Appeal from an order of the Justice Court of the Village of Walden, Orange County (Raynard A. Ozman, J.), dated June 2, 2011. The order granted defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, and the matter is remitted to the Justice Court for a new determination, following a hearing, of defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds.

Defendant was issued an appearance ticket on July 31, 2008 charging him with assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00) and directing him to appear in the Justice Court of the Village of Warwick on August 13, 2008. Ultimately, the justices of the Justice Court of the Village of Warwick recused themselves, and the case was transferred to the Justice Court of the Village of Walden by order of the County Court on September 23, 2009.

On March 1, 2011, defendant moved to dismiss the accusatory instrument pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) (b). Defendant asserted that the People were required to be ready for trial within [*2]90 days of his appearance in court and that a minimum of 140 days was chargeable to the People. The People argued, among other things, that the recusal of all the justices of the Justice Court of the Village of Warwick was an "exceptional circumstance" under CPL 30.30 (4) (g), and that therefore a 78-day period of delay from July 7, 2009 to September 23, 2009 was excludable. On June 2, 2011, the Justice Court granted the motion without a hearing, on the ground that the time periods from August 20, 2008 to September 17, 2008 (28 days), and from July 7, 2009 to September 23, 2009 (78 days), were chargeable to the People. The court stated that "these two periods of delay [were] clearly attributable to the People as it is their responsibility to file proper accusatory instruments, in this case complaints, with the Court, announce readiness, and also move the County Court for a case transfer order once advised of the recusal by the judges." The court noted that it "[did] not reach a determination on any other adjournments in this case as to whether they [were] excludable for speedy trial calculation purposes."

At the outset, we note that this matter is before us on a record that is very sparse. The record contains an undated letter stamped "RECEIVED JUL 07 2009,"
signed by Village of Warwick Justice Jeanine Garritano Wadeson, wherein she notified the parties that she had recused herself from this matter and indicated that Village of Warwick Acting Justice Peter D. Barlet had also recused himself. Justice Barlet did not sign the letter. The letter went on to advise the parties that they "must take action to have this matter transferred out of the Village of Warwick Justice Court" pursuant to CPL 170.15 (3). In deciding the speedy trial motion, the Justice Court of the Town of Walden assumed that the undated letter properly communicated the recusal of all the justices of the Justice Court of the Village of Warwick and calculated defendant's speedy trial time by using the date the letter was stamped, i.e., July 7, 2009. The record further contains an affidavit from Justice Barlet, dated September 9, 2009, wherein he advised the parties that he was recusing himself.

Under the circumstances presented, we find no basis to conclude that Justice Wadeson's letter constituted proper notification of a recusal by Justice Barlet. A determination by a judge to recuse himself is the responsibility of the judge before whom a proceeding is pending. However, the record is insufficient to permit this court to make a determination that this matter was ever transferred to Justice Barlet in July 2009 or that he properly recused himself prior to his execution of the affidavit on September 9, 2009. Indeed, it is problematic to permit one justice to announce the recusal of another justice, especially in the absence of a clear indication that such announcement was done with authority (see generally Rules of Chief Admin of Cts [22 NYCRR] § 100.3 [E]).

As noted above, upon finding that the People were chargeable with an excess of 90 days, i.e., 28 and 78 days, the Justice Court did not pass upon any other periods of time. While speedy trial time in this case is to be calculated from the date defendant first appeared in court in response to the appearance ticket (see CPL 30.30 [5] [b]), it is unclear from the record exactly when that occurred, although it is undisputed that defendant was arraigned on September 17, 2008. The record before us is also inadequate to allow us to pass upon the subsequent periods of time which the People allege should be excluded, as well as the date on which the People allege they declared readiness.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and the matter is remitted to the Justice Court for a new determination, following a hearing, of defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory [*3]instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds.

Nicolai, P.J., LaSalle and Tolbert, JJ., concur.