The house piping (i.e., the outlet piping from the meter) were the Walits'
responsibility to maintain and repair. Gas leaks that occur in the meter piping
(i.e., at any point before the meter) do not register on the meter. In
contrast, gas leaks that occur in the house piping (i.e., at any point after
gas passes through the meter and then leaks through the house piping) are registered in
the meter. Keyspan's testing, which was witnessed by the FDNY and the PSC
personnel,[FN7]
found both the Walits' meter (which the FDNY had recovered intact from the incident
scene) and the in-ground service line to be leak-free. Keyspan also conducted a gas-flow
simulation test to determine how much gas could have passed through the Walits'
meter.[FN8]
Although the Walits' meter (American AL425; serial no. 9789501) was registered at the
maximum gas-flow capacity of 415 cubic feet per hour, Keyspan was able, as part of its
laboratory test, to push through this meter a total of 2 cubic feet of gas in as little as
10.62 seconds, or at the flow of 677 cubic feet per hour.[FN9] The record is unclear whether, in the
field conditions rather than in its laboratory, Keyspan would have been able to push gas
at the sustained flow of 677 cubic feet per hour through the Walits' meter for at least
several consecutive hours, rather than for only 10.62 seconds. Moreover, Keyspan's
foreman supervisor Joet Richards — the only deposed individual with some
understanding about how gas meters worked — was unsure whether the Walits'
meter would have been capable of sustaining this level of gas flow. He testified (at page
84 of his pretrial deposition) that "[w]henever the meter is made to pass per hour, that's
what it's going [to] pass. No more than that." He conceded (at pages 87- 88) that he could
not comprehend why Keyspan would use a higher flow of 677 cubic feet per hour rather
than the Walits' meter's rated capacity of 415 cubic feet per hour. Be that as it may,
Keyspan provided the FDNY with a finding [*4]that the
gas flow of the Walits' meter was 667 cubic feet per hour. Next, Keyspan provided the
FDNY with (1) the Walits' pre-incident gas usage, as recorded on their meter, and (2)
their gas usage for approximately the same period in the immediately preceding year.
Based on Keyspan's finding that the gas flow of the Walits' meter was 667 cubic feet per
hour and further based on Keyspan's representations regarding the magnitude of the
Walits' gas usage, the FDNY calculated that 4,711.72 cubic feet of gas had passed
through the Walits' meter but could not otherwise be unaccounted for.[FN10] (It appears that the
Walits' boiler was not shut off despite the summer season.[FN11]) The FDNY concluded that such
unaccounted-for gas must have leaked "from an open pipe in the system."[FN12] The FDNY's
calculation and conclusion, as set forth in its investigation report, are worth quoting in
full herein:
"1.In a 63 day billing period in 1999 (5/26/00 to 7/27/00), 420 State St. [i.e.,
the Walits' meter] used 4500 cubic feet of natural gas.
Whereas the
FDNY during its investigation pegged the leak to an "open pipe in the system," the
FDNY sidestepped this issue altogether in its final "Fire and Incident" report which it
issued shortly before concluding its investigation. There, the FDNY stated that:
"Examination showed that the fire/explosion originated in the subject
premises, in the cellar, in an area beyond the service meters which contained gas supply
piping, in the vapors of a flammable natural gas/air mixture" (emphasis
added).[FN14]
In its final report, the FDNY identified the house piping as the origin of the
fire/explosion, rather than as the origin of the gas leak. As a matter of
common sense, a fire/explosion are not the same as a gas leak. However, Supervising
Fire Marshal (SFM) Robert Byrnes, at his pretrial deposition, identified the origin of the
gas leak in the house piping. He explained that he reached this conclusion by eliminating
what he believed to be all other potential causes of the gas leak; namely, the in-ground
street line and the Walits' meter. He theorized that if both the in-ground street line and
the Walits' meter were leak-free as Keyspan said they were after testing them, then a gas
leak must have originated in the house piping, such as from a break in the house piping
or in a flexible connector to a gas-fired appliance.[FN15] But this simplistic elimination of
other potential causes of the gas leak does not suffice, without more, to establish actual
causation. Significantly, SFM Byrnes' conclusion that the gas leak originated in the
house piping could not be confirmed by physical evidence. The broken piping that the
FDNY had recovered from the brownstone provided [*6]no clue as to the origin of the gas leak.[FN16] When SFM Byrnes
was questioned closely at his pretrial deposition as to how he arrived at his conclusion
that the gas leak originated in the house piping, he repeatedly hedged in his answers and
descriptions of what the FDNY found in the course of its investigation. His answers
ranged between the two extremes of "we can't be specific" on the one hand and "the most
probable cause" on the other hand.[FN17] It is unclear to the Court whether his
vacillation resulted from the insufficient data provided by Keyspan to him and others at
the FDNY, his fading memory of the events (his deposition was taken nine years after the
incident), or some other reason.
The incident gave rise to six lawsuits, four of which have
remained active (actions No. 1, 3, 4, and 5).[FN18] The former owners and residents of
the adjacent brownstone at 418 State Street sued Keyspan and the Walits' estates jointly
in action No. 1 and, separately, the Walits' estates alone in action No. 3. The Walits'
estates, in turn, sued Keyspan in action No. 4. The Walits' tenant, Ms. Davidsen,
separately sued Keyspan and the Walits' estates in action No. 5. The causes of action
sounded in common-law negligence and wrongful death.
Keyspan has moved, by separate motions, for summary judgment dismissing the
complaints and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it in each of actions No. 1, 4,
and 5. The Walits' estates have cross-moved, by a combined cross motion, for summary
judgment dismissing the complaints and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them
in each of actions No. 1, 3, and 5.
CPLR 3212 (b)
provides, in relevant part, that:
"A motion for summary judgment shall be supported by affidavit, by a copy of the
pleadings and by other available proof, such as depositions and written admissions. The
affidavit shall be by a person having knowledge of the facts; it shall recite all the
material facts; and it shall show that there is no defense to the cause of action or that the
cause of action or defense has no merit. The motion shall be granted if, upon all the
papers and proof submitted, the cause of action or defense shall be established
sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in favor of any
party. . ." (emphasis added).
"[T]he proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing
of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to
demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact. Failure to make such prima facie
showing requires a denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing
papers" (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [internal citations
omitted]). "While the burden of proof is easily defined, satisfying the standard is often
elusive" (Andrew Wolfe, Defining and Meeting Forgotten Burdens of Proof,
NYLJ, May 6, 2013 at 4, col 2). "As a general rule, a party does not carry its burden in
moving for summary judgment by pointing to gaps in its opponent's proof, but must
affirmatively demonstrate the merit of its claim or defense" (L & D Service Sta., Inc.
v Utica First Ins. Co., 103 AD3d 782, 783 [2d Dept 2013]).
Turning to the
elements of plaintiffs' claims against Keyspan, no dispute exists that Keyspan may be
held liable if it received actual or constructive notice of a gas leak or of a defective
piping, and had an adequate opportunity to remedy it (see Algood v 2160-2164 Caton,
LLC, 4 AD3d 442, 443 [2d Dept 2003]; Mittendorf v Brooklyn Union Gas
Co., 195 AD2d 449 [2d Dept 1993]). What constitutes actual or constructive notice
to a gas utility of a gas leak or a defect in the gas piping is typically a question of fact for
the jury (see NY PJI § 2:189).
In support of its initial burden of proof on the lack of notice, Keyspan offers four
pieces of [*9]evidence. First, Keyspan offers the
deposition testimony of the tenant in the brownstone, Noreen Davidsen, who left the
brownstone at 1 Mr. Smith's subsequent affidavit does nothing to establish that Keyspan lacked a
pre-incident notice of the gas leak. His record search, as explained in his affidavit, was
limited to those complaints that either would have come from the subject brownstone at
420 State Street or would have identified the subject brownstone as a gas-leak
site.[FN24] He
performed no search for any records [*10]regarding
receipt of complaints of gas leaks from the brownstone's neighbors, including a
next-door cooperative apartment building at 422 State Street. His failure to search for
gas-odor complaints from the brownstone's neighbors is puzzling, considering that such
information was available as indicated by an FDNY investigator's note that Keyspan had
advised him that "[t]here were no reports of natural gas leaks in the area seventy
two hours prior to the subject incident to Brooklyn Union/Keyspan" (emphasis
added).[FN25] As
neither the Walits nor their tenant Ms. Davidsen was at home when the gas leak was
recognized by their neighbor at about 4:45 A gas utility may be
held liable if its meter or meter piping was defective (see Reid v Westchester Light.
Co., 236 NY 322, 326 [1923]). To be entitled to summary judgment on this basis,
Keyspan must demonstrate that a gas leak did not originate from the Walits' meter or the
meter piping. To this end, Keyspan offers an FDNY investigator's report [FN29] stating that the
FDNY investigators witnessed Keyspan testing of the Walits' meter and that it passed a
"flow-rate test" indicating that it was leak-free.[FN30] The finding that the Walits' meter
was leak-free, however, does [*12]not eliminate the
potentiality that the connection-fitting tightness of the meter piping was
inadequate.[FN31] As Keyspan's gas-meter tester Joet
Richards conceded (at page 90 of his pretrial deposition), his testing of the Walits' meter
did not account for whether or not there may have been any leaks at the juncture of the
meter piping and the Walits' meter. Assuming, without deciding, the validity of
Keyspan's theory that the Walits' house piping was leaking as reflected by the increased
usage on their meter, this theory does not foreclose a concurrent leak at the
connection of the meter piping and their meter.
More fundamentally, Keyspan's proof does not sustain its theory that the cause of the
incident was a gas leak in the house piping. The only evidence in this regard comes from
an inadmissible and unauthenticated PSC report, dated July 18, 2000, from Mike
Henriquez, Junior Engineer, to Joseph Klesin, Supervising Assistant Utility Engineer.
This internal report concluded (at page 6), that "[t]he source of the escaping natural gas
was downstream of the meter set but was unable to be pinpointed"[FN32] and that "Brooklyn
Union's facilities were not involved in the incident."[FN33] As Keyspan [*13]has submitted no testimony or affidavit from any
individual at the PSC to establish foundation for the admission of this internal report as a
business record, such report is hearsay and inadmissible for any purpose in support of
Keyspan's summary judgment motion for which relief must be based exclusively on
admissible evidence.[FN34]
Keyspan's next piece of evidence is an FDNY investigation report on the results of
Keyspan's gas-flow simulation test for the Walits' meter. Based on the Walits' prior year's
usage and the gas flow rate through their meter, the FDNY calculated that it would have
taken about 7 hours at a flow rate of 677 cubic feet per hour to account for about 4,712
cubic feet of excessive gas use compared to the prior year's use. The FDNY then isolated
the period of about 7 hours on the day of the incident during which both the tenant and
the Walits were away from the brownstone. According to the FDNY, it would have taken
about 7 hours to account for the lost gas. Because no one was in the brownstone for
about 7 hours immediately preceding the incident, the FDNY posited that "[a]llowing
room for error, the [7-hour] time frame allows for that amount of gas to free-flow from
an open pipe in the system" (emphasis added). This conclusion appears to be
factually incorrect because, as noted above, the Walits' meter was rated at only 415 cubic
feet per hour and thus could not pass the 677 cubic feet per hour as the FDNY assumed
based on Keyspan's report.[FN35] Apart from [*14]this factual infirmity, the FDNY's conclusion that 4,712
cubic feet of gas escaped from the Walits' meter during the 7 consecutive hours that the
tenant and the Walits were absent from the brownstone, amounts to no more than a rank
speculation that the house piping was opened up by someone or that it somehow opened
up by itself within that time frame. In any event, the FDNY did not specify the origin of
the gas leak in the final report it issued at the conclusion of its investigation, and thus the
final report superseded any conclusions it reached in its prior investigation reports.
Keyspan's last piece of evidence on the origin of the gas leak — the pretrial
testimony of SFM Byrnes — fails to demonstrate as a matter of law that the gas
leak originated in the house piping. His pretrial testimony presented a view of only one
individual at the FDNY as to the potential location of the gas leak. Neither he nor anyone
else from the FDNY had performed any tests on the Walits' meter or the meter piping.
Merely because he witnessed Keyspan performing the testing does not mean that
Keyspan properly performed it in the first instance. He accepted Keyspan's test results
and all of its representations to the FDNY at face value. His technical knowledge of the
cause of the incident is second-hand, entirely derived from what Keyspan told him or
others at the FDNY.[FN36] Finally and crucially, his pretrial
testimony as to the potential location of the gas leak contradicts that of the FDNY's final
report which did not specify the location of the gas leak. In view of the inherently limited
nature of the FDNY's investigation, the inadmissibility of the PSC internal report, and
Keyspan's failure to provide to the Court any evidence that the gas leak originated in the
house piping, there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether the gas leak originated
in the house piping (cf. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v Turnerson's Elec.,
Inc., 280 AD2d 652, 653 [2d Dept 2001]). Consequently, Keyspan's separate
motions for summary judgment are denied without regard to the sufficiency of the
opponents' papers. In light of the foregoing, the parties' remaining arguments need not be
reached.
The cross motion by the Walits' estates for summary
judgment dismissing all claims and cross claims against them in actions No. 1, 3, and 5 is
denied because of the aforementioned controversy as to who was responsible for the gas
leak. Additionally, the cross motion is untimely with respect to action No. 3,
Davidsen v Morales (index No. 20622/01). The cross motion was served on Dec.
27, 2011, which was more than 60 days after the note of issue was filed on Apr. 11, 2011
in action No. 3, and the Walits' estates have failed to demonstrate good cause for the
delay (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Kings County Uniform Civil Term Rule, Part C [6]).
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Keyspan's separate motions for summary judgment are denied in
each of actions No. 1, 4, and 5; and it is further
ORDERED that the Walits' estates' combined cross motion for summary judgment is
denied in each of actions No. 1, 3, and 5; and it is further
ORDERED that the captions are amended to reflect the prior dismissal of the
defendants City of New York, the Board of Education of the City of New York, and the
New York City School Construction Authority; and it is further
[*15] ORDERED that counsel to the Walits' estates in
action No. 1 (Sullivan Papain Block McGrath & Canavo P.C.) shall serve a copy of this
decision and order with notice of entry on all other counsel appearing in actions No. 1, 3,
4, and 5 and shall file an affidavit of said service with the County Clerk in each of these
actions.
The parties are reminded that their next scheduled appearance is in JCP-1 on June
24, 2013.
This decision also constitutes the order of the Court pursuant to Rule 202.8 (g) of the
Uniform Rules for the New York State Trial Courts.
E N T E R,
J. S. C.
2.In the similar period of 2000 (5/24/00 to 7/12/00, the day following the
collapse), 420 State St. used 8900 cubic feet of natural
gas.
3.By 1999 standards, the projected average daily usage
for that 2000 period is approximately 71.42 cubic feet per day. That translates into a
projected 3500 cubic feet of gas usage in a comparable 49 day
period.
4.Subtracting the projected 3500 cubic feet from the
actual 8900 cubic feet, 5400 cubic feet of natural gas is unaccounted
for.
5.The gas at 420 State St. ran freely for 61 minutes
following the collapse, until Keyspan shut off the gas in the street [at 2042 hours]. . . .
At 677 cubic feet per hour, those 61 minutes would allow 688.28 cubic feet of
gas to escape. That now leaves 4711.72 cubic feet of gas unaccounted
for.
6.At 677 cubic feet per hour, it would take 6.96
hours to free flow that amount of gas.
7.A time frame
shows that the tenant at 420 State St. [i.e., Davidsen] left the building at
approximately 1300 hours and the building remained unoccupied until the Walits
returned home at approximately 1930 hours, and the collapse was reported at 1941 hours,
approximately 6.67 hours after the tenant left the [*5]building. Allowing room for error, the time frame [of
6.67 hours] allows for that amount of gas to free-flow [at the rate of 677 cubic feet per
hour] from an open pipe in the system.
8.The appliance
located in 420 State St. with the largest BTU/HR input is the Weil McClain boiler model
No. E-7-B, an AGA rating of 192,000 BTU/HR. There are 1050 BTUs in 1 cubic [foot]
of gas; therefore, if the unit failed, 182.86 cubic feet of gas could escape in one hour
(approximately 1281 cubic feet in 7 hours), and it would take 25.77 hours to meet the
4711.72 cubic feet of unaccounted-for gas" (emphasis added).[FN13]
Before addressing these motions, a
few words are warranted regarding the limited nature of the evidence which Keyspan has
submitted to the Court in support of its initial burden of proof. A natural gas explosion
on a summer weekday inside a brownstone located on a busy City block, resulting in
three fatalities and two destroyed residencies, was a man-made disaster that so
profoundly affected public safety that it demanded nothing less than full
disclosure.[FN19]
Instead, Keyspan has offered to the Court (1) the FDNY investigation file, (2) the pretrial
depositions, (3) two affidavits from Keyspan employees,[FN20] and (4) an internal memorandum
prepared by PSC. Keyspan has failed to submit to the Court a single, non-privileged
document of its own. It has submitted no repair/service history, no complaint history, no
repair/service tickets, no gas-usage history regarding its supply of gas to the brownstone
or to any other residence on the affected block. Along the same lines, it submitted no
sworn statement from any of its employees who performed the on-site investigation, even
though it had established a command center at the site of the incident (see Paul
[*8]Smith Tr at 20), had the homes evacuated, and
performed an investigation.[FN21] Moreover, although Keyspan was
the sole entity that performed all tests upon which the FDNY and the PSC based their
own separate investigations of the incident, and although Keyspan as a regulated utility
had the necessary equipment (which the FDNY and the PSC admittedly lacked) to test
meters and piping, it has failed to provide the Court with any of its own rules for
investigating gas explosions, conducting accident reconstructions, and performing
post-accident tests. Nor did Keyspan provide the Court with the general parameters
enunciated in the ANSI standards, the Fire Codes, and the PSC regulations. Keyspan's
failure to produce the information of this type has handicapped the Court in its review of
the limited record before it. By way of illustration, it can be taken as a given that the only
objective means a gas utility has of determining its customer's usage are the readings
obtained from a meter that is accurate. Although Keyspan tested the Walits' meter
for leaks, it never tested the Walits' meter for accuracy. Whether the Walits' meter was
accurate (or not) would, in turn, have affected the amount of the unaccounted-for gas that
passed through it. But no one has advised the Court whether or not such test should have
been performed either pursuant to Keyspan's own rules or pursuant to the generally
applicable (e.g. the ANSI) standards. What is more, the facts here go beyond
passive silence. Keyspan retained the Walits' meter after testing it. There is nothing in the
record indicating whether the Walits' meter is still in existence or whether Keyspan has
already destroyed it. As a result, no expert has been able to examine or test the Walits'
meter, even though, before the incident, Keyspan had scheduled the Walits' meter (which
was then 30 years old) for replacement — not once, not twice, but three times
— and every time Keyspan failed to replace it.[FN22]
Footnote 1:The facts, as gleaned
from the parties' submissions, are viewed, for the purpose of the instant motions and
cross motion for summary judgment, in the light most favorable to the non-moving
parties (see Baron Assoc., LLC
v Garcia Group Enters., Inc., 96 AD3d 793, 793-794 [2d Dept 2012]) and
giving them the benefit of every favorable inference (see Fleet Mtge. Corp. v
Rebich, 227 AD2d 518, 519 [2d Dept 1996]).
Footnote 2:All references are to the
year 2000, unless otherwise indicated.
Footnote 3:See the July 13th
Interview Sheet, Complaint — Follow-Up Information, "Subject: Canvas of State
St.," prepared by Kevin Dallos, Brooklyn Base, 35th Squad, FDNY, ¶ 5.
Footnote 4:Ms. Davidsen returned
to State Street only after the explosion.
Footnote 5:See the Aug.
2nd Interview Sheet, Complaint — Follow-Up Information, "Subject: Time Line,
7/11/00," prepared by Fire Marshal (FM) Dennis Kerbis.
Footnote 6:There was one other
meter in the cellar, and that meter (Rockwell RT210) was for Ms. Davidsen's stove in her
garden-floor apartment. Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this decision and
order are to the meter for the gas that was supplied to the Walits (hereinafter, the Walits'
meter).
Footnote 7:Neither the FDNY nor
the PSC (Public Service Commission) performed any incident-related tests. All of such
tests were performed by Keyspan.
Footnote 8:Keyspan conducted no
gas-flow simulation test on Ms. Davidsen's meter.
Footnote 9:Keyspan tested the
Walits' meter for gas-flow simulation two times. The first test (known as "Test #4")
yielded the flow of 677 cubic feet per hour, whereas the second test (known as "Test #5")
yielded the flow of 670 cubic feet per hour when Keyspan was able to push 2 cubic feet
of gas through the Walits' meter in 10.87 seconds. The FDNY used the higher of the two
test results. These tests are summarized in the Aug. 1st Interview Sheet, Complaint
— Follow-Up Information, "Subject: Gas Flow Simulation Test at Coney Island
Keyspan," prepared by FM Kerbis.
Footnote 10:Unlike the FDNY,
the PSC concluded that only 3,723 (rather than 4,711) cubic feet of natural gas was
unaccounted for before the explosion.
Footnote 11:See the July
17th Interview Sheet — Complaint Follow-Up Information, "Subject: Interview of
James Devereux 7/6/63" (the name of its preparer does not appear on the report).
Footnote 12:See the Aug.
2nd Interview Sheet, Complaint — Follow-Up Information, "Subject: Gas Flow
Simulation Test at Coney Island Keyspan," prepared by FM Kerbis, page 3, ¶ 7.
Footnote 13:See the Aug.
2nd Interview Sheet, Complaint — Follow-Up Information, "Subject: Gas Flow
Simulation Test at Coney Island Keyspan," prepared by FM Kerbis, page 3.
Footnote 14:See the July
17th FDNY's Fire and Incident Report, co-signed by Supervising Fire Marshal Robert
Byrnes.
Footnote 15:The Walits had only
four gas-fired appliances of their own in their brownstone: a 12-year-old boiler, a
hot-water heater of some undisclosed age, a stove, and a dryer (see the July 25th
Interview Sheet, Complaint — Follow-Up Information, "Subject: Interviews,"
prepared by FM Kerbis; see also the July 17th Interview Sheet, Complaint
— Follow-Up Information, "Subject: Brooklyn Union/Keyspan Tests and ID. of
Victims," prepared by FM Rignola [listing the appliances that were removed from the
incident scene]).
Footnote 16:See SFM
Byrnes Tr at 128-129 ("There were many pipes taken out of that building, broken, bent
or collapsed before or after the explosion. . . . We could not eliminate them as a source of
the leak or not. . . . Because the [brownstone] collapsed. There was a huge pile of debris.
I couldn't tell you which pipe came out of what location.").
Footnote 17:SFM Byrnes' pretrial
testimony is illustrative of his uncertainty as to the origin of the gas leak:
"In general, when a gas leaks and gets ignited, the [fire works] . . . back to
the source of the leak" (at 132) . . . "[W]e can't be specific in this particular case, beyond
the service meters, which contain[ ] gas piping, gas supply piping" . . . "We go through
the process of elimination" . . . "Based on a reasonable degree of scientific certainty,
eliminating the other possible sources of the gas leak, [the house piping] is the most
probable source of the leak" (at 134-135).
SFM Byrnes' reference to "a reasonable degree of scientific certainty"
amounts to a bootstrapping argument. Because he testified as a fact witness, rather than
as an expert, he could not enlarge his own testimony by declaring himself an expert and
then claiming, to "a reasonable degree of scientific certainty," that the gas leak originated
in the house piping.
Footnote 18:The remaining
actions No. 2 and 6 have been discontinued or dismissed. All City defendants have been
previously dismissed by order, dated Sept. 16, 2001 (Sup Ct, Kings County). Keyspan's
initially appealed this order but subsequently withdrew its appeal (see Davidsen v
Morales, 2012 NY Slip Op 63528[U] [2d Dept 2012]).
Footnote 19:The Mayor and the
FDNY Commissioner visited the incident scene.
Footnote 20:One affidavit is by a
Keyspan employee (Ron Johnson) who observed another Keyspan employee (Joet
Richards) test the Walits' meter. Because Mr. Richards was deposed, Mr. Johnson's
affidavit is redundant. The other affidavit is by a Keyspan employee (Paul Smith) who
performed a highly limited record search and came up with no meaningful results.
Footnote 21:Paul Smith, a
Keyspan day-shift dispatch supervisor who was summoned later that evening to
Keyspan's on-site command center vehicle, performed no investigation. Rather, he "stood
by waiting, made some calls back and forth to the office to see if [he] was needed and . . .
call[ed] for some equipment, ensuring employees were on location, they call it logistical
[sic] related" (Smith Tr at 23). He departed from the command vehicle at midnight of the
day of the incident and never returned to the site of the incident (id. at 22-23).
Footnote 22: To complicate
matters further, Keyspan replaced the gas service line to the next-door apartment building
at 422 State Street after the incident, and such work was performed in front of the
brownstone at issue (see Levinson Tr at 48 and 103). Whether or not Keyspan
replaced the brownstone's service line after the incident does not appear in the record.
This omission is material. In the event that Keyspan did replace the brownstone's service
line, then Keyspan should have included the piping from that service line as part of its
gas-flow simulation test on the Walits' meter, instead of using the standard piping from
its laboratory.
Footnote 23:As used at Keyspan,
the terms "service history" and "service-ticket history" are not synonymous. According to
Mr. Smith (at page 114 of his pretrial deposition), a service-ticket search is a
report of a service person's investigation. He explained (at page 113) that a
service-ticket search appears on a different computer screen than a
service-history search and that he performed no search for service tickets.
Footnote 24: See Smith
Aff, ¶ 3 ("I searched for all records relating to the service history at 420 State
Street, Brooklyn, New York in the two years prior to the incident."); ¶ 5 ("On
July 11, 2000 at 7:56
Footnote 25:See the July
17th Interview Sheet, Complaint — Follow-Up Information, "Subject: Brooklyn
Union/Keyspan tests and ID. of Victims," prepared by FM Salvatore Rignola. SFM
Byrnes testified (at pages 68-69 of his pretrial deposition) that the FDNY obtained this
information from Keyspan and did not independently verify its accuracy.
Footnote 26:Contrary to
Keyspan's position, the Walits' next door neighbors, who were registered nurses, could
properly testify, as lay witnesses, as to the type of odor they smelled (natural gas) and as
to the possible location it was coming from (the brownstone). No expert testimony was
required in that regard. As one commentator cogently summarized the distinction
between lay and expert witness testimony, "lay testimony results from a process of
reasoning familiar in everyday life, while expert testimony results from a process of
reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field. [A] lay witness with
experience could testify that a substance appeared to be blood, but that a witness would
have to qualify as an expert before he could testify that bruising around the eyes is
indicative of skull trauma" (see Advisory Committee Notes on Year 2000
Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 701 ["Opinion Testimony by Law
Witnesses"]).
Footnote 27:See
Levinson Tr at 82 ("[The Keyspan technician] said, Yes, I smell it [the gas odor],' and
that's when he put his meter on and he said, Yes, I see it.'"); at 85 ("[The Keyspan
technician] said, "I smell the gas, too.'"). See also Williams Tr at 16 ("[The
Keyspan technician] smelled it and that's when he took out his meter and he put it in the
kitchen around a little bit and then it registered. He explained to us how it had registered
and there was gas and that's when he started to pursue checking it.").
Footnote 28:See the July
13th Interview Sheet, Complaint — Follow-Up Information, "Subject: Canvas of
State St.," prepared by Kevin Dallos, Brooklyn Base, 35th Squad.
Footnote 29:See the July
17th Interview Sheet, Complaint — Follow-Up Information, "Subject:
Interviews," prepared by FM Kerbis.
Footnote 30:According to the
New York State regulations, a flow-rate test can be either (1) a "check-rate test" when a
meter test is conducted using a flow rate at the lower end of the meter's rated
capacity range, or (2) an "open-rate test" when a meter test is conducted using a flow rate
at the higher end of the meter's rated capacity range (see 16 NYCRR
226.2 [i]). Here, the flow-rate test of the Walits' meter was in the nature of a "check-rate
test," meaning that it was at the lower end of this meter's rated capacity range.
Keyspan has submitted no engineering criteria (as they may be set forth either in its own
engineering documents or in the standards and codes that are utilized in the natural gas
industry generally) indicating that Keyspan's use of the "check-rate test," i.e., at
the lower end of the meter's rated capacity range was appropriate for the Walits'
meter.
Footnote 31:Contrary to
Keyspan's position, the FDNY's July 17th investigation report does not conclude that
"the house pipes within 420 State Street were leaking gas." The only conclusion that FM
Kerbis reached in his report was that "[t]he testing for leakage in all 3 meters [2 meters
from 420 State Street and 1 meter from 418 State Street] was negative." Significantly, no
connection-fitting tightness of the Walits' meter was ever tested.
Footnote 32:Whereas the PSC
merely indicated that "[t]he source of the escaping natural gas was downstream of the
meter set but was unable to be pinpointed," Keyspan goes further to argue that the PSC
concluded that "a leak in those pipes caused the [in]cident." But this is not what
the PSC concluded. The PSC is silent in its report as to what caused the incident.
Footnote 33:How the PSC was
able to reach this conclusion is anyone's guess, as only the Walits' meter, together with
the service line, were tested by Keyspan, rather than by the PSC. The Court finds that the
PSC's assumption (on page 5 of its report) that Keyspan's flow-rate test "simulate[d] the
conditions found at the time of the incident" was flawed. First, the PSC's assumption (on
page 4 of its report) that the Keyspan system was operating at a "low pressure" of only
7-inches water column at the time of the incident is based on the use of some undefined
"district regulator charts," rather than on the actual on-site pipe pressure at the time of the
incident. Parenthetically, the Court notes that the phrase "low pressure" (a term of art in
the context of gas utilities) is determined by reference to what a typical customer
receives, rather than by reference to a pressure that is "low" compared to the meter's rated
capacity (see 16 NYCRR 255.3 [a] [15] [a "low-pressure distribution system"
means "a distribution system in which the gas pressure in the main is substantially the
same as the pressure provided to the typical customer"]). In this regard, the Court notes
that foreman supervisor at Keyspan's meter-testing facility (Joet Richards) testified (at
pages 82-83 of his pretrial deposition) that his "understanding" was that the gas pressure
going through the system was at a "low pressure" of about 14 inches water column, but
that he did not know whether the actual gas pressure varied in the field. The Court
further notes that, pursuant to 16 NYCRR 261.19 (a), Keyspan must notify a customer
once a year if the customer has received gas at a pressure in excess of 14 inches water
column at any time during that year. There is no evidence, one way or another, in this
case whether this provision had ever been triggered before the incident and, if so, if
Keyspan had complied with it. Where, as here, a key fact is in the exclusive knowledge
of the movant, summary judgment should be denied (see Van Slyke v Pargas,
Inc., 69 AD2d 927, 929 [3d Dept 1979]). Second, the use of a single continuous
50-foot length of polyethylene tubing to simulate the "service line" was not analogous to
the actual on-site service line at the brownstone that consisted of two separate 25-foot
lengths of polyethylene tubing (see PSC's report at 2, "[t]he service line that
supplies 420 State Street . . . is comprised of 25 feet of . . . polyethylene . . . and 25 feet
of . . . polyethylene insert . . . "). The term "service line" (another term of art in the
context of gas utilities) means "a piping, including associated metering and pressure
reducing appurtenances, that transports gas below grade from a main to the first
accessible fitting inside the wall of a customer's building when a meter is located within
the building. . . ." (16 NYCRR 255.3 [a] [29]).
Footnote 34:The PSC's unsworn
cover letter, dated Jan. 10, 2005, enclosing copies of some unspecified documents and
the PSC's unsworn cover letter, dated Feb. 2, 2005, enclosing some additional
unspecified documents, in each instance, in response to Keyspan's requests regarding the
incident, do not establish a foundation for the admissibility of the PSC report.
Footnote 35:As noted, Keyspan's
foreman supervisor Joet Richards testified (at page at 84 of his pretrial deposition),
"[w]henever the meter is made to pass per hour, that's what it's going [to] pass. No more
than that."). Mr. Richards indicated (at page 88) that the use of a higher rate of 667 cubic
feet per hour rather than the meter's stated rate of 415 cubic feet per hour was
incomprehensible to him.
Footnote 36:Significantly,
Keyspan has submitted to the Court no non-privileged documents of its own to
substantiate whatever it provided to the FDNY to assist in investigation.