Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Carmen R. Velasquez, J.), entered February 29, 2012. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant's cross motion to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for defendant's alleged breach of contract. In his complaint, plaintiff stated that, within the time span of about a month, he had received a minimum of 30 prerecorded telephone messages from defendant; that thereafter, on June 15, 2011, plaintiff had sent an email to defendant in which he had stated, among other things, that, beginning at 12:01 a.m. on June 16, 2011, he would charge defendant $1,500 each time it called his numbers, and that the placement of any call to him meant that defendant consented to pay the $1,500 per call; and that, after receiving three calls from defendant on July 16, 2011, plaintiff had demanded payment from defendant but had received no payment from defendant. Plaintiff subsequently moved to compel discovery, and defendant cross-moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211. As limited by the brief, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court entered February 29, 2012 as granted defendant's cross motion.

In determining a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211 [a] [7]), a court must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged therein as true, and give the plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences to determine whether those facts support any cognizable legal theory (see Nelson v Capital Cardiology Assoc., P.C., 97 AD3d 1072, 1073 [2012]; see also Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825 [2007]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). The sole criterion is whether, from its four corners, the pleading's factual allegations, taken together, manifest any cause of action cognizable at law (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; Kopelowitz & Co., Inc. v Mann, 83 AD3d 793, 796 [2011]; Fasano v Colon, 27 AD3d 691 [2006]).

To state a cause of action based on a breach of contract, the facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint must establish, in the first instance, the formation of a valid contract, based on plaintiff's June 15, 2011 email, including an offer, an acceptance of the offer, consideration, mutual assent and an intent to be bound (Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc. v Baldwin Union Free [*2]School Dist., 84 AD3d 1232, 1233-1234 [2011]; 22 NY Jur 2d, Contracts § 9), as well as its subsequent breach by defendant. We find that the factual allegations of the complaint failed to demonstrate the foregoing elements. Therefore, the complaint fails to state a cause of action cognizable at law (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d at 275; Kopelowitz & Co., Inc. v Mann, 83 AD3d at 796; Fasano v Colon, 27 AD3d at 691). Consequently, the Civil Court properly granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 12, 2013