[*1]
Geico Indem. Co. v Makagon
2013 NY Slip Op 52029(U) [41 Misc 3d 142(A)]
Decided on December 3, 2013
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on December 3, 2013
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : WESTON, J.P., RIOS and ALIOTTA, JJ
2012-127 Q C.

GEICO Indemnity Company as Subrogee of LEE ARRINGTON, Respondent, —

against

Rudolf Makagon and RIFAT HALIM, Respondents, -and- FORDHAM UNIVERSITY and SUSANNA ELIZABETH REED, Appellants.


Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Jodi Orlow, J.), entered March 28, 2011. The order denied a motion by defendants Fordham University and Susanna Elizabeth Reed for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims asserted against them.


ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, and the motion by defendants Fordham University and Susanna Elizabeth Reed for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims asserted against them is granted. [*2]

In this subrogation action, plaintiff seeks to recover for property damage to, and loss of use of, its subrogor's vehicle, which was involved in a multi-vehicle accident on February 22, 2008 on the West Side Highway in Manhattan. Plaintiff alleges that a motor vehicle owned by defendant Rudolf Makagon and operated by defendant Rifat Halim, and a vehicle owned by defendant Fordham University (Fordham) and operated by defendant Susanna Elizabeth Reed, caused its subrogor's vehicle to sustain damage as a result of defendants' negligence. Insofar as is relevant to this appeal, defendants Makagon and Halim asserted cross claims for indemnification and/or contribution against defendants Fordham and Reed.

After issue was joined but prior to discovery, defendants Fordham and Reed moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them. In a supporting affidavit, Reed averred that, on the date in question, she was driving Fordham's van in the right lane of the West Side Highway, and it had just begun to snow. She noticed about 10 vehicles in front of her van that had been involved in an accident and were piled up. She brought the van to a complete stop on the right shoulder of the highway and did not make any contact with the vehicles piled up in front of her. She was stopped for at least 15 seconds when the rear of her van was struck by a vehicle owned and operated by a party not involved in this litigation, but the rear impact did not cause the van to make contact with any vehicle in front of her, including plaintiff's subrogor's vehicle.

In separate affirmations in opposition, counsel for plaintiff and for defendants Makagon and Halim argued that the summary judgment motion was premature and should be denied since there was outstanding discovery, and depositions had not yet been conducted (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

By order entered March 28, 2011, from which defendants Fordham and Reed appeal, the Civil Court denied the motion as premature.

Defendants Fordham and Reed established a prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability. In opposition, neither plaintiff nor defendants Makagon and Halim submitted an affidavit from a person with personal knowledge of the facts either denying the allegations in the Reed affidavit or showing any negligence on the part of defendants Fordham and Reed. Although, in their affirmations in opposition, both plaintiff's counsel and counsel for defendants Makagon and Halim contended that the summary judgment motion was premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]), their contentions are unavailing, as they failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of Fordham and Reed. The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is an insufficient basis for denying the motion (see Kimyagarov v Nixon Taxi Corp., 45 AD3d 736 [2007]).

Our conclusion that defendants Fordham and Reed are not liable for the damage to plaintiff's subrogor's vehicle "necessarily defeats" the cross claims asserted against them by defendants Makagon and Halim (Tapinekis v Rivington House Health Care Facility, 17 AD3d 572, 574 [2005]).

Accordingly, the order of the Civil Court is reversed and the motion by defendants Fordham University and Susanna Elizabeth Reed for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims asserted against them is granted. [*3]

Weston, J.P., and Aliotta, J., concur.

Rios, J., taking no part.
Decision Date: December 03, 2013