Matter of Dakim S.
2014 NY Slip Op 00303 [113 AD3d 499]
January 21, 2014
Appellate Division, First Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, March 5, 2014


In the Matter of Dakim S., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.

[*1] Tamara A. Steckler, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Raymond E. Rogers of counsel), for appellant.

Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Ronald E. Sternberg of counsel), for presentment agency.

Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Allen G. Alpert, J.), entered on or about June 20, 2013, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent upon a fact-finding determination that he committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of sexual abuse in the third degree, and placed him on probation for a period of 18 months, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the petition dismissed. Order of disposition, same court, Judge and entry date, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent upon a fact-finding determination that he committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, and placed him on probation for a period of 18 months, unanimously reversed, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, without costs, and the petition dismissed.

As the presentment agency concedes, the court's finding as to sexual abuse in the third degree was based on legally insufficient evidence because there was a lack of independent evidence to corroborate appellant's confession (see Family Ct Act § 344.2 [3]).

The presentment agency also concedes that the sexual abuse case influenced the court's determination to adjudicate appellant a juvenile delinquent in the stolen property case rather than granting an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, and it therefore requests a remand for a new dispositional hearing. However, since the period of probation has now expired, we instead exercise our interest of justice jurisdiction to dismiss the petition.

In view of these determinations, we find it unnecessary to address appellant's remaining arguments. Concur—Tom, J.P., Saxe, Moskowitz, Gische and Clark, JJ.