Schorr v Schorr
2014 NY Slip Op 00290 [113 AD3d 490]
January 16, 2014
Appellate Division, First Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, March 5, 2014


Bari Yunis Schorr, Respondent,
v
David Evan Schorr, Appellant.

[*1] David E. Schorr, appellant pro se.

Newman & Denney P.C., New York (Louis I. Newman of counsel), for respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Deborah A. Kaplan, J.), entered on or about July 16, 2012, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted plaintiff's motion to quash nonparty subpoenas, for a protective order requiring defendant to seek leave of the court before issuing any further subpoenas or deposition demands, and for interim counsel fees, and awarded plaintiff $20,000 in such fees, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

In this matrimonial action, which has been the subject of numerous motions and has been before this Court on two occasions (see Schorr v Schorr, 96 AD3d 583 [1st Dept 2012]; Schorr v Schorr, 106 AD3d 544 [1st Dept 2013]), the court again properly awarded plaintiff counsel fees after considering the financial positions of the parties and the circumstances of the case (see Domestic Relations Law § 237; see also Schorr, 96 AD3d at 584). The record shows that defendant has continued to engage in extensive motion practice, including bringing motions that have little merit, and his claim that he is the non-monied spouse also continues to lack support (id.).

The court providently exercised its discretion in granting the motion to quash the subpoenas. Defendant failed to show that he could not obtain the information sought in the course of depositions of plaintiff or other sources (see Financial Structures Ltd. v UBS AG, 96 AD3d 433 [1st Dept 2012]; Menkes v Beth Abraham Servs., 89 AD3d 647 [1st Dept 2011]). Moreover, plaintiff has explicitly stated that she would provide all relevant information to defendant. The court also exercised its discretion in a provident manner in issuing the protective order based on defendant's issuance of harassing and unnecessary subpoenas (see CPLR 3103 [a]; [*2]Matter of U. S. Pioneer Elecs. Corp. [Nikko Elec. Corp. of Am.], 47 NY2d 914, 916 [1979]).

We have considered defendant's remaining contentions and find them unavailing. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Friedman, DeGrasse, Richter and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.