Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Pauline A. Mullings, J.), rendered September 21, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

The People charged defendant with criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (Penal Law § 170.25), a class D felony, after he had "produced" to the arresting officer a forged Homeland Security Employment Authorization card which, defendant admitted, he had recently purchased for $300. With the People's consent, the Criminal Court reduced the felony to the misdemeanor of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree (Penal Law § 170.20), whereupon defendant waived the right to be prosecuted by information (see CPL 100.10 [4]; 170.65 [1], [3]) and pleaded guilty to the charge.
On appeal, defendant contends that the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally defective because it lacked sufficient allegations of fact of an evidentiary nature from which defendant's intent to "deceive, defraud or injure another" (Penal Law §§ 170.25, 170.20) may reasonably be inferred. For the reasons that follow, we reject this contention and affirm the judgment of conviction.

A misdemeanor complaint is sufficient on its face when it contains "a statement of the complainant alleging facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charge[]" (CPL 100.15 [3]) which "provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged in the accusatory part of such instrument" (CPL 100.40 [4] [b]; see People v Dumas, 68 NY2d 729, 731 [1986]). Intent, which is "specific to the crime charged" (People v Bailey, 13 NY3d 67, 72 [2009]), is " the product of the invisible operation of [the] mind' " (People v Rodriguez, 71 AD3d 450, 452 [2010], affd 17 NY3d 486, quoting People v Samuels, 99 NY2d 20, 24 [2002]). Absent direct evidence, such as an admission, intent may be " inferred from the act itself . . . [or] from the defendant's conduct and the surrounding circumstances' " (71 AD3d at 452, quoting People v Bracey, 41 NY2d 296, 301 [1977]; see also People v Barnes, 50 NY2d 375, 381 [1980]).

Here, for purposes of satisfying the reasonable cause standard, which is applicable to both felony and misdemeanor complaints, defendant's admission that he had purchased the forged Homeland Security Employment Authorization card at a not insignificant cost, and the allegation [*2]that defendant "produced" the card to the arresting officer, inferentially to deceive the officer, constitute sufficient allegations of fact, aside from mere possession, to establish reasonable cause to believe that defendant knowingly possessed the forged instrument with the intent to deceive or defraud others (see Rodriguez, 71 AD3d at 452-453; People v Dallas, 46 AD3d 489, 491 [2007]; People v Wellington, 41 AD3d 517 [2007]; cf. People v Bailey, 13 NY3d at 71-72; People v Brunson, 66 AD3d 594, 595 [2009]).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 16, 2013