Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Richard N. Allman, J.), rendered March 26, 2007. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 265.01 [1]). On appeal, defendant contends that his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated. It is well settled that the statutory right to a speedy trial is forfeited by a guilty plea (see People v O'Brien, 56 NY2d 1009 [1982]; People v Franco, 104 AD3d 790 [2013]) and, therefore, this contention will not be considered. However, defendant moved in the Criminal Court to dismiss the accusatory instrument on constitutional speedy trial grounds, which issue survives a guilty plea and a valid waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Hansen, 95 NY2d 227, 230-231 [2000]; People v Franco, 104 AD3d at 791).

In order to determine whether a defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.20, the following factors must be considered: "(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any [*2]indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay" (People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445 [1975]). An inexcusable delay will not "in and of itself, be sufficient to warrant the drastic measure of dismissal" (id. at 446). In evaluating a constitutional speedy trial claim, the court "must engage in a sensitive weighing process of the diversified factors present in the particular case" (id. at 445), with "no one factor or combination of . . . factors . . . necessarily decisive or determinative of the speedy trial claim" (id.).

Upon weighing the Taranovich factors in the case at bar, we find that defendant has not established that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. We note that defendant's constitutional due process right to prompt prosecution and his constitutional right to a speedy trial are evaluated using the same Taranovich factors (see People v Decker, 13 NY3d 12, 14-15 [2009]). Although the People could have provided disclosure and Rosario materials more promptly, it has not been shown that their delay in doing so deprived defendant of a fair trial.

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Weston, J.P., Rios and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: September 05, 2013