| People v Holland (Vincent) |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 51864(U) [41 Misc 3d 134(A)] |
| Decided on November 14, 2013 |
| Appellate Term, First Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York,
New York County (Lynn R. Kotler, J.), rendered October 27, 2011, convicting him, upon
a plea of guilty, of fraudulent accosting, and imposing sentence.
Per Curiam.
Judgment of conviction (Lynn R. Kotler, J.), rendered October 27, 2011, affirmed.
The accusatory instrument was not jurisdictionally defective. The misdemeanor complaint sufficiently set forth the factual basis for the fraudulent accosting charge (see Penal Law § 165.30) to which defendant ultimately pleaded guilty by alleging, inter alia, that defendant approached the deponent police officer on the corner of a specified West 43rd Street address, "gestur[ing] toward a nearby gentlemen's club; that defendant stated, in sum and substance, that he (defendant) had "two floors" of "girls" at the club, with "hot oil massages" available on the second floor and "sex" available on the third floor, each for $150; that defendant told the officer to "get his money ready" while handing him what defendant described to be a "ticket" to the club; and that, according to an identified club employee, the club "does not have a second or third floor." The complaint thus contained "facts of an evidentiary character" (CPL 100.15[3]) demonstrating "reasonable cause" to believe that defendant committed the crime charged (CPL 100.40[4][b]); see People v Ragland, 13 Misc 3d 130[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 51841[U][App Term, 1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 928 [2006]; People v Farrar, 120 Misc 2d 464 [1983]; cf. People v Simmons, 2 Misc 3d 728 [2003]). For purposes of our threshold, pleading-stage inquiry, the accusatory instrument provided sufficient facts to support a finding that, as alleged, defendant acted with the requisite fraudulent intent (see Penal Law § 165.30[1]), and this occurred even though there was no allegation that "an actual taking of [money or] property of the victim" occurred (see Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law § 165.30, at 239).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: November 14, 2013