Appeal from judgments of the City Court of Middletown, Orange County (Steven W. Brockett, J.), rendered August 14, 2012. The judgments convicted defendant, upon his pleas of guilty, of two charges of petit larceny.

ORDERED that the judgments of convictions are affirmed.

In satisfaction of pending dockets, defendant pleaded guilty to two charges of petit larceny (Penal Law § 155.25) and signed a contract to participate in a drug treatment court program. Under the terms of the plea agreements, defendant's pleas would be vacated and he would receive adjournments in contemplation of dismissal, if he successfully entered into and completed the drug program. However, defendant was informed by the court that he would face consecutive sentences of up to a year in jail on each charge if he failed to complete the program. The City Court was subsequently notified that defendant had left the drug program. After the court conducted an inquiry, defendant was sentenced to two consecutive one-year jail terms.

Defendant's contention that his right to due process was violated because the City Court failed to hold a hearing before it imposed the bargained-for sentences is unpreserved for appellate review since, in the City Court, defendant never objected to the adequacy of the inquiry conducted by the City Court, did not request a hearing, and did not move to withdraw his pleas (see People v Pisciotta, 105 AD3d 456 [2013]; People v Arrington, 94 AD3d 903 [2012]). In any event, defendant's contention lacks merit as the record indicates that defendant did not dispute that he had failed to complete the drug program, and the court conducted a sufficient inquiry regarding this failure prior to imposing the sentences (see People v Valencia, 3 NY3d 714 [2004]; People v Pisciotta, 105 AD3d 456). There were no disputed factual issues that required a hearing as a matter of due process (see People v Valencia, 3 NY3d 714; People v Pisciotta, 105 AD3d 456).

Defendant's contention that his sentences were excessive similarly lacks merit. As a general rule, a defendant who has been sentenced according to the terms of a bargained-for plea and sentencing agreement will not be heard to complain that the sentence was unduly harsh or excessive (see People v Galvez, 72 AD3d 838 [2010]; People v Ubiles, 59 AD3d 572 [2009]; People v Grigg, 53 AD3d 629, 630 [2008]). Under the circumstances presented, we find no basis to deviate from that rule.

Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are affirmed. [*2]

Nicolai, P.J., Iannacci and Tolbert, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 16, 2013