[*1]
Graham v Jamaica Seven, LLC
2013 NY Slip Op 51381(U) [40 Misc 3d 137(A)]
Decided on August 8, 2013
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on August 8, 2013
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., WESTON and RIOS, JJ
2012-172 Q C.

Shane O. Graham, Respondent, —

against

Jamaica Seven, LLC, Appellant.


Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Barry A. Schwartz, J.), entered July 20, 2011. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,319 and dismissed defendant's counterclaim.


ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff brought this small claims action to recover his security deposit from defendant, his former landlord. Defendant counterclaimed, alleging that it was entitled to set off the security deposit against the cost of repairing damage that plaintiff had caused to the apartment. After a nonjury trial, the Civil Court found that plaintiff was entitled to the return of his security deposit. The court also found that defendant was barred by res judicata from seeking a setoff for the damage to the apartment because defendant had previously brought a commercial claims action against plaintiff based upon, among other things, the claimed damage to the apartment, which action had been dismissed as against plaintiff.

The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the [*2]evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544, 545 [1990]). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better opportunity from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]).

In this case, the trial court's findings and conclusions are supported by the record, which includes plaintiff's testimony as to the security deposit that he had paid to defendant. Defendant's argument on appeal as to why its counterclaim is not barred by res judicata lacks merit. Moreover, defendant failed to establish that a necessary party had not been joined (see Cruz v Diamond, 6 Misc 3d 134[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50187[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]; see also Holmes v Worthen, 19 Misc 3d 33, 35 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; Kormi v Gleit, 2003 NY Slip Op 50900[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2003]).

In view of the foregoing, we find that the judgment provided the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (CCA 1807; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams, 269 AD2d at 126). Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: August 08, 2013