| Iannelli v Lynch |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 51586(U) [41 Misc 3d 126(A)] |
| Decided on September 26, 2013 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Appeal from a decision of the Justice Court of the Town of Pleasant Valley,
Dutchess County (Paul Caltagirone, J.), dated May 27, 2011, deemed from a judgment of
the same court entered June 16, 2011 (see CPLR 5512 [a]). The judgment, insofar as
appealed from as limited by the brief, after a nonjury trial, awarded defendant the sum of
$642.75 on her counterclaim, which award the court reduced by an award to plaintiff in
the sum of $135, for an award to defendant in the net principal sum of $507.75.
ORDERED that the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff operates a day care center, which defendant's daughter attended in 2010. In this small claims action, plaintiff initially sought to recover $330 in fees she believed were due under the parties' agreement. In her counterclaim, defendant asserted that because plaintiff had failed to provide her with timely receipts in an acceptable form, she had been unable to obtain $642.75 in reimbursements from a flexible spending account. At a nonjury trial, plaintiff amended her demand to seek the principal sum of $900. Following the trial, the Justice Court awarded defendant judgment in the net principal sum of $507.75, based upon a finding that defendant was entitled to recover the full $642.75 she had sought in her counterclaim, less $135 which the court determined was owed to plaintiff by defendant. The only issue plaintiff raises on appeal is whether defendant proved her entitlement to recover on her counterclaim. [*2]
Plaintiff introduced into evidence the parties' written contract for day care services. The contract contained terms as to the rate of tuition, the hours for which care was to be provided, and overtime rates and policies, among other things, but did not address the timing or format for receipts to be provided to the parents. It included a provision that, "Any changes to this contract must be done in writing and agreed upon by both the parent(s) and the provider."
At trial, defendant testified that plaintiff knew of her need for receipts other than her cancelled checks, and that plaintiff had, on one occasion, provided her with a receipt in acceptable form. There is implicit in all contracts a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the course of contract performance, which encompasses the implied obligation of each party to the contract to undertake any promises which a reasonable person in the position of another party to the contract would be justified in understanding were included (see e.g. 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 153 [2002]; Dalton v Educational Testing Serv., 87 NY2d 384, 389 [1995]; Rowe v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 46 NY2d 62, 69 [1978]; Legend Autorama, Ltd. v Audi of Am., Inc., 100 AD3d 714, 716 [2012]), provided, however, that no obligation can be implied that would be inconsistent with other terms of the contractual relationship (Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 304 [1983]). We conclude that a reasonable person in defendant's position would be justified in understanding that she would receive receipts from plaintiff in a form and pursuant to a schedule which was adequate for her to receive reimbursement from her flexible spending account; that construing the existence of such an obligation would not be inconsistent with the other terms of the parties' contractual relationship; and that such a term was inherent in the parties' contract pursuant to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). Our review of the judgment is limited to whether "substantial justice has not been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UJCA 1807). The deference normally accorded to the credibility determinations of a trial court applies with greater force in small claims proceedings, given the limited scope of review and the often attenuated record available on appeal (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]).
The parties disputed whether plaintiff had in fact provided adequate receipts to defendant, and no definitive documentary proof was provided. By its award of the sum of $642.75 on defendant's counterclaim, the Justice Court implicitly found that plaintiff had an obligation to provide defendant with such receipts, which obligation plaintiff had failed to perform. We find that the judgment rendered substantial justice between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (UJCA 1804, 1807).
We do not consider those assertions made by the parties or the materials annexed to their appellate briefs which are dehors the record (see Chimarios v Duhl, 152 AD2d 508 [1989]).
Accordingly, the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.
Nicolai, P.J., and Iannacci, J., concur.
[*3]
Decision Date: September 26,
2013