Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), entered June 16, 2011. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $350.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff brought this small claims action to recover unpaid attorney's fees from defendant, a former client, for his preparation of a commercial lease. Defendant admitted that they had agreed that she would pay plaintiff $350 for his preparation and negotiation of the lease, but claimed that the lease had not been timely drafted and that plaintiff was responsible for the prospective tenant's backing out of the deal. She contended that it was plaintiff who had breached their agreement. After a nonjury trial, a judgment was entered on June 16, 2011 awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $350.

Our review is limited to determining whether "substantial justice has not been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (CCA 1807). The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that its conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). The determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510 [1991]). The deference accorded to a trial court's credibility determinations applies with even greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court, given the limited standard of review (see CCA 1807; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125 [2000]).

In the instant case, the Civil Court apparently credited plaintiff's version of the facts rather than defendant's, and there is no reason for this court to disturb that determination. The absence of a written letter of engagement or retainer agreement did not preclude plaintiff from recovering legal fees on the facts presented (see Seth Rubenstein, P.C. v Ganea, 41 AD3d 54, 60 [2007]; 22 NYCRR 1215.1, 1215.2 [a]). At trial, plaintiff demonstrated that he had timely prepared a lease and negotiated its terms in good faith, that defendant had accepted these legal services, that he had an expectation of compensation therefor, and that $350 was the reasonable [*2]value of the legal services rendered (see Michael H. Spector, AIA, P.C. v Billy Smith's Sport Ctr., Inc., 95 AD3d 967 [2012]). We conclude that the judgment rendered "substantial justice . . . between the parties" (CCA 1807).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 12, 2013