[*1]
Matter of Bramble v New York City Dept. of Educ.
2013 NY Slip Op 51942(U) [41 Misc 3d 1230(A)]
Decided on November 14, 2013
Supreme Court, Richmond County
Aliotta, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on November 14, 2013
Supreme Court, Richmond County


In the Matter of the Application of Lisa Bramble and ROBERT BRAMBLE, Petitioners, for an Order Pursuant to General Municipal Law §50-e(5) to Permit the Late Filing of a Notice of Claim,

against

The New York City Department of Education, Respondent.




80117/13

Thomas P. Aliotta, J.



Upon the foregoing papers, the applications of petitioners Lisa Bramble and Robert Bramble (Motion Seq. Nos. 001 and 002) for (1) leave to serve a late Notice of Claim and (2) to compel discovery from defendant New York City Department of Education (hereinafter "DOE") are denied.

This matter arises out of an incident which is alleged to have occurred on March 20, 2012, in Room 131 B of Susan E. Wagner High School on Staten Island. Petitioner, Lisa Bramble (hereinafter "petitioner"), a special education teacher and grade advisor at the high school, claims to have sustained extensive personal injuries when she attempted to shield a student from an assault by an unruly group of fellow students who had appeared at her office door. In her proposed Notice of Claim petitioner alleges, inter alia, that "at approximately 9:10 a.m....a number ofviolent, feral and angry students gathered outside Room 131 B [i.e., her office] and attempted to invade [the] room in order to attack and forcibly remove a student [who was eating breakfast therein]". She further alleges that when petitioner "saw the commotion and the threat posed to her guest student, [she] rushed to the doorway...to intercept and restrain the attacking students while struggling to release the rope from the door handle [FN1] in order to close the door on the attacking students and thwart the violent intrusion"[FN2] (see Petitioners' Exhibit A, paras 14, 15).

In support of the application, petitioner maintains that she delayed the filing of a Notice of Claim beyond 90 days after the incident(i.e., on or before June 19, 2012) because she did not [*2]appreciate the full extent of her injuries [FN3]; that the DOE had knowledge of the essential facts of the claim within two or three days of the occurrence through the "Written Statement Forms" filed by petitioner and her two eye-witnesses; and that the DOE has not been prejudiced by the delay, since it was the DOE's own custodial staff which supplied the rope as a make-shift remedy to keep the door from slamming shut instead of repairing the broken door's closing mechanism.

In opposing the application, the DOE argues, inter alia, that it has been substantially prejudiced by petitioners' delay in that it prevented respondent from conducting a prompt investigation of the incident; that it had no knowledge of the essential facts constituting the nature of petitioner's claim or theory of recovery prior to the filing of the Summons and Complaint on April 30, 2013 (almost one year late); and that petitioner's failure to appreciate the seriousness of the exacerbation of her admittedly pre-existing back injury on or before June 19, 2012 is no reasonable excuse for her failure to file a timely Notice of Claim [FN4].

As previously indicated, the applications are denied.

In order to commence a tort action against the DOE, a claimant is statutorily required to file a Notice of Claim within 90 days ofthe alleged injury (see Education Law §3813[1]; General Municipal Law §50-e[1][a]; Williams v. Nassau County Med. Ctr., 6 NY3d 531; Matter of McLeod v. City of New York, 105 AD3d 744, 745). Nevertheless, pursuant to those same statutes (see Education Law §3813[2-a]; General Municipal Law §50-e[5]), a court may grant a prospective claimant leave to file a late Notice of Claim upon the consideration of various factors, chief among which is whether the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of the alleged injury or a reasonable time thereafter (see Education Law §3813[2-a]; Matter of Felice v. Eastport/South Manor Cent. School Dist., 50 AD3d 138, 147; Matter of Morris v. County of Suffolk, 88 AD2d 956, affd 58 NY2d 767). Among the other relevant factors to be considered are whether (1) the claimant was an infant; (2) there was a reasonable excuse for the delay, and (3) the delay has substantially prejudiced the public corporation in mounting a defense to the action (see Matter of Dell'Italia v. Long Is. R.R. Corp., 31 AD3d 758; Matter of Sica v. Board of Educ. of City of NY, 226 AD2d 542). Upon each of these issues, the burden of proof rests upon the petitioner (see e.g. Matter of Sica v. Board of Educ. of City of NY, 226 AD2d at 542). [*3]

Here, petitioner has failed to establish that the DOE acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting this claim within 90 days after the claim arose or within a reasonable time thereafter(see Matter of Formisano v. Eastchester Union Free School Dist., 59 AD3d 543, 544). Although the DOE was clearly aware of the incident and petitioner's injury, the "Written Statement Forms" prepared by petitioner and her two para-professionals failed to indicate how the fact of her injury as the result of a spontaneous outburst by a trio of unrulystudents which took place outside her office relate to the legal claim now asserted, i.e., that her injury was the result of the DOE's negligent failure to timely repair the broken door-closing mechanism for Room 131 B. The relevant statutes contemplate not only knowledge of the facts, but also how they relate to the legal claim to be asserted (id. at 544; see Matter of Sparrow v. Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free School Dist., __AD3d__, 2013Slip Op 6696; Matter of Felice, 50 AD3d at 147-148; see also Matter of Joseph v. City of New York, 101 AD3d 721, 722; Matter of Werner v. Nyack Union Free School Dist., 76 AD3d 1026; Matter of Doyle v. Elwood Union Free School Dist., 39 AD3d 544, 545).

Likewise, petitioner has failed to establish that the DOE would not be substantially prejudiced in its defense on the merits should leave be granted, or to rebut its assertion that her extensive delay has deprived it of the opportunity to locate witnesses and conduct a timely and meaningful investigation of the alleged broken-door incident (see Matter of Scolo v. Central Islip Union Free School Dist., 40 AD3d 1104, 1106; Matter of Price v. Board of Educ. of City of Yonkers, 300 AD2d 310, 311).

Finally, petitioner's conclusory assertion that she did not immediately appreciate the nature and severity of her injury fails to constitute a reasonable excuse for her 13 month delay in filing in the absence of supporting medical evidence(see Matter of Sparrow, ___ AD3d___, 2013 NY Slip Op 6696, supra). Here, petitioner's claim is belied by the medical reports and self-made log attached to her petition, which reveal, inter alia, that she had a pre-existing back injury and was aware of the need for corrective surgery fully 11 months prior to making this application (see Matter of Wright v. City of New York, 66 AD3d 1037, 1038; Matter of Kumar v. City of New York, 52 AD3d 517, 518).

In light of the foregoing, petitioners' request for discovery (Motion Seq. No 002) is denied as academic.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that petitioners' motions are denied in their entirety.

E N T E R,

___/s/__________________________

Hon. Thomas P. Aliotta

J.S.C.

Dated: November 14, 2013

gl

Footnotes


Footnote 1:It is alleged by petitioner that a rope positioned on the door handle and attached to a fixed object on the office wall interfered with her ability to speedily close the door. It is further alleged that petitioner's injuries were "substantially caused by the negligence...of the DOE...in permitting...a defective entrance door to have an inoperable open door closer mechanism which prevented the rapid closing of the door in an emergency", and that the DOE, "instead of repairing or replacing said open door closer mechanism so as to permit the rapid closing of the door in an emergency situation, opted to supply a piece of rope to keep the door in the open position" (see Petitioners' Exhibit A, Proposed Notice of Claim, paras 23, 24).

Footnote 2:In her March 23, 2012 "Written Statement Form" prepared for filing with the DOE, petitioner described the incident as follows: "I heard screaming in the hall. I went to the door to see what was going on. As I got to the doorway several students were screaming threats to a student sitting at the table in my office. The 3 students began to push by me. I blocked the door, pushing them out while taking the rope off the door. I was pushing them with all my might as I was pulling the door to lock us out of room 131B. Noreen Harris and Margaret Faiella (i.e., two para-professionals) were pushing the door closed from the inside. The girls continued to push and tried to get...the [door] locked" (see Petitioners' Exhibit B).

Footnote 3:Petitioner's "chronological listing of [her] injuries and medical condition from the original injury-causing incident of March 20, 2012 through November 20, 2012 when [she] underwent [major] back surgery" indicates that she first consulted with her surgeon, Michael Neuwirth, M.D., who she "wanted to perform the surgery," on June 14, 2012, but that the surgery could not be performed until November 20, 2012 due to alleged coverage issues (see Petitioners' Exhibit E; see also paragraph 34 of affidavit of Lisa Bramble). This motion was made by Order to Show cause dated May 10, 2013, some six months after the surgery, 11 months after the need for surgery was diagnosed, and 14 months after the underlying incident.

Footnote 4:In fact, petitioner's March 27, 2012 "Occurrence Report" filed with the DOE (see defendant's Exhibit C) indicates that she sustained an "injury to her back" during the incident, and that her first visit with Dr. Neuwirth, with whom she discussed spinal surgery, occurred approximately one week prior to the expiration of the 90-day period within which to file a Notice of Claim (see Petitioners' Exhibit F).