| Bouton v City of Newburgh |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 00317 [113 AD3d 715] |
| January 22, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| Frances Bouton, Appellant, v City of Newburgh et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants. |
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Catania, Mahon, Rider PLLC, Newburgh, N.Y. (Rebecca Baldwin Mantello of
counsel), for respondent City of Newburgh.
Burke, Gordon & Conway, White Plains, N.Y. (Stephen P. Falvey of counsel), for
respondent T.M. Brennan Contractors, Inc.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of two orders of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Marx, J.), both dated May 7, 2012, as granted those branches of the respective motions of the defendants City of Newburgh and T.M. Brennan Contractors, Inc., which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.
Ordered that the orders are affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.
The defendant City of Newburgh and the defendant T.M. Brennan Contractors, Inc. (hereinafter together the movants), each made a prima facie showing of their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The movants submitted evidentiary proof, including a transcript of the testimony given by the plaintiff at a hearing held pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h, a transcript of the plaintiff's deposition testimony, and photographs of the accident site, that established that the condition which caused the subject accident was open and obvious, and not inherently dangerous (see Soussi v Gobin, 87 AD3d 580, 580-581 [2011]; Capasso v Village of Goshen, 84 AD3d 998 [2011]; Orlando v Audax Constr. Corp., 14 AD3d 500 [2005]; Fernandez v Edlund, 31 AD3d 601 [2006]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the movants' respective motions which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.
In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the plaintiff's remaining contentions. Skelos, J.P., Dickerson, Cohen and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.