Appeal from an amended judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Robert H. Spergel, J.), rendered May 16, 2012. The amended judgment revoked a sentence of probation previously imposed by the same court, upon a finding, after a hearing, that defendant had violated a condition thereof, and resentenced him to a term of one year of imprisonment on his conviction of violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (4-a).

ORDERED that the amended judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Defendant's contentions that the District Court's finding that he violated a condition of his probation was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence and was based solely on hearsay have been rendered academic, as he has served the resentence imposed (see People v Pesce, 9 Misc 3d 138[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51749[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2005]; People v Ackridge, 1 Misc 3d 129[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51573[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2003]). In any event, were these issues not academic, we would have found that the District Court's determination was based on a preponderance of the evidence and was not based solely on hearsay (see People v Ramlall, 64 AD3d 667, 668 [2009]; see People v Rennie, 190 AD2d 830 [1993]; see also People v DeMoney, 55 AD3d 953, 954 [2008]; People v Almonte, 50 AD3d 696 [2008]; People v Spady, 25 AD3d 881, 882 [2006]; People v Costanza, 281 AD2d 120, 124 [2001]; People v Krzykowski, 121 AD2d 831, 832 [1986]).

Defendant contends that his constitutional rights were violated when the District Court denied his request that his handcuffs be removed during the hearing, citing "security reasons." This claim is not academic, as it is of importance to the criminal justice system, and it is sufficient likely to recur yet evade appellate review. Thus, the issue falls within the exception to the mootness doctrine (see Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 714 [1980]; People v Concepcion, 41 Misc 3d 1 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2013]).

The court's directive that defendant be handcuffed at the hearing does not require reversal. The general rule prohibiting handcuffing and shackling of defendants in court, absent "a case-specific, on-the-record finding of necessity" (People v Clyde, 18 NY3d 145, 153 [2011]), applies to nonjury trials and to criminal proceedings, which includes probation revocation hearings (see People v Best, 19 NY3d 739, 743 [2012]; Matter of Darvin M. v Jacobs, 69 NY2d 957, 959 [1987]; People v Recor, 209 AD2d 831, 832 [1994]; CPL 1.20 [18]). In this case, the District Court's basis for its determination, "security reasons," did not constitute a case-specific, [*2]on-the-record finding of necessity.

However, the District Court's erroneous directive that defendant be handcuffed was harmless, as the evidence of defendant's violation of a term of his probation was overwhelming, and there was no reasonable possibility that the directive affected the outcome of the hearing (see People v Best, 19 NY3d at 744-745; People v Clyde, 18 NY3d at 153-154). Defendant admitted to his probation officer that he did not participate in "aftercare" drug treatment sessions and that he did not want to reside in a "sober house" maintained by his drug treatment program. Defendant explained to his probation officer that the treatment sessions, which were held five days per week and three hours per day, were "too much for him to go to." The probation officer also had personally observed defendant failing to attend his aftercare program.

Accordingly, the amended judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Nicolai, P.J., LaSalle and Marano, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 16, 2013