Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (William Miller, J.), rendered July 20, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of driving while intoxicated.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

On October 10, 2010, the People charged defendant with driving while intoxicated (common law) (Vehicle and Traffic Law * 1192 [3]), driving while impaired (Vehicle and Traffic Law * 1192 [1]), and leaving the scene of an accident without reporting (Vehicle and Traffic Law * 600 [a] [1]). The accusatory instrument alleged, in pertinent part, that the accident victim had informed the complainant/arresting officer that he had observed defendant operating his vehicle in the oncoming traffic lane shortly before the accident and that defendant had driven away. The complainant also stated that at "approximate[ly the same] . . . time and place," he had observed defendant exhibit signs of intoxication, namely slurred speech, red, watery eyes, an odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath, and "an unsteady gait." In a supporting deposition, the victim asserted that the facts set forth in the information attributed to him were true to his knowledge. On July 20, 2011, defendant pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law * 1192 [3]) in satisfaction of the accusatory instrument.

On appeal, defendant contends that the information was jurisdictionally defective because the factual averments were insufficient to establish, prima facie, that he had operated his vehicle while in an intoxicated condition. For the reasons that follow, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

As defendant did not waive prosecution by information, the facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument must be reviewed according to the requirements of an information (see CPL 100.10 [1]; 170.65 [1], [3]; People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 228 [2009]; People v Chan, 36 Misc 3d 44, 46 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]). An information is facially sufficient if it alleges nonhearsay factual allegations of an evidentiary nature which, if true, establish prima facie every element of the offense charged and defendant's commission thereof (see CPL 100.15 [3]; 100.40 [1] [c]; People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 136-137 [1987]). As defendant raised no issue in the Criminal Court with respect to the hearsay nature of any of the [*2]facts alleged, that aspect of the facial sufficiency requirements was waived (People Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 367 [2000]) and, as a consequence of his guilty plea, forfeited (People v Keizer, 100 NY2d 114, 121 [2003]). The prima facie requirement, which is "specific to informations" (People v Jones, 9 NY3d 259, 262 [2007]), is satisfied where the facts establish "reasonable cause" (CPL 100.40 [1] [b]) to believe that the defendant committed a particular offense. When reviewing an accusatory instrument for facial sufficiency, the factual allegations must be given "a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d at 360). It is only necessary, "as a matter of common sense and reasonable pleading" (People v Davis, 13 NY3d 17, 31 [2009]), that the instrument "factually describe the elements of the crime and the particular acts of the defendant constituting its commission" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d at 363) in sufficient detail to satisfy the requirements of due process and double jeopardy (People v Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 103 [2010]), that is, to afford the accused a fair opportunity to prepare a defense and avoid being charged twice with the same offense (People v Casey, 95 NY2d at 360; see also People v Shack, 86 NY2d 529, 540 [1995] [a facially sufficient instrument also ensures that "the crime for which defendant is tried . . . is in fact the crime with which (defendant) was charged"]).

Here, the accident victim's sworn allegation that he had observed defendant operating his vehicle in the oncoming traffic lane before defendant collided with the victim's vehicle, and the personal observations of the arresting officer that, at approximately the same time and place, he had observed defendant exhibit indicia of intoxication, namely, slurred speech, red, watery eyes, the odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath, and an "unsteady gait," sufficed to establish reasonable cause to charge defendant with driving while intoxicated (see CPL 100.40 [1] [b]; People v Maldonado, 86 NY2d 631, 635 [1995]; e.g. People v Kozlowski, 69 NY2d 761, 762 [1987]). It was not necessary that the facts supporting the allegation that defendant operated his vehicle in an intoxicated condition be attributed to the personal knowledge of a single witness (People v Netusil, 34 Misc 3d 137[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52410[U], *1 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2011]). Thus, giving the accusatory instrument a common sense and not overly technical reading, the officer's observations of defendant, made shortly after the victim had observed defendant operating his vehicle in the oncoming lane, coupled with the absence of any evidence that defendant consumed an alcoholic beverage after he had stopped his vehicle, excluded " all inferences other than simultaneous operation and intoxication' " (People v Spencer, 289 AD2d 877, 879 [2001], quoting People v Saplin, 122 AD2d 498, 499 [1986]; see also People v Sieber, 40 Misc 3d 133[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51143[U], *1 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2013]).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 29, 2013