This Court must determine inter alia if it was proper to entertain applications for child support, maintenance and equitable distribution where the plaintiff-movant and children have resided in the country of Jordan for more than a decade.

Plaintiff Rima I. Ahmad (plaintiff) seeks a divorce and ancillary relief against defendant Mousa A. Khalil (defendant). Plaintiff moves, under motion sequence number 1, by an order to show cause filed on September 27, 2012, for an order: (1) awarding her the sole and exclusive occupancy of the marital premises located at 18 Al Shafa Street, Swiefyh, Amman, Jordan (the marital premises), together with the sole and exclusive possession of all items of personal property, including but not limited to furnishings, furniture, and household items, located therein, (2) directing defendant to pay for all of the expenses to maintain the marital premises, to include, but not be limited to the mortgage, property taxes, homeowners' insurance, routine maintenance, and utilities, [*2]including electric, propane, water, cable, phone, and internet service, (3) awarding her the exclusive use and possession of the 2008 GMC Yukon Denali automobile, and directing defendant to continue paying the underlying note, insurance, and registration expenses of this vehicle, (4) directing defendant to continue paying for all of the children's private school tuition and academic expenses for their attendance at the Modern American School in Amman, Jordan, (5) directing defendant to provide and maintain at his own expense suitable and just policies of comprehensive health insurance for her benefit and for the benefit of the children of the marriage, and that defendant be directed to pay 100% of unreimbursed medical expenses for same, (6) directing defendant to provide and maintain at his own expense suitable and just policies of life insurance with an aggregate death benefit of $3,000,000 for her benefit and for the benefit of the minor children of the marriage, (7) directing defendant to pay her a reasonable sum of temporary spousal maintenance in accordance with his income and her standard of living, retroactive to the commencement of this action, but not less than $10,000 per month, (8) directing defendant to pay her a reasonable amount of child support, in accordance with the Child Support Standards Act, together with all of the ancillary relief therein, retroactive to the commencement of this action, (9) directing defendant to pay reasonable and suitable counsel fees, on her behalf, in the sum of $75,000, incurred or to be incurred by her in the prosecution of this action, (10) directing defendant to pay for the suitable appraisal fees of a neutral court-appointed appraiser to determine the value of defendant's business interests, to include but not be limited to: (a) Sunset Plumbing Supply, which is located at 6001 4th Avenue, in Brooklyn, New York, and (b) Area Plumbing Supply, which is located at 10924 101st Avenue, in Jamaica, New York, (11) directing defendant to pay for the suitable appraisal fees of a neutral court-appointed real estate appraiser to determine the value of defendant's interests in real estate in New York, (12) directing defendant to pay for the suitable appraisal fees of a real estate appraiser to determine the value of defendant's interests in real estate in Amman, Jordan, (13) directing defendant to pay for the fees of a forensic accountant to determine defendant's income stream for the purpose of establishing a final award of spousal support and child support, (14) directing that defendant, his attorneys, his agents, or his representatives, and anyone acting on defendant's behalf or at his direction or under his authorization be enjoined and restrained from conveying, secreting, dissipating, removing, transferring, encumbering, assigning, or otherwise disposing of any marital or separate assets of any nature whatsoever, real or personal, including but not limited to any bank accounts, contents of any safe deposit box, real property owned by defendant individual or jointly with any other persons, other than as may be necessary for ordinary living expenses during the pendency of this action, and (15) permitting her to appear telephonically with respect to the proceedings in this action.

By an emergency order to show cause filed on January 18, 2013, defendant moves, under motion sequence number 2, for an order: (1) vacating a January 7, 2013 order by the court, which, he asserts, was entered against him on default, and (2) denying plaintiff's [*3]September 27, 2012 pendente lite order to show cause in its entirety, or in the alternative, denying all aspects of this motion which are more properly addressed in Jordan and confining this court's involvement to equitable distribution of the parties' New York assets.

Defendant cross-moves, by a cross motion filed on February 4, 2013, under motion sequence number 3, for an order: (1) recognizing the parties' Jordanian divorce, and (2) dismissing plaintiff's pendente lite application in its entirety pursuant to CPLR 327 (a), or in the alternative, denying all relief requested in plaintiff's application with the exception of equitable distribution of the parties' New York marital property.

The parties were married in Amman, Jordan on March 11, 1993 in a religious ceremony. Prior to their marriage, plaintiff and defendant executed a prenuptial agreement in Jordan. Defendant is 47 years old and plaintiff is 36 years old. There are three children born of the marriage (the children).

The parties, who originally both lived in Jordan, after being married for nearly two and a half years, moved to Brooklyn, New York, in August 1995 to take advantage of economic opportunities here. The parties lived in Brooklyn for eight years until 2003. According to defendant, it was important to both parties that the children be raised in Jordan. Plaintiff asserts that defendant insisted that she and the children move back to Jordan so that the children could be raised in the ethnic and religious setting of that country. Since 2003 (for over a decade), plaintiff has resided in Jordan with the children, and they continue to reside in an apartment located in a four-family building at 18 Al Shafa Street, Swiefyh, in Amman, Jordan, which plaintiff refers to as the marital premises. Plaintiff states that her home in Jordan consists of four bedrooms and five bathrooms. Defendant resides at 123 93rd Street in Brooklyn, New York. Defendant claims that he attempted to convince plaintiff and the children to return to Brooklyn, but they refused to do so. Defendant has regularly visited with plaintiff and the children in Jordan, and has sent plaintiff money there, by money transfers via Western Union, on a regular basis. Plaintiff claims that defendant's brother makes inquiries as to her needs, and he informs defendant of what funds and items she needs, which are then provided by defendant and delivered to her by defendant's brother.

Plaintiff asserts that defendant currently provides her funds to pay the mortgage on her home in Jordan, which is held by the Housing Bank of Jordan, as the mortgagee, in the amount of $2,684 per month. She states that her house utilities are approximately $675 per month, and that she and the children spend about $2,800 per month for food and clothing. According to plaintiff's Statement of Net Worth, plaintiff spends $245 on household maintenance, plus $200 for a housekeeper. Plaintiff has a family car, which is a 2008 Yukan Denali Truck. Plaintiff claims that the payments on the car are $1,412 per [*4]month, not including gas and maintenance. The children attend one of the finest private school institutions in Jordan, which is called the Modern American School-Amman. The monthly school tuition for all three children is $2,740 per month. Plaintiff also spends $820 on monthly recreational expenses. Plaintiff's Statement of Net Worth sets forth that plaintiff's total family expenses are $15,060 ^[FN1] per month, which defendant has continued to provide to her. Plaintiff asserts that she and the children have become very comfortable with their current standard of living and totally depend upon the support provided to them by defendant.

Plaintiff and the children do not have any comprehensive health insurance. According to plaintiff, defendant provides funds needed for any medical attention that is required, and she spends an average of $300 per month for medical services. Plaintiff asserts that defendant does not permit her to manage the family finances, and that he verbally abuses her and treats her with disrespect by not permitting her to express her own opinion on many family issues.

Defendant operates two plumbing supply houses, one in Brooklyn and one in Queens, which plaintiff claims generate substantial income. Plaintiff is a housewife and mother, and is unemployed. As to the marital assets, plaintiff claims that defendant owns 23 real properties in New York, which are either in defendant's name directly or in the name of either of his two businesses or in entities owned directly by him. She states that she does not know the value of these properties or the income streams that may be generated by these properties. In addition, plaintiff states that defendant owns four separate properties in Jordan. One of these properties consists of a five-family dwelling which was built by defendant in 2002 and she claims is located in a very affluent area of Amman, Jordan. The second property is the four-family residence where plaintiff now lives, which she also asserts is located in a very affluent area of Amman, Jordan. Plaintiff asserts that defendant collects rental income from both of these Jordan properties on an ongoing basis. The third property in Jordan is vacant land which, plaintiff believes, is worth in excess of $500,000. The fourth property is a private house in an area in Jordan known as "Abdoun," which plaintiff believes has been leased.

In 2010, plaintiff commenced divorce proceedings in Jordan. Defendant was notified of this divorce action in Jordan, and he asserts that, at that time, he attempted to "smooth things over" with plaintiff. Although the Jordanian court had jurisdiction over the parties, plaintiff chose to abandon those proceedings, and defendant continued sending money to plaintiff, supporting her and the children. Defendant claims that in the summer of 2012, plaintiff asked him to pay for her and the children to go on vacation in Turkey in September 2012, and he gave them money in order for them to do so. Defendant asserts that at that time, he was unaware that plaintiff had already begun [*5]preparations for filing a divorce action against him in New York.

On September 27, 2012, plaintiff filed a summons and verified complaint in this court, along with her order to show cause which seeks pendente lite relief. Plaintiff's complaint seeks a divorce on the ground of constructive abandonment, pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (2), based upon defendant's refusal to have sexual relations with her commencing on or about March 25, 2011 and continuing for a period of more than one year immediately prior to the commencement of the action, and also on the ground of an irretrievable breakdown in her and defendant's relationship for at least six months prior to the commencement of this action, pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (7). Defendant was timely served with the verified complaint and order to show cause.

On November 13, 2012, the original return date of the order to show cause, defendant appeared pro se and the order to show cause and preliminary conference were adjourned in order for him to retain counsel. Defendant retained counsel who had, until that point, been retained by defendant exclusively for his business purposes. According to defendant, his first attorney did not have much experience in family law. Defendant claims that this former attorney assured him that the New York action would be dismissed, and that he was also assured by his attorney in Jordan that Jordan was a better forum in which to pursue a divorce action. Defendant asserts that while waiting for the New York action to be dismissed in accordance with the representations of his attorneys, he commenced a divorce action against plaintiff in Jordan.

On November 22, 2012, a judgment of divorce, divorcing the parties, was granted by Revocable Divorce Deed No. 43/11/491 issued by the Sharia Court Amman South in Jordan. The Sharia Court Amman South in Jordan has confirmed that "no return annotation" was found on the Revocable Divorce Deed No. 43/11/491, rendering the divorce irrevocable. The divorce in Jordan was for an absolute divorce only, and did not determine any ancillary issues. Plaintiff, by her counsel in Jordan, filed a custody petition in Jordan, which she, thereafter, withdrew. Plaintiff presently has custody of the children. Defendant has commenced a separate custody petition in Jordan, which remains pending there.

On November 27, 2012, defendant appeared with his then attorney. At that court appearance, counsel informed the court that he had just been retained and did not have much knowledge of the case, and the court adjourned plaintiff's order to show cause to December 21, 2012. On December 21, 2012, counsel failed to appear due to an automobile collision, and plaintiff's order to show cause was adjourned to January 7, 2013. On January 7, 2013, counsel attempted to file and serve a cross motion for an order: (1) pursuant to CPLR 302 (b) and Domestic Relations Law § 230 (5), dismissing this action based upon an alleged lack of jurisdiction and an alleged lack of residency requirements to maintain this divorce action in New York, and (2) granting a declaratory judgment giving full faith and credit to, and declaring and recognizing the foreign [*6]judgment of divorce issued by the Jordanian court. This cross motion was not timely filed and was later withdrawn by defendant. The court notes that the defendant was granted additional time to oppose plaintiff's order to show cause.

At that time, the court issued an interim order, dated January 7, 2013, which directed defendant to pay plaintiff $5,000 in certified funds to be received by plaintiff by January 11, 2013 for combined maintenance and support, and for defendant to pay plaintiff's counsel $7,500 in certified funds to be received by January 18, 2013 for plaintiff's counsel fees. Defendant asserts that due to an issue with Western Union, he was only able to send $700 out of the $5,000, and that he intends to send the remaining $4,300 and will make the counsel fee payment of $7,500 in the event that the court denies his motion insofar as it seeks to vacate at least that portion of the order.

By a Consent to Change Attorney dated January 10, 2013, Carrie Anne Cavello, Esq. of the law firm of Schpoont & Cavallo, LLP, was substituted as defendant's attorney of record in place and stead of former counsel. On January 18, 2013, defendant, by his new counsel, filed his order to show cause, seeking an order vacating the court's January 7, 2013 interim order and denying plaintiff's order to show cause or those aspects of it which are more properly addressed in Jordan. On January 18, 2013, the parties appeared before the court, and the court set out a new briefing schedule. On February 4, 2013, defendant filed his cross motion, which seeks an order recognizing the parties' Jordanian divorce, and dismissing plaintiff's order to show cause in its entirety pursuant to CPLR 327 (a) or denying all relief requested in plaintiff's order to show cause with the exception of the equitable distribution of the parties' New York marital property.

Plaintiff has opposed both defendant's order to show cause and cross motion by her opposition papers dated February 15, 2013. Defendant has submitted a reply in further support of his cross motion. Oral argument with respect to plaintiff's order to show cause, defendant's order to show cause, and defendant's cross motion was held before the court on April 11, 2013.^[FN2]

In addressing the issue of whether the Jordanian divorce decree should be recognized by this court, the court notes that "the courts of this State generally will accord recognition to the judgments rendered in a foreign country under the doctrine of comity which is the equivalent of full faith and credit given by the courts to judgments of our sister States" (Greschler v Greschler, 51 NY2d 368, 376 [1980]). "It is axiomatic that comity should be extended to uphold the validity of a foreign divorce decree absent a [*7]showing of fraud in its procurement or that recognition of the judgment would do violence to some strong public policy of the state" (Farag v Farag, 4 AD3d 502, 504 [2d Dept 2004]; see also Matter of Gotlib v Ratsutsky, 83 NY2d 696, 699-700 [1994]; Greschler, 51 NY2d at 376; Azim v Saidazimova, 280 AD2d 566, 567 [2 Dept., 2001]; Hanjis v Hanjis, 33 Misc 3d 1220[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52036[U], [Sup Ct, Queens County 2011]).

"While it is generally the rule in this State that where the basic public policy of the forum would be offended a court can refuse to recognize the validity of a foreign judgment . . . the public policy exception to the doctrine of comity is usually invoked only in the rare instance where the original claim is repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought" (Greschler, 51 NY2d at 377 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see also Matter of Gotlib, 83 NY2d at 700). "Thus, for this court to refuse full recognition to a lawful foreign judgment, it must be demonstrated that the decree violates some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal'" (Greschler, 51 NY2d at 377, quoting Loucks v Standard Oil Co. of NY, 224 NY 99, 111 [1918]). "It follows that foreign judgments generally should be upheld unless enforcement would result in the recognition of a transaction which is inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense'" (Greschler, 51 NY2d at 377, quoting Intercontinental Hotels Corp. [Puerto Rico] v Golden, 15 NY2d 9, 13 [1964]; see also Altman v Atlman, 150 AD2d 304, 307 [1 Dept., 1989], appeal denied 74 NY2d 612 [1989]; S.B. v W.A., 38 Misc 3d 780, 822 [Sup Ct, Westchester County 2012]).

Hence, comity should be extended to uphold the validity of a foreign divorce decree "[a]bsent some showing of fraud in the procurement of the foreign country judgment . . . or that recognition of the judgment would do violence to some strong public policy of this State" (Greschler, 51 NY2d at 376; see also Azim v Saidazimova, 280 AD2d 566, 567 [2 Dept., 2001]; Matter of Caputo, 266 AD2d 538, 539 [2 Dept., 1999]; Matter of Fickling v Fickling, 210 AD2d 223, 223-224 [2 Dept., 1994]). Furthermore, "a departure from settled comity principles can be justified only as a rare exception . . . Some evidentiary basis to support the proposition that the particular divorce decree of the foreign country was the product of individualized fraud or coercion or oppression or rested on proximately related public policies fundamentally offensive and inimical to those of this State must be demonstrated" (Matter of Gotlib, 83 NY2d at 699-700; see also Matter of Caputo, 266 AD2d at 539).

Here, recognition of the Jordanian judgment of divorce would not run contrary to New York's public policy, and would not be vicious, wicked, or immoral. As noted above, plaintiff presently lives in Jordan and has lived there exclusively for over a decade, and she does not deny that she has counsel in Jordan and commenced her own divorce action in the Jordanian courts in 2010, as well as a child custody proceeding in the Jordanian courts which she has recently abandoned. This New York action was filed only [*8]after plaintiff had commenced and then abandoned her Jordanian divorce action and commenced her divorce proceeding in New York while her custody petition in Jordan was still pending.

While plaintiff, in an attempt to argue that the Jordanian divorce offends New York public policy, claims that she had no notice of the Jordanian divorce action since under the Sharia law in Jordan, a divorce may be unilaterally obtained by the husband. Defendant, in response, asserts that plaintiff did, in fact, have notice of the Jordanian divorce proceedings, but chose not to participate. In any event, plaintiff does not dispute that she did not seek to appear or to vacate the Jordanian divorce, and that she wants to be divorced from defendant. The Jordanian court has only determined the issue of the termination of the parties' marriage and plaintiff does not wish to remain married to defendant and seeks a judgment of divorce in this New York action. Indeed, it appears that plaintiff terminated her action for divorce in Jordan because she learned that she would receive greater financial benefits from a divorce being granted to her in New York. However, the fact that plaintiff may receive greater economic benefits in a divorce action in New York does not constitute a basis to deny recognition to the Jordanian judgment of divorce.

A "divorce action may lie in New York only if the parties are still married" (Matter of Gotlib, 83 NY2d at 699; see also Vartsaba v Vartsaba, 20 Misc 3d 1145[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51884[U], [Sup Ct, Kings County 2008]). Here, the Jordanian divorce decree is a valid and binding judgment obtained in Jordan, and the parties are, thus, no longer married in Jordan or in New York if comity is afforded to that judgment.Plaintiff, however, in arguing that comity should not be given to the Jordanian judgment of divorce, also relies upon Schaeffer v Schaeffer (294 AD2d 420 [2d Dept 2002]). Plaintiff's reliance upon Schaeffer (294 AD2d at 420-421), however, is misplaced. In Schaeffer (294 AD2d at 420), a motion by the plaintiff-wife to impose a sanction upon the defendant-husband pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 was granted in an action for a divorce and ancillary relief because the defendant, by means of deceit and subterfuge, commenced a foreign divorce action after he had already appeared in the New York divorce action and had submitted to the jurisdiction of the New York courts, and after the plaintiff-wife had already moved to hold him in contempt for his failure to comply with a pendente lite order. The record in Schaeffer (294 AD2d at 420-421) had established that the actions of the defendant-husband were made in bad faith in order to circumvent the pendente lite order and the pending contempt proceeding against him and solely for the purpose of harassing and maliciously injuring the plaintiff-wife. The Appellate Division, Second Department, in Schaeffer (294 AD2d at 421, quoting Matter of Gotlib, 83 NY2d at 699-700), therefore, found that the Supreme Court, Kings County, [Rigler, J.] had correctly refused to recognize the foreign divorce granted in Israel while the New York action was pending since "[t]he facts and circumstances of th[at] case clearly support[ed] the proposition that the particular divorce decree of the foreign country was the product of [*9]individualized fraud or coercion or oppression.'" Indeed, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Schaeffer (294 AD2d at 421), found that "the proceeding in Israel was the result of the fraud, duress, and deceit practiced by the defendant upon the plaintiff and the courts," and, as a result, the Supreme Court was not obligated to extend comity to the divorce granted in Israel.

Here, in contrast, the Jordanian divorce was not the result of any fraud, duress, or deceit practiced by defendant upon plaintiff or the court. There was no pending contempt proceeding against defendant at the time he sought a divorce from plaintiff in Jordan. Furthermore, the Jordanian divorce decree was not the product of any fraud, coercion, or oppression. In fact (as previously noted), plaintiff herself had previously sought a divorce from defendant in Jordan, recognizing it as an appropriate forum for the granting of such relief. Thus, the fraud exception to the doctrine of comity is not applicable in the instant matter, and the court finds no compelling public policy for refusing full recognition of the Jordanian judgment of divorce under the doctrine of comity.

Furthermore, the court notes that the Appellate Division, Second Department recently held that it was proper for a Supreme Court to deny summary judgment deeming a foreign divorce invalid where the foreign divorce was obtained by a party in accordance with foreign law (see Siddiqui v. Siddiqui, 2013 NY Slip Op 04791 [June 26, 2013]). In Siddiqui, the husband commenced an action for divorce against the wife in New York but while that action was pending sought an absolute divorce from the wife in Pakistan by performing a talaq. The Appellate Division noted in the decision that under Pakistan's Muslim Family Laws Ordinance a man is permitted to divorce his wife by performing talaq, which consists of stating or writing three times that the man is divorcing his wife together with following various other procedures including giving written notice of the pronouncement of talaq to the wife and to a certain Pakistani governmental official after which the divorce is granted after ninety (90) days (see Siddiqui, supra.) The Appellate Division noted further that "the foreign divorce obtained by the defendant simply terminated the parties' marriage, while the parties have filed petitions in the Family Court to determine issues of child custody, maintenance, and child support" (Siddiqui, supra.). The Appellate Division also noted that it made no finding regarding "whether the foreign divorce was fundamentally offensive to the public policy" of New York. Similarly, this court expresses no opinion on the issue of whether the foreign divorce is fundamentally offensive to the public policy of this State (see generally Id.).

Here, applying the principles of comity, the court recognizes the Jordanian judgment of divorce which terminates the marital status of the parties (see Matter of Gotlib, 83 NY2d at 699-700; Greschler, 51 NY2d at 376; Kuznetsov v Kuznetsova, 39 Misc 3d 1215[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50622[U], [Sup Ct, Kings County 2013]). It cannot go unnoticed that the plaintiff continues to reside with the children in Jordan.

Forum Non Conveniens [*10]

While the court finds that the parties are divorced pursuant to the Jordanian divorce decree, such divorce decree only addressed the issue of the dissolution of the parties' marriage and did not address any of the other ancillary issues, such as child support, maintenance, counsel fees, expert fees, or the equitable distribution of the marital property, which are the subject of plaintiff's complaint and her order to show cause. Plaintiff seeks the resolution of these issues by this court, whereas defendant maintains that this court should deny plaintiff such relief based upon the ground of forum non conveniens.

It is well established that while "nonresidents are permitted to enter New York courts to litigate their disputes as a matter of comity . . . our courts are not required to add to their financial and administrative burdens by entertaining litigation which does not have any [real] connection with this State" (Islamic Republic of Iran v Pahlavi, 62 NY2d 474, 478 [1984], cert denied 469 US 1108 [1985]; see also Matter of Mzimaz v Barik, 89 AD3d 948, 948 [2 Dept., 2011]). The common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens, as codified by statute in CPLR 327, "permits a court to stay or dismiss such actions where it is determined that the action, although jurisdictionally sound, would be better adjudicated elsewhere" (Islamic Republic of Iran, 62 NY2d at 478-479).

CPLR 327 (a) provides as follows:

"When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in another forum, the court, on the motion of any party, may stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just. The domicile or residence in this state of any party to the action shall not preclude the court from staying or dismissing the action."

"The burden rests upon the defendant challenging the forum to demonstrate relevant private or public interest factors which militate against accepting the litigation" (Islamic Republic of Iran, 62 NY2d at 479; see also Bader & Bader v Fort, 66 AD2d 642, 645 [1 Dept., 1979], appeal dismissed 48 NY2d 649 [1979]). In applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the court must consider and balance various competing factors in order to determine, in the exercise of its sound discretion, whether or not to retain jurisdiction (see Islamic Republic of Iran, 62 NY2d at 479). "Among the factors to be considered are the burden on the New York courts, the potential hardship to the defendant, and the unavailability of an alternative forum in which [the] plaintiff may bring suit" (id.; see also Banco Ambrosiano v Artoc Bank & Trust, 62 NY2d 65, 73 [1984]; Irrigation & Indus. Dev. Corp. v Indag S.A., 37 NY2d 522, 525-526 [1975]; Nasser v Nasser, 52 AD3d 306, 306-307 [1 Dept., 2008]; Morley v Morley,191 AD2d 372, 372-373 [1 Dept., 1993]). The court may also consider the residency of the parties, and whether the cause of action arose primarily in a foreign jurisdiction (see Islamic Republic of Iran, 62 NY2d at 479; Silver v Great Amer. Ins. Co., 29 NY2d 356, 361 [1972]; Nasser, 52 AD3d at 306). "No one factor is controlling" (Islamic Republic of [*11]Iran, 62 NY2d at 479; see also Irrigation & Indus. Dev. Corp., 37 NY2d at 526). The doctrine of forum non conveniens is a flexible one, and "rests upon justice, fairness and convenience," and is applied based upon the facts and circumstances of each case (Islamic Republic of Iran, 62 NY2d at 479; see also Silver, 29 NY2d at 361; Nasser, 52 AD3d at 306).

Here, as discussed above, the parties were married in Jordan. Plaintiff is a resident of Jordan and has lived there for more than a decade, and the children have also lived in Jordan for more than a decade. The children attend school in Jordan, their doctors, educators, and religious instructors are in Jordan, their nanny is in Jordan, and their network of friends are all in Jordan. As a result, the vast majority of witnesses on the issues of support, maintenance, marital property, and finances are current residents of Jordan. In addition, the parties executed a prenuptial agreement in Jordan, which is controlled by the laws of Jordan, and may be determinative of the issues of support, maintenance, and marital property in Jordan. The issue of this prenuptial agreement and its effect may only be properly litigated in Jordan.

Jordan is available as an alternative forum. Plaintiff admits that the Jordanian court would afford her a remedy for support and maintenance. In fact, both parties commenced divorce actions and custody actions in Jordan. Moreover, Jordan is the only forum which can determine the issue of child custody since the children have resided solely in Jordan for the past decade (see Domestic Relations Law § 76 [1]). Jordan also provides an alternative forum for resolution of the issues of maintenance, child support, and the distribution of Jordanian marital property.

The burden which would be imposed upon this New York court in retaining this entire divorce action would be an excessive one. Discovery would require Jordanian documents and would necessitate translations from Arabic. All witnesses and evidence necessary to assess the veracity of plaintiff's claims regarding her expenses are in Jordan, thousands of miles away from Brooklyn. Plaintiff's expenses are incurred in Jordan, and it would be extremely difficult for this court to assess the standard of living in Jordan, the value of the dollar in Jordan, and the financial needs of plaintiff and children as it relates to the world economic monetary system. This court is not equipped to render a determination as to plaintiff's appropriate support and lifestyle as it relates to the cost analysis in the country of Jordan. The issues of the amount of maintenance and child support to which plaintiff may be entitled can only be properly determined in Jordan. Furthermore, the enforcement of any rulings made in New York would prove difficult as this court's enforcement powers do not extend to the country of Jordan.

While plaintiff would prefer to litigate in New York because it may be more economically advantageous for her to do so, this is not a basis for this court to retain jurisdiction of this divorce action. The public policy in New York "frowns upon [such] forum shopping" (O'Connell v Corcoran, 1 NY3d 179, 185 [2003]). Child support and maintenance and add-on expenses are based upon the needs and expenses of plaintiff and [*12]the children, who live in Jordan and incur these expenses there. The Court could not assess the impact of any income defendant may assert should be imputed to plaintiff. Thus, as to the issues of maintenance and child support, Jordan is a far more convenient and appropriate forum than New York (see CPLR 327 [a]).

Plaintiff argues that since some of the marital property is located in New York and since some of defendant's income is derived from New York sources, New York is the more convenient forum. This argument must be rejected. While defendant presently resides in New York, earns income in New York and owns certain real properties in New York, he also owns real properties in Jordan and plaintiff and the children live in Jordan. There is no substantial nexus between New York and the parties' marriage except for the fact that they lived in New York for eight years, own real property and have business interests in New York. "It is well established that New York courts are not compelled to retain jurisdiction in any case which has no substantial nexus to New York" (Stamm v Deloitte & Touche, 202 AD2d 413, 413 [2d Dept 1994]). Moreover, as discussed below, this court can retain that part of this action which concerns the equitable distribution of the parties' New York marital property. Thus, the court finds that the doctrine of forum non conveniens applies to require dismissal of those aspects of plaintiff's complaint (as discussed below) which are more appropriately resolved by the Jordanian courts (see CPLR 327 [a]; Nasser, 52 AD3d 306-307), and that the only aspect of this action that should remain in New York is the question of the equitable distribution of the parties' New York marital property [real property and business interests], along with those issues directly related thereto.

Equitable Distribution of the Parties' New York Marital Property

As to the equitable distribution of the parties' New York marital property, the court finds that New York is the most appropriate forum for resolving this issue. Indeed, defendant, in his cross motion, seeks, in the alternative, that the court dismiss all relief requested in plaintiff's order to show cause on the ground of forum non conveniens with the exception of the equitable distribution of the parties' New York marital property. The doctrine of comity does not preclude plaintiff from seeking equitable distribution in the present action since Domestic Relations Law § 236 permits a party to bring a proceeding in New York to obtain the distribution of marital property following a foreign judgment of divorce (see O'Connell, 1 NY3d at 183). Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (2) and (5) expressly provide that a divorced spouse who possesses an interest in marital property within this State may commence an action for equitable distribution of property following the entry of a foreign judgment of divorce (see Peterson v Goldberg, 180 AD2d 260, 262 [2 Dept., 1992], lv dismissed 81 NY2d 835 [1993]; Nikrooz v Nikrooz, 167 AD2d 334, 335 [2 Dept., 1990]; Mahoney v Mahoney, 131 AD2d 822, 822-823 [2 Dept., 1987]; Braunstein v Braunstein, 114 AD2d 46, 51 [2d Dept 1985], appeal dismissed 68 NY2d [*13]753 [1986]; Bennett v Bennett, 103 AD2d 816, 817 [2d Dept 1984]; Hanjis v Hanjis, 33 Misc 3d 1220[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52036[U], [Sup Ct, Queens County 2011]).

An ex parte foreign judgment of divorce terminates and dissolves only the marital status of the parties and "is 'divisible' in that it has no effect upon the property held by the parties outside of the jurisdiction of the [foreign country] issuing the judgment" (Peterson, 180 AD2d at 262; see also Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [2], [5]; Matter of Sannuto v Palma-Sannuto, 32 AD3d 443, 444 [2 Dept., 2006]; Somma v Somma, 19 AD3d 477, 477 [2 Dept., 2005]; Young v Knight, 236 AD2d 534, 535 [2 Dept., 1997]; Mattwell v Mattwell, 194 AD2d 715, 716-717 [2d Dept 1993]; Nikrooz, 167 AD2d at 335; Mahoney, 131 AD2d 822-823; Braunstein, 114AD2d at 51; Bennett, 103 AD2d at 817). Thus, a party may file an action for equitable distribution of marital property after the entry of a foreign judgment which dissolved the parties' marriage to provide for the distribution of property not affected by a foreign judgment of divorce (see Mattwell, 194 AD2d at 717).

In the present case, since plaintiff claims an interest in New York marital property, she may, in accordance with the plain language of the governing statutes (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [2], [5]) seek equitable distribution of this New York property following the entry of the ex parte Jordanian divorce decree (see Matter of Sannuto, 32 AD3d at 444; Peterson, 180 AD2d at 262; Nikrooz, 167 AD2d at 335; Braunstein, 114 AD2d at 51). Therefore, plaintiff's economic and property rights in the New York real property may be determined in New York, and so much of her complaint as may be construed as asserting those rights will not be dismissed (see Young, 236 AD2d at 535).

Exclusive Occupancy and Maintenance of the Property located in Jordan

In addressing the specific items of relief sought in plaintiff's order to show cause, the court notes that insofar as plaintiff seeks an award of the sole and exclusive occupancy of the marital premises, together with the sole and exclusive possession of all items of personal property, including but not limited to furnishings, furniture, and household items, located therein, these premises are located in Jordan, rendering Jordan the appropriate jurisdiction to make a determination as to this issue pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens (see CPLR 327 [a]). Similarly, plaintiff's request for defendant to pay for all expenses to maintain and upkeep the marital premises is an issue which must be decided in Jordan pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens (see id.; Nasser, 52 AD3d at 306). Notably, the mortgage on the premises is held in Jordan, the property taxes are paid to the Jordan government, and all other expenses with respect to the premises are paid in Jordan, rendering Jordan a more appropriate forum to address this issue.

Insofar as plaintiff seeks exclusive use and possession of the 2008 GMC Yukon Denali automobile, it is noted that this automobile is located in Jordan and used [*14]exclusively in Jordan, and that the underlying note, insurance, and registration expenses of this vehicle are paid in Jordan. Thus, Jordan is the appropriate forum for determining all issues related to this vehicle, pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens (see CPLR 327 [a]).

Education Expenses

The doctrine of forum non conveniens also requires that plaintiff's motion, to the extent that it seeks an order directing defendant to continue paying for all of the private school tuition and academic expenses for the children for their attendance at the Modern American School in Amman, Jordan, be decided by the Jordanian courts since this school is located in Jordan, the tuition and expenses are incurred and paid in Jordan, and the children are located there (see id.).

Health Insurance

Plaintiff's motion, insofar as she seeks defendant to pay health insurance and to reimburse her for all medical expenses incurred by her and the children, can only be addressed by the Jordanian courts since plaintiff and the children use doctors located solely in Jordan and they incur their medical costs there (see id.). In addition, the issue of the amount of life insurance which is appropriate for defendant to obtain is also properly within the province of the Jordanian courts (see id.).

Temporary Maintenance

While plaintiff seeks interim maintenance in the amount of no less than $10,000 per month, the court finds that the issue of temporary maintenance can only be determined by the Jordanian courts. As noted above, plaintiff and defendant have a prenuptial agreement entered into in Jordan which may be determinative of this issue, and in view of the need to assess plaintiff's standard of living in Jordan (along with enforcement issues), the issue of maintenance may only be properly decided in Jordan (see id.).

Child Support

With respect to plaintiff's request for an award of child support, the court finds that since Jordan is the proper forum to decide custody issues, it is also the proper forum for plaintiff to seek child support. The Jordanian courts have both the jurisdiction to do so and the means to assess the needs of the children, their lifestyle, and the costs associated with supporting them (see generally Cooke v Cooke, 201 AD2d 400, 400-401 [1 Dept., [*15]1994], lv denied 83 NY2d 759 [1994]). Evidence concerning the children's present and future needs, care, health, education, and activities is more readily available in Jordan (see CPLR 327 [a]).

Counsel Fees

Plaintiff, in her motion, also seeks an order directing defendant to pay reasonable counsel fees, on her behalf, in the sum of $75,000. Inasmuch as "proceedings to obtain . . . a distribution of marital property following a foreign judgment of divorce" fall under the general category of matrimonial actions (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [2]), the court is statutorily authorized, pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237, to award plaintiff counsel fees in this case with respect to those counsel fees incurred with respect to the equitable distribution of the parties' New York real properties (see Mattwell, 194 AD2d at 717; S.B., 38 Misc 3d at 817-818; Sullivan v Sullivan, 155 Misc 2d 440, 444-445 [Sup Ct, NY County 1992], affd 201 AD2d 417 [1994]). The court does not find, however, that plaintiff is entitled to an award of counsel fees incurred with respect to those issues which relate to property in Jordan, maintenance, child support, or other issues which are properly the province of the Jordanian courts.

An award of interim counsel fees is within the discretion of the Court (DeCabrera v. Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879 [1987]). Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law section 237(a), which was amended as of October 2010, the Court in an action for divorce:

. . . may direct the person or persons maintaining the action, to pay counsel fees and fees and expenses of experts directly to the attorney of the other spouse to enable the other party to carry on or defend the action or proceeding as, in the court's discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. There shall be rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse. In exercising the court's discretion, the court shall seek to assure that each party shall be adequately represented and that where fees and expenses are to be awarded, they shall be awarded on a timely basis, pendente lite, so as to enable adequate representation from the commencement of the proceeding.

The sponsor of the bill in the Senate noted:

Justification: This bill would amend sections 237 and 238 of the Domestic Relations Law to require the court in a matrimonial case, or a proceeding to enforce a judgment therein, involving parties with greatly unequal financial resources, to order the monied party to pay counsel fees for the non-monied party during the course of the case so as to enable her or him to carry on or defend it.

Current law places an onus upon the party in a matrimonial action seeking counsel fees pendente lite, to show why the interests of justice require it. In addition, Judges appear [*16]reluctant to order pendente lite counsel fee awards in matrimonial actions under the current statute. A judicial order for pendente lite counsel awards in a matrimonial proceeding is a vital step in preventing an imbalance in the parties' resources from affecting the proceeding's outcome. Given the importance of pendente lite counsel fees, and the frequency of financial imbalance between parties to matrimonial proceedings, it is inappropriate to place the burden upon a non-monied spouse to justify it. Therefore, it is important for the Legislature to revise the statute, as proposed, to create a rebuttable presumption that such relief is necessary.

This bill proposal presumes that in a matrimonial case an order for pendente lite counsel fees is required, and it is left to the affected parties to show why, in the interests of justice, the order should not be made. This will better address today's economic and social realities, and will help ensure that no party to a matrimonial case is strategically at a disadvantage for want of resources to pursue or defend the case.

It has long been established that "[a]n award of an attorney's fee pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237(a) is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the issue is controlled by the equities and circumstances of each particular case" (Grant v Grant, 71 AD3d 634, 634-635, 895 NYS2d 827 [2d Dept 2010], quoting Gruppuso v Caridi, 66 AD3d 838, 839, 886 NYS2d 613 [2d Dept 2009], quoting Morrissey v Morrissey, 259 AD2d 472, 473, 686 NYS2d 71 [2d Dept 1999]). "In determining whether to award such a fee, the court should review the financial circumstances of both parties together with all the other circumstances of the case, which may include the relative merit of the parties' positions'" (Gruppuso, 66 AD3d at 839, quoting DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879, 881, 524 NYS2d 176 [1987]). " An appropriate award of attorney's fees should take into account the parties' ability to pay, the nature and extent of the services rendered, the complexity of the issues involved, and the reasonableness of the fees under all of the circumstances'" (DiBlasi v DiBlasi, 48 AD3d 403, 405, 852 NYS2d 195 [2d Dept 2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 716, 862 NYS2d 468 [2008], quoting Grumet v Grumet, 37 AD3d 534, 536, 829 NYS2d 682 [2d Dept 2007] [citations omitted]).

It is also well-settled that "[a]n award of interim counsel fees is designed to create parity in divorce litigation by preventing a monied spouse from wearing down a nonmonied spouse on the basis of sheer financial strength" (Rosenbaum v Rosenbaum, 55 AD3d 713, 714, 866 NYS2d 234 [2d Dept 2008], citing O'Shea v O'Shea, 93 NY2d 187, 193, 689 NYS2d 8 [1999]; Wald v Wald, 44 AD3d 848, 844 NYS2d 86 [2d Dept 2007]). "Such awards are designed to redress the economic disparity between the monied spouse and the non-monied spouse' and ensure that the matrimonial scales of justice are not unbalanced by the weight of the wealthier litigant's wallet'" (Kaplan v Kaplan, 28 AD3d 523, 523, 812 NYS2d 360 [2d Dept 2006], quoting Frankel v Frankel, 2 NY3d 601, 607, [*17]781 NYS2d 59 [2004], quoting O'Shea, 93 NY2d at 190).

Interim counsel fees are awarded to level the playing field and " prevent the more affluent spouse from wearing down or financially punishing the opposition by recalcitrance, or by prolonging the litigation'" (Gober v Gober, 282 AD2d 392, 393 [1 Dept., 2001], quoting O'Shea v O'Shea, 93 NY2d 187,193 [1999]; see also Prichep v Prichep, 52 AD3d 61, 65 [2 Dept., 2008]). Thus, interim fees are generally warranted "where there is a significant disparity in the financial circumstances of the parties" (Prichep, 52 AD3d at 65; see also DelDuca v DelDuca, 304 AD2d 610, 611 [2 Dept., 2003]; Celauro v Celauro, 257 AD2d 588, 589 [2 Dept., 1999]). "[U]nlike a final award of counsel fees, a detailed inquiry or evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the award of interim counsel fees" (Isaacs v Isaacs, 71 AD3d 951, 951 [2 Dept., 2010]; see also Prichep, 52 AD3d at 65; Singer v Singer, 16 AD3d 666, 667 [2 Dept., 2005]; Flach v Flach, 114 AD2d 929, 929 [2 Dept., 1985]). Additionally, it should be noted that the court in Prichep specifically provided that "[w]hen a party to a divorce action requests an interim award of counsel fees, as opposed to a final award, no such detailed inquiry is warranted" (52 AD3d 61, 65, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667 [2 Dept.,2008]).

Here, plaintiff is the less monied spouse, who has been a full-time homemaker and mother throughout the marriage while the defendant has been the sole financial provider for the family and, as such, there is a rebuttable presumption under amended DRL 237 that she should be awarded counsel fees to be paid by defendant. Plaintiff has further demonstrated that she lacks sufficient funds of her own to compensate her counsel. Consequently, an award of interim counsel fees to plaintiff is warranted (see Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]; Khaira v Khaira, 93 AD3d 194, 201 [1 Dept., 2012]; Palmeri v Palmeri, 87 AD3d 572, 572 [2 Dept., 2011]).

Emile Sayegh, Esq. of Sayegh & Sayegh, P.C. (plaintiff's attorney), as plaintiff's attorney, has submitted a supporting affirmation for counsel fees. Plaintiff's attorney notes that plaintiff signed a retainer agreement on June 19, 2012, and claims that plaintiff paid an initial retainer fee of $10,000. The retainer agreement provides that plaintiff will be billed at the rate of $350 per hour for the legal services rendered. While plaintiff's attorney seeks an award of interim counsel fees in the amount of $75,000, plaintiff's attorney, in support of this request, annexed only two pages listing descriptions of services, which as of September 24, 2012 total $5,495. While plaintiff's attorney does not document that any amounts above this sum have been incurred or billed to plaintiff it is clear that the delay in between the making of the initial Order to Show Cause and oral argument rest with the defendant which resulted in numerous court appearances, answering papers and a cross motion. It is also clear that there was the need for long distance consultation and discussions with foreign counsel. Counsel's hourly rate of $350 appears reasonable based upon his experience. Furthermore, as noted above, plaintiff is only entitled to recover attorney's fees incurred in connection with the equitable distribution of the New York marital property. [*18]

As noted above, the court, in its January 7, 2013 order, has already directed defendant to pay plaintiff counsel fees in the amount of $7,500. The defendant is directed to immediately comply with the January 7, 2013 order insofar as it directs the payment of $7,500 in initial pendente lite counsel fees. In as much as what remains to be litigated in New York are issues of equitable distribution, an additional counsel fees of $5,000 pendente lite is warranted for a total of $12,500 to be paid pendente lite with right to seek additional fees pendente lite if warranted. This sum is appropriate pendente lite based upon the sheer number of hours that were expended by plaintiff's counsel due to the need to make multiple appearances due to defendant's former counsel's actions or failure to properly act and to respond to the defendant's emergency Order to Show Cause, dated January 18, 2013, the making of a cross motion, dated February 4, 2013, and answering papers. This award of $12,500 to plaintiff for pendente lite attorney's fees is without prejudice to future applications for additional counsel fees, as necessary at the time of trial or sooner, as the need for such recovery is demonstrated and upon the requisite showing (see Dodson, 46 AD3d at 305; Jorgensen v Jorgensen, 86 AD2d 861, 861 [2 Dept., 1982]). If the defendant fails to make the full payment within thirty (30) days from the date of this decision and order, the plaintiff may enter a judgment with the Clerk of the Court upon notice to the defendant without further application to this Court for the amount due and owning, plus statutory costs and interest as of the date of the defendant's failure to pay. The Court believes that pursuant to the dictates of Prichep (supra.) to require at this juncture a more detailed inquiry would defeat the purpose of a pendente lite counsel fee award and serve as an obstacle to the non-monied spouse obtaining and maintaining competent counsel. It is self-evident from the number of appearances the issues presented and papers submitted that the amount awarded pendente lite is fair and reasonable.

Expert Fees

Insofar as plaintiff requests an order directing defendant to pay for the appraisal fees of a neutral court-appointed appraiser to determine the value of defendant's business interests and to pay the appraisal fees of a neutral court-appointed real estate appraiser to determine the value of defendant's interest in New York real properties, it is noted that Domestic Relations Law § 237, along with counsel fees, permits the payment of the fees of experts. The issue of the granting of an expert appraiser's fee in a matrimonial action lies within the purview of this matrimonial court (see Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]; O'Brien v O'Brien, 66 NY2d 576, 590 [1985]; McGarrity, 49 AD3d at 825-826; Bluemer v Bluemer, 47 AD3d 652, 653 [2 Dept., 2008]; Zirinsky v Zirinsky, 138 AD2d 43, 45-46 [1 Dept., 1988]; Pacheco v Pacheco, 107 AD2d 741, 741 [2 Dept., 1985]).

The court finds that an order directing defendant to pay for the suitable appraisal fees of a neutral court-appointed appraiser to determine the value of defendant's business [*19]interests in Sunset Plumbing Supply and Area Plumbing Supply is warranted in as much as he is the monied spouse. The court also finds that an order directing defendant to pay for the suitable appraisal fees of a neutral court-appointed real estate appraiser to determine the value of defendant's interests in real estate in New York is warranted. Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.16 and 22 NYCRR 202.18 the Court shall appoint a neutral appraiser of the real estate located in New York and a neutral appraiser of the business interests in the plumbing supply businesses known as Sunset Plumbing Supply and Area Plumbing Supply. The fee for said appraisers shall be paid by the defendant (100%) no later than July 30, 2013. Proof of payment shall be provided to plaintiff's counsel on or before July 30, 2013. If the parties reach an agreement on an appraiser for the real estate and business interests they shall forward a consent stipulation to chambers on or before July 8, 2013. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement on an appraiser for the real estate and/or appraiser for the business interest in the plumbing businesses they shall each provide the names of three (3) appraisers for the real estate and three (3) appraisers for the business interests directly to chambers, on notice to the other party, no later than July 8, 2013.

Insofar as plaintiff seeks an order directing defendant to pay for the appraisal fees of a real estate appraiser to determine the value of defendant's interests in real estate in Amman, Jordan, such relief will not be granted by this court. Such an award is appropriately addressed to the Jordanian courts (see CPLR 327 [a]).

To the extent that plaintiff's motion seeks an order directing defendant to pay for the fees of a forensic accountant to determine defendant's income stream for the purpose of establishing a final award of spousal support and child support, such motion must be denied since the issues of maintenance and child support will be determined by the Jordanian courts. Moreover, such issue is, in any event, premature at this juncture, and if a forensic accountant is needed with respect to a determination regarding plaintiff's interests in defendant's New York businesses, plaintiff may make an application for such relief upon an appropriate showing of such need.

Restraining Order

Insofar as plaintiff seeks an order enjoining and restraining defendant from conveying, transferring, or otherwise disposing of assets, the court reminds the parties that pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (2) (b) and 22 NYCRR 202.16-a, the automatic orders remain in full force and effect and the defendant is prohibited from any unauthorized transfer of any marital assets located in the United States during the pendency of this action.

Telephonic Appearance [*20]

Insofar as plaintiff seeks an order directing that she be permitted to appear telephonically, the court directs that plaintiff may appear telephonically in this action except for purposes of deposition and trial or pursuant to further order of the Court.

Conclusion

Plaintiff's motion, by the September 27, 2012 order to show cause, is granted to the extent stated above. Defendant's motion for an order vacating the January 7, 2013 order is vacated only to the extent that the issues of maintenance and support shall be decided by the Jordanian courts. Such motion is granted insofar as it seeks an order denying all aspects of plaintiff's September 27, 2012 order to show cause which are more properly addressed in Jordan, and providing that this court's retention of, and involvement in this action shall be limited to the determination of the equitable distribution of the parties' New York assets. Defendant's cross motion is granted insofar as it seeks an order recognizing the parties' Jordanian divorce, and dismissing the relief requested in plaintiff's order to show cause (as discussed above) pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, except for the equitable distribution of the parties' New York marital property and relief related thereto as set forth above.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

E N T E R:

JEFFREY S. SUNSHINE