Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Town of Philipstown, Putnam County (Stephen G. Tomann, J.), entered August 5, 2011. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $3,000.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff commenced this small claims action against her former landlord to recover her security deposit. After a nonjury trial, the Justice Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $3,000. On appeal, defendant argues that she should have been able to retain the security deposit to offset unpaid rent or, in the alternative, to cover her cost of repairing and cleaning the premises. Upon a review of the record, we find that the judgment provided the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (UJCA 1804, 1807; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]).

The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to evaluate their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]).

Plaintiff established at trial that, in a prior proceeding, defendant had been awarded a money judgment against her for the rental arrears, and that plaintiff's wages were being garnished to satisfy that judgment. Defendant failed to establish that plaintiff owed any arrears accruing after the prior action. With respect to defendant's assertion, in the alternative, that she is entitled to retain the security deposit to cover her costs arising from plaintiff's damage to the premises, we note that it is well settled that a security deposit remains the property of the tenant (General [*2]Obligations Law § 7-103 [1]) and must be returned at the conclusion of the tenancy (see Cruz v Diamond, 6 Misc 3d 134[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50187[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]), in the absence of competent proof that the tenant caused damage beyond that attributable to ordinary wear and tear (see generally Finnerty v Freeman, 176 Misc 2d 220, 222 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 1998]). Here, the record does not support defendant's claims of damage to the premises. In view of the foregoing, and as defendant's remaining argument is without merit, we affirm the judgment.

Nicolai, P.J., Iannacci and Tolbert, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 17, 2013