[*1]
| People v Ketterles |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 52081(U) [41 Misc 3d 1238(A)] |
| Decided on October 24, 2013 |
| Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County |
| Laporte, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting
Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be
published in the printed Official Reports. |
Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings
County
The People of
the State of New York,
against
Ali Ketterles, Defendant.
|
2012KN072055
Nadely Bataille
Assistant District Attorney
Kings County District Attorney's Office
350 Jay Street
Brooklyn, NY 11201
(718) 250-5291
Defendant Duran was represented by
Adrian Lesher, Esq.
Legal Aid Society
111 Livingston St.
Brooklyn, NY 11201
(718) 243-6219
Evelyn J. Laporte, J.
Defendant, ALI KETTERLES, is charged with one count each of
Assault in the Third Degree (P.L. § 120.00 [1]); Attempted Assault in the Third
Degree (P.L. § 110/120.00 [1]); Menacing in the Third Degree (P.L. §
120.15); and one count of Harassment in the Second Degree (P.L. § 240.26 [1]). He
moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument pursuant to C.P.L. § 30.30 on the
grounds that he has been denied his statutory right to a speedy trial because the People
have failed to file a facially insufficient accusatory instrument. The People oppose the
motion.
[*2]FACIAL
SUFFICIENCY
OF THE ACCUSATORY
INSTRUMENTS
To be sufficient on its face, a misdemeanor information must contain factual
allegations of an evidentiary character demonstrating reasonable cause to believe the
defendant committed the offenses charged. (C.P.L. §§ 100.15 [3]; 100.40 [1]
[b]; 70.10.) These facts must be supported by non-hearsay allegations which, if true,
establish every element of the offenses. (C.P.L. § 100.40 [1] [c].) An information
which fails to satisfy these requirements is jurisdictionally defective. (C.P.L.
§§ 170.30 and 170.35; People v. Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 [1987];
People v. Dumas, 68 NY2d 729 [1986].) It is a fundamental principle that an
information must allege each and every element of the offense charged. People v.
Butt, 153 Misc 2d 751 (Crim. Ct. Kings Co. 1992).
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
The defendant was arrested on August 28, 2012 and arraigned on
August 29, 2012. The original complaint charged the defendant with Assault in the Third
Degree (P.L. § 120.00 [1]); Attempted Assault in the Third Degree (P.L. §
110/120.00 [1]); Menacing in the Third Degree (P.L. § 120.15); and one count of
Harassment in the Second Degree (P.L. § 240.26 [1]) and reads as follows:
[Detective Steven G. Sneider of the 79th Precinct] is informed by Latosha
Smith-Ketterles that, [on or about August 11, 2012 at approximately 1:30 a.m. at 685
Gates Avenue in Kings County, New York State], the defendant punched the informant
numerous times about the face.
The deponent is further informed by the informant that the above described
actions caused the informant to suffer bruising, swelling, pain and a laceration to the
informant's lip and to be treated at a local hospital, to suffer substantial pain, to fear
further physical injury and to become alarmed and annoyed.
This original complaint was sworn to and signed by the deponent,
Detective Sneider on August 28, 2012.
The factual information contained in the original complaint was provided by
an informant, Lathosha Smith-Ketterles. Because this factual information did not come
directly from the sworn deponent, it is hearsay and requires corroboration from Lathosha
Smith-Ketterles by way of a supporting deposition. The People can not legally assert
readiness until such time that the People have a jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory
instrument which does not contain hearsay. (People v. Colon, 59 NY2d 921
[1983]).
To this date, the People never provided a supporting deposition from the
informant for the original complaint. Therefore, it was never converted to a
jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instrument.
SECOND ACCUSATORY
INSTRUMENT
On September 10, 2012, the People filed and
served a superseding complaint (hereinafter, "SSI-1") charging Attempted
Assault in the Third Degree (P.L. § 110/120.00 [1]); Menacing in the Third Degree
(P.L. § 120.15); and one count of Harassment in the Second [*3]Degree (P.L. § 240.26 [1]). "SSI-1"reads as follows:
[Police Officer Jeanmarc Denis of the 79th Precinct] states that at
approximately 1:37 AM, Deponent received a radio run of an assault in progress at 685
Gates Avenue, County of Kings, State of New York and arrived at the above location at
approximately 01:40 AM.
Deponent further states that upon arrival, at the approximate above time and
place, Deponent observed a woman, whom Deponent later learned to be Latosha
Smith-Ketterles, visibly shaking, crying, upset and bleeding from the mouth, and that
Latosha Smith-Ketterles stated to deponent "my husband beat me up, he punched me".
Deponent further states that deponent observed Latosha Smith-Ketterles with
swelling and a laceration to the lip, and a bloody mouth.
"SSI-1" was sworn to and signed by Police Officer Denis on September 4,
2012.
To be sufficient on its face, an information must provide reasonable cause to
believe that the defendant committed the offense, and the non-hearsay allegations must
establish, if true, every element of the offense charged (see, People v.
McNamara, 78 NY2d 626, 629 [1991], citing CPL § 100.40[1][b],[c];
People v. Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 136-137 [1987]). Mere conclusory
allegations are insufficient (see, People v. Dumas, 68 NY2d 729 [1986]) and a
purported information which fails to meet these requirements is fatally defective (see,
People v. Alejandro, supra at 136). An information should be given a
non-technical reading so long as it gives the defendant sufficient notice to prepare a
defense and will prevent him from being tried twice for the same crime (see, People
v. Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]).
"SSI-1" asks the court to presume that the informant is married to the
defendant and therefore, the defendant is the person who struck her. But there is no
actual mention of the complainant's connection to the defendant, or the defendant's
connection to any crime in this instrument. The only clue that the informant might be
related to the defendant is that she shares his last name — "Ketterles". But
assuming that this means that Ali Ketterles is the person who struck the informant
requires the court to rule out the possibility that the defendant is her brother,
brother-in-law, father, some other relative, or merely a person who happens to share the
same last name. While the People have inserted an additional description of the
informant's apparent mental state in this instrument, they have provided nothing in the
factual portion of the complaint which allows the court to presume that the defendant,
Ali Ketterles, committed the alleged offenses without the use of conjecture and
supposition. Therefore this accusatory instrument is facially insufficient.
Moreover, a review of the court file and the transcripts of all of the
proceedings which followed the filing of "SSI-1" reveal that the defendant was never
arraigned on "SSI-1". Under CPL § 100.50 (1) (2) defendant must be arraigned on a
superseding complaint in order for it to legally replace original complaint. The CPL
§ 170.10 requirement that the court arraign defendants on the superseding
accusatory instruments is mandatory, not discretionary. People v. Goss, 87 NY2d
792 (1996).
Therefore, the filing of "SSI-1" did not replace the original complaint in this
matter.
THIRD ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT
The court file also contains an additional accusatory instrument
(hereinafter, "SSI 2") that bears the title "SSI: 2012KN072055" and was sworn
to and signed by Police Officer Denis on September 4, 2013. That document reads as
follows:
Deponent [Police Officer Jeanmarc Denis of the 79th Precinct] states that at
approximately 1:37 AM, Deponent received a radio run of an assault in progress at 685
Gates Avenue, County of Kings, State of New York and arrived at the above location at
approximately 01:40 AM.
Deponent further states that upon arrival, at the approximate above time and
place, Deponent observed a woman, whom Deponent later learned to be Latosha
Smith-Ketterles, visibly shaking, crying, short of breath, upset and bleeding from the
mouth, and that Latosha Smith-Ketterles stated to deponent my husband beat me up, he
punched me.
Deponent further states that while Latosha Smith-Ketterles was visibly
shaking, crying, short of breath, upset and bleeding from the mouth, Latosha
Smith-Ketterles stated in sum and substance that Latosha Smith-Ketterles was in a cab on
the way from her husband's house to Latosha Smith-Ketterles's house and her husband
repeatedly punched her.
Deponent further states that deponent observed Latosha Smith-Ketterles with
swelling and a laceration to the lip, and a bloody mouth.
Once again "SSI-2" has provided nothing in the factual portion of the
complaint which allows the court to presume that the defendant Ali Ketterles committed
the alleged offenses without the use of conjecture and supposition. This third
complainant is based solely upon conclusions and therefore fails to achieve facial
sufficiency.
Most importantly, the court record show that the defendant was not arraigned
on this superseding accusatory instrument either. Therefore, the original complaint still
controls the speedy trial calculations in this matter. See, CPL §§ 100.50 (1)
(2); 170.10; People v. Goss, supra.
CALCULATION OF SPEEDY TRIAL
TIME
Under C.P.L. § 30.30 (1) (b) the People must be
ready for trial within ninety (90) days from the commencement of a criminal action
where the defendant is charged with one or more offenses, at least one of which is an A
Misdemeanor or Unclassified Misdemeanor punishable by no more than one (1) year in
jail. Once the defendant has alleged a delay of more than this allowable time, the People
have the burden of demonstrating sufficient excludable time in order to withstand a
motion to dismiss. People v. Fields, 214 AD2d 332 (1995); People v.
Santos, 68 NY2d 859 (1986); People v. Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333 (1980).
The original complaint contained the A misdemeanor charge of the Assault in the Third
Degree (P.L. § 120.00 [1]).
CALCULATION OF TIME CHARGED UNDER CPL §
30.30
The instant action commenced with the defendant's arraignment on
August 29, 2012. For purposes of the computation of the applicable speedy trial
time, the day on which the accusatory [*4]instrument is
filed is excluded. People v. Stiles, 70 NY2d 765 (1987). Accordingly,
August 30, 2012 constitutes day one (1) of the ninety (90) day period
applicable to the instant charges.
On August 29, 2012 the case was adjourned to August 31,
2012 for the People to file a supporting deposition. Effective readiness requires that
the People have a jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instrument. (People v.
Colon, 59 NY2d 921 [1983]). 1 day is chargeable during this adjournment.
On August 31, 2012 the People were not ready and the defendant
was not produced. The case was adjourned to November 5, 2012 for
conversion. The People filed and served a superseding complaint ("SSI-1") along with a
statement of readiness off calendar on September 10, 2012. However, as noted
above, this document was not an information in that it did not identify the defendant as
someone who had committed any offense. Moreover, the defendant was never arraigned
on "SSI-1". Effective readiness requires that the People have a jurisdictionally sufficient
accusatory instrument. (People v. Colon, 59 NY2d 921 [1983]). Thus, the period
following the filing of the statement of readiness and the November 5, 2012
appearance is includable. Therefore, 66 days are chargeable to the People.
On November 5, 2012 the People answered ready and the
case was adjourned to November 15, 2012 for Discovery by Stipulation
("DBS"). It is noted that because DBS is regarded as a courtesy provided to the defendant
in lieu of motion practice and discovery practice in Kings County, the adjournment is
excludable under CPL § 30.30 (4) (a) "irrespective of the People's readiness".
People v. Khachiyan, 194 Misc 2d 161 (Crim. Ct., Kings Co., 2002). See, also,
People v. Wilson, 2010 NY Slip Op 20136, Crim. Ct., Kings Co.; People v.
Dorilas, 19 Misc 3d 75 (2008); People v. Sai, 223 AD2d 439 (1st Dep't,
1996); People v. Burton, 133 Misc 2d 701 (Crim. Ct. NY County 1986); C.P.L.
§ 30.30 (4)(a). 0 days included.
On November 15, 2012 the People filed DBS and the case was
adjourned to November 27, 2012 for hearing and trial. The People are entitled
to a reasonable adjournment for witness procurement and trial preparation. What
constitutes Areasonable@ should be determined on a case by case basis, depending on
the complexity of the issues and the number of necessarywitnesses. In general, an
adjournment of two weeks has been held reasonable. This is up to the discretion of the
court. People v. Stirrup, supra; People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 (1985). 0
days chargeable.
On November 27, 2012 the People were not ready for trial.
The People requested a two-week adjournment for trial. The court adjourned the case to
December 12, 2012 for trial. Generally, the People are chargeable only with the
number of days requested, provided an announcement of readiness was previously made.
(See, People v. Smith, 82 NY2d 676 [1993]; People v. Dushain, 247
AD2d 234 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied, 91 NY2d 1007 [1998]; People v.
Rivera, 223 AD2d 476 [1st Dept], lv denied, 88 NY2d 852 [1996];
People v. Urraea, 214 AD2d 378 [1st Dept 1995]; People ex rel Sykes v.
Mitchell, 184 AD2d 466 [1st Dept 1992]). However, that calculation only applies
when the People have previously given a valid statement of readiness. As previously
discussed, effective readiness requires that the People have a jurisdictionally sufficient
accusatory instrument. (People v. Colon, supra). Thus, the People are charged
with this entire adjournment. 15 days are included.
On December 12, 2012 the People were not ready for trial because
the assigned ADA had a death in the family. The People requested a two-week
adjournment for trial. The court adjourned the case to January 7, 2013 for trial.
However, the People did not have a jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instrument.
(People v. Colon, supra). Thus, the People are charged with this entire
adjournment. 26 days are included.
[*5]
On January 7, 2013 the People
were not ready because it was the arresting officer's Regular Day Off ("RDO"). The
People requested a three-day adjournment. The court adjourned the case to February
13, 2013 for trial and directed the People to file a statement of readiness
off-calendar once they were prepared to proceed to trial. The People filed a certificate of
readiness off calendar on January 18, 2013 . However, as discussed above, the
People did not have a jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instrument. (People v.
Colon, supra). Thus, the People are charged with this entire adjournment. 37
days are included.
On February 13, 2013 the People answered ready, but the
defendant was not ready to proceed, so the case was adjourned to February 25,
2013 for trial. However, as discussed above, the People did not have a
jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instrument. (People v. Colon, supra). Thus,
the People are charged with this entire adjournment. 12 days are included..
On February 25, 2013 the People were not ready because it
was the arresting officer's Regular Day Off ("RDO"). The People requested March 4,
2013 for trial. However, as discussed above, the People did not have a
jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instrument. (People v. Colon, supra). Thus,
the People are charged with this entire adjournment. 8 days are included..
On March 4, 2013 the People were not ready because the
assigned ADA was out of the office with District Attorney Hynes. The People requested
March 11, 2013 for trial. The court adjourned the case to March 12,
2013. However, as discussed above, the People did not have a jurisdictionally
sufficient accusatory instrument. (People v. Colon, supra). Thus, the People are
charged with this entire adjournment. 8 days are included.
On March 12, 2013 the People were not ready because the
arresting officer was out of the country for an extradition. The People requested
March 20, 2013 for trial. However, the People did not have a jurisdictionally
sufficient accusatory instrument. (People v. Colon, supra). Thus, the People are
charged with this entire adjournment. 8 days are included.
On March 20, 2013 the People answered ready for trial. Defense
counsel was not ready because he was awaiting the transcript of the defendant's parole
hearing. However, as discussed above, the People did not have a jurisdictionally
sufficient accusatory instrument. Therefore, this court can not legally credit their
statement of readiness. (People v. Colon, supra). Thus, the People are charged
with this entire adjournment. 15 days are included.
On April 4, 2013 the People answered ready for trial. Defense
counsel was not ready because he was awaiting the transcript of the defendant's parole
hearing. The case was adjourned to April 9, 2013 for trial. However, the People
did not have a jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instrument. Therefore, this court can
not legally credit their statement of readiness. (People v. Colon, supra). Thus, the
People are charged with this entire adjournment. 5 days are included.
On April 9, 2013 the People were not ready because it was their
police witness was unavailable. The People requested April 11, 2013 for trial.
The court adjourned the case to April 15, 2013. The People did not have a
jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instrument. (People v. Colon, supra). Thus,
the People are charged with this entire adjournment. 6 days are included..
On April 15, 2013 the People answered ready for trial.
Defense counsel was not ready. The case was adjourned to April 23, 2013 for
trial. However, the People did not have a jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory
instrument. Therefore, this court can not legally credit their statement of readiness.
(People v. Colon, supra). Thus, the People are charged with this entire
adjournment. 8 days are included.
[*6]
On April 23, 2013 the People
were not ready because it was the arresting officer's was out of the country for an
extradition. The People requested April 24, 2013 for trial. The court adjourned
the case to April 30, 2013 as requested by the People. However, the People did
not have a jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instrument. Therefore, this court can not
legally credit their statement of readiness. (People v. Colon, supra). Thus, the
People are charged with this entire adjournment. 7 days are included.
On April 30, 2013 the People answered ready for trial. Defense
counsel was not in court as he was engaged in another matter. The case was adjourned to
May 8, 2013 for trial. However, the People did not have a jurisdictionally
sufficient accusatory instrument. Therefore, this court can not legally credit their
statement of readiness. (People v. Colon, supra). Thus, the People are charged
with this entire adjournment 8 days included.
On May 8, 2013 the People answered ready for trial. The case was
adjourned to May 15, 2013 for trial. However, the People did not have a
jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instrument. Therefore, this court can not legally
credit their statement of readiness. (People v. Colon, supra). Thus, the People are
charged with this entire adjournment. 7 days are included.
On May 15, 2013 the People answered ready for trial. The case was
adjourned to May 23, 2013 for trial. However, the People did not have a
jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instrument. Therefore, this court can not legally
credit their statement of readiness. (People v. Colon, supra). Thus, the People are
charged with this entire adjournment. 8 days are included.
On May 23, 2013 the People answered ready for trial. Defense
counsel was not in court. The case was adjourned to June 6, 2013 for trial.
However, the People did not have a jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instrument.
Therefore, this court can not legally credit their statement of readiness. (People v.
Colon, supra). Thus, the People are charged with this entire adjournment. 26
days included.
On June 6, 2013 the People answered ready for trial. Defense
counsel asked for leave to make a motion to dismiss for facial insufficiency. The case
was adjournedfor motion practice. This entire period, to date, is excludable. People v.
Burton, 133 Misc 2d 701 (Crim. Ct. NY County 1986) (court found period during
which a case was adjourned for defense motions was excludable in computation of
statutory speedy trial time); People v. Sai, 223 AD2d 439 (1st Dept 1996) (court
found that time requested by defense counsel to submit motions is excludable from
speedy trial calculations). C.P.L. § 30.30 (4) (a). 0 days included.
In this matter, the People never appeared before this court with a
jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instrument against the defendant. Without such a
valid and facially sufficient accusatory instrument, the People can not answer ready for
trial in good faith. (People v. Colon, 59 NY2d 921 [1983]). Hence, the only
excludable court adjournments here are the periods during which and accommodation
was made for the defendant. This only occurred for DBS and on the date the counsel
requested leave to make the instant motion.
CONCLUSION
Based
on the foregoing, in total, the People are charged with 279 days of includable delay
since the commencement of the action on August 29, 2012. Since more
than 90 days of chargeable time has elapsed, Defendant's motion to dismiss, pursuant to
C.P.L. § 30.30, is granted.
The foregoing is the decision and the order of the court.
[*7]
_________________________________
Dated: October 24, 2013EVELYN J. LAPORTE
Brooklyn, New York Judge of the Criminal Court