[*1]
Herrera v 3684 Nostrand Assoc., LLC
2013 NY Slip Op 52020(U) [41 Misc 3d 142(A)]
Decided on November 29, 2013
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on November 29, 2013
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : RIOS, J.P., PESCE and SOLOMON, JJ
2012-1158 Q C.

Santos Lopez Herrera, Respondent, — November 29, 2013

against

3684 Nostrand Assoc., LLC, Appellant.


Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (William A. Viscovich, J.), entered October 27, 2011. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $5,000.


ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

In this small claims action by a commercial tenant to recover a security deposit in the amount of $5,000, defendant appeals from a judgment of the Civil Court which, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $5,000. Upon a review of the record, we find that the judgment provided the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (CCA 1804, 1807; see Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]).

The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). This standard applies with [*2]greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126). Here, plaintiff had, with defendant's permission, assigned his five-year commercial lease to a third party and immediately sought the return of his security deposit. Defendant maintained that plaintiff remained liable even after the assignment, and therefore was not entitled to the return of the security deposit prior to the end of the lease. Since the record reflects that, at the time of the trial, the five-year lease had ended and had not been renewed, there is no basis to disturb the Civil Court's determination that plaintiff was entitled to the return of the security deposit at that time. Under the circumstances presented, we need not decide whether or not plaintiff had been entitled to the immediate return of his security deposit at the time of the assignment.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Rios, J.P., Pesce and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 29, 2013