Recitation in accordance with CPLR 2219(a) of the papers considered on the petition for a judgment, pursuant to CPLR 7510, confirming an arbitration award (Mot. Seq. No.4, Mot. Cal. #55); Respondents' "cross motion" for an order dismissing the petition, or, in the alternative, pursuant to CPLR 7511, vacating the arbitration award (Mot. Seq. # 6; Mot. Cal. #56); and on the motion of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and Marcy Tower LLC for an order granting them leave to intervene and partially vacating the arbitration award (Mot. Seq. #5, Mot. Cal. #54):

-Notice of Petition

Verified Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award

Exhibits A-E

-Cross Motion to Dismiss Petition or in the Alternative to Vacate Arbitration Award

Respondent Moshe Roth's Affirmation in Support of Cross Motion to Dismiss

Notice of Petition and Petition or in the Alternative to Vacate Arbitration Award and in Opposition to Petition to Confirm Award

-Affirmation of Mendel Brach in Support of Cross Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Vacate Award and in Opposition to Petition to Confirm Award

Verified Answer

-Exhibits to Affirmations of Moshe Roth and Mendel Brach in Support of Cross Motion (Volume I of III)

Exhibit A

-Exhibits to Affirmations of Moshe Roth and Mendel Brach in Support of Cross Motion (Volume II of III)

Exhibit A

-Exhibits to Affirmations of Moshe Roth and Mendel Brach in Support of Cross Motion (Volume III of III)

Exhibits B-T

-Notice of Motion to Intervene and to Partially Vacate Arbitration Award

Affirmation of Jon Hollis in Support of Motion to Intervene and to Partially Vacate Arbitration Award

Exhibits 1-7

Appendix A

-Affirmation in Opposition to Cross Motion to Dismiss Petition and in Reply to Opposition to Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award

Exhibits A-Z

Exhibits AA-AG

-Affirmation in Opposition to Motion to Intervene and to Partially Vacate [*2]Arbitration Award

Exhibits A-D

-Attorney's Reply Affirmation

Reply Affirmation of Mendel Brach

Exhibits A-O

-Joint Reply Memorandum of Law of Proposed Intervenors JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and Marcy Tower LLC in Further Support of Motion to Intervene

Exhibits 1-5

Petitioners were represented by Joseph Covello, Esq. and Perry Balagur, Esq. of Lynn, Gartner, Dunne & Covello, LLP. Respondents were represented by J. Michael Gottesman, Esq. Proposed intervenor JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. was represented by Jon Hollis, Esq. and David M. Satnick, Esq. of Loeb & Loeb LLP, and proposed intervenor Marcy Tower LLC was represented by Donald G. Davis, Esq. of Fidelity National Law Group.

Petitioners Edward Wydra and Martin Wydra, and defendants Mendel Brach and Moshe Roth a/k/a Mozes Roth, together with some number of juridical entities controlled by at least one of them, were parties to an arbitration before The Beth Din Kollel HaRabbonim Rabbinical Court ("the Rabbinical Court") commenced prior to this action. The arbitration yielded a Decision of the Rabbinical Court"dated as of September 22, 2010" (the "First Award") that was the subject of a special proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 75 commenced by Petitioners and 10 juridical entities against defendants Brach, Roth and 21 juridical entities, including defendants 519 Marcy LLC a/k/a 519 Marcy Avenue, LLC, 222 Skillman LLC, and 652 Park, LLC.

With a Decision, Order and Judgment dated September 12, 2011, this Court vacated the First Award, and remitted the matter to the Rabbinical Court for rehearing on issues, including clarification as to which disputes and juridical entities were subject to the Rabbinical Court's determinations. (See Matter of Wydra [Brach], 32 Misc 3d 1241 [A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51664 [U] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2011].)

An appeal was taken by Petitioners and Respondents, which resulted in a Decision and Order of the Second Department dated July 31, 2013, affirming this Court's Decision, Order and Judgment (see Matter of Wydra [Brach], 108 AD3d 776 [2d Dept 2013]), and finding, among other things, that Respondents "failed to demonstrate bias on the part of the rabbinical court arbitrators who made the arbitration award dated September 22, 2010" (see id.), and, further, that Respondents' "remaining contentions are without merit" (see id.) Petitioners' cross appeal was dismissed "as abandoned".

Prior to issuance of the Second Department's Decision and Order, in August 2012, the Rabbinical Court issued a Decision, Ruling and Award (the "Second Award"), which sets forth in 13 pages all of its findings. [*3]

By Decision and Order dated November 27, 2012 in an action entitled Mew Equity LLC v Sutton Land Services, L.L.C. (hereinafter "the Mew Equity Action"), this Court gave collateral estoppel effect to the Second Award in dismissing Mendel Brach's and Moshe Roth's counterclaims in that action. (See Mew Equity LLC v Sutton Land Services, 37 Misc 3d 1225[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 52161 [U][Sup Ct, King County 2012].) In its review of the Second Award, this Court noted as follows:

"Unlike the First Award, the Rabbinical Court specified the disputes and juridical entities subject to its determinations. Among these findings, the Rabbinical Court determined that, among other entities, plaintiffs Edward and Martin Wydra, counterclaim defendants Dahill LLC and Hewes LLC, defendants/counterclaim plaintiffs Mendel Brach and Moshe Roth a/k/a Mozes Roth, and defendant entities 222 Skillman LLC, 652 Park LLC, and 519 Marcy LLC a/k/a 519 Marcy Avenue, LLC, were parties to the Master Agreement, and therefore subject to the arbitration agreement. Notably, the Rabbinical Court did not list plaintiff Mew Equity LLC, nor any of the other defendants, as parties to the arbitration." (Id., at *4.)

In opposition to giving the Second Award collateral estoppel effect, Mendel Brach and Moshe Roth contended, among other things, that they did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate before the Rabbinical Court. After rejecting their contentions, this Court concluded that Mendel Brach and Moshe Roth "did not utilize the opportunity that they were afforded". (See id., at *9.) Significantly, however, the Court considered Mendel Brach's and Moshe Roth's contentions despite the fact that, as of that time, they had not applied to vacate the Second Award (nor had Petitioners applied to confirm the Second Award). The Court noted, "Since any alleged ground for vacating or modifying an arbitration award may be interposed in a respondent's answer to a petition to confirm the award (see David D. Siegal, New York Practice, § 601 at 1094 [5th Ed] Lyden v Bell, 232 AD2d 562, 563 [2d Dept 1996]), there seems to be no reason why such ground may not be asserted to resist proposed collateral estoppel effect of the award where the proponent, for its own reasons, has not sought confirmation." (See Mew Equity LLC v Sutton Land Services, 37 Misc 3d 1225[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 52161 [U], at *7.)

Petitioners filed this petition and application on May 31, 2013, and Respondents filed their cross motion on July 24, 2013, prior to the issuance of the Second Department's Decision and Order on July 31. Petitioners' Affirmation in Opposition to Cross Motion to Dismiss Petition and in Reply to Opposition to Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award served on October 10 addresses the Second Department's Decision and Order. Respondents served an Attorney's Reply Affirmation on November 8, 2013, which does not address the Decision and Order. Even so, in the 67-page Attorney's Reply Affirmation, Respondents had ample opportunity to comment on the effect of the Second Department's Decision and Order, and would have been expected to in light of Petitioners' discussion of it. As such, the Court need not provide any further opportunity for briefing on these motions.

[*4]JP Morgan Chase, N.A.'s and Marcy Tower LLC's Motion to Intervene

JPMorgan Chase, N.A. ("JPMC") and Marcy Tower LLC ("Marcy Tower") seek an order, pursuant to CPLR §§ 1012, 1013 and 7511, allowing them to intervene in the instant special proceeding on the ground that the Second Award "improperly purports to adversely affect the rights and property interests of JPMC and Marcy Tower, neither of which was a party to the Beth Din Arbitration, but whose respective rights and interests in real property are instead currently being litigated before this Court" in the Mew Equity Action. (See Affirmation of Jon Hollis in Support of Motion to Intervene and to Partially Vacate Arbitration Award, ¶ 3.)

In the Mew Equity Action, plaintiffs Mew Equity LLC, Martin Wydra, and Edward Wydra seek declaratory relief as against JPMC and Marcy Tower as part of their Sixth Cause of Action. They seek a declaration that Mew Equity LLC, Martin Wydra, and Edward Wyrda have a $1.8 million mortgage lien on real property located at 519 Marcy Avenue, and that their mortgage lien has priority over liens granted by Marcy Tower to Washington Mutual Bank, JPMC's predecessor in interest. (See Verified Amended Complaint in Mew Equity Action, ¶¶ 123-39.) In their Answer to Amended Complaint in the Mew Equity Action, JPMC and Marcy Tower assert various defenses, including that prior to the property being transferred to Marcy Tower, LLC, Martin Wydra executed a written document releasing any mortgage held by Mew Equity LLC, Martin Wydra, or Edward Wydra on the property at 519 Marcy Avenue.

In a Decision and Order dated February 14, 2012, this Court noted as follows:

"Although the property at 519 Marcy Avenue may ultimately be the subject of a confirmed beth din award (again, defendants 222 Skillman LLC, 625 Park, LLC and 519 Marcy LLC a/k/a 519 Marcy Avenue, LLC were named respondents in the CPLR Article 75 proceeding), it does not appear that the respective interests of defendant Marcy Tower LLC, the current owner of the property, or defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association, as mortgagee, will be affected. To the extent, therefore, that this action would determine those interests as they relate to any interests of Plaintiffs, or any co-defendant for that matter, there seems no reason to stay the action pending final resolution of the beth din arbitration."

Even so, JPMC and Marcy Tower contend that the Second Award does, in fact, purport to affect their interests with respect to the 519 Marcy Avenue property. In their motion, JPMC and Marcy Tower take issue with the following provisions of the Second Award (hereinafter "519 Marcy Provisions"):

"f. The Rabbinical Court further finds that the March 2, 2005 Letter from Martin Wydra to whom it may concern' did not effectively release 519 Marcy Avenue from the lien created by the $1,800,000 Mortgage and that 519 Marcy Avenue has not been released from the lien created by the $1,800,000 Mortgage."

* * *

"1. The 519 Marcy Lien

i)420 Marcy LLC, 519 Marcy LLC a/k/a 519 Marcy Avenue LLC, Frankwink Properties, LLC, 222 Skillman LLC, 189 Spencer LLC and 416 Bedford Avenue, L.L.C. are deemed obligated and encumbered, as the case may be, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the $1,800,000 Mortgage as if timely and duly perfected.

ii)Defendants Brach and Roth are hereby directed to act with all reasonable dispatch and take or authorize all lawful actions, at their own expense, to cause the records of the clerk of the County of Kings, New York, to reflect and effectuate the foregoing finding."

Here, since the 519 Marcy Provisions purport to encumber or attempt to encumber property owned by Marcy Tower (who was not a party to the arbitration agreement) with a $1,800,000 Mortgage, and to give such mortgage priority over a lien held by JPMC (who was also not a party to the arbitration agreement); and since the 519 Marcy Provisions purport to determine matters that are at issue in the Mew Equity Action, including the effect of the written release executed by Martin Wydra; JPMC and Marcy Tower sufficiently demonstrate that they each have "a real and substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings". (Wells Fargo Bank, National Association v McLean, 70 AD3d at 677; see also Halstead v Dolphy, 70 AD3d 639, 639-40 [2d Dept 2010][appellant "demonstrated that it holds a mortgage on the real property which is the subject of this action, and that its interest in the property may be adversely affected by the judgment sought"] NYCTL 1991-1 Trust v Chalom, 47 AD3d 779, 780 [2d Dept 2008] ["ownership interest in the property would entitle it to intervene in this matter"]) As such, JPMC and Marcy Tower demonstrate prima facie entitlement to intervention, whether by right or in the [*6]Court's discretion.

Contrary to Petitioners' contention in opposition, a motion to intervene may be made in a special proceeding involving confirmation or vacatur of an arbitration award. (See e.g. Civil Service Bar Association, Local 237, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v City of New York, 64 AD2d 594, 594-595 [1st Dept 1978].) Moreover, CPLR 105(b) provides that "[t]he word action' includes a special proceeding". (See Matter of Long Island College Hospital, 44 Misc 3d 1210[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51638[U], *4 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2013] ["SUNY-Downstate's argument that CPLR 1012 and 1013 are inapplicable to this special proceeding is unavailing as CPLR 1012 and 1013 provide for intervention in an action' which, by definition, includes this special proceeding (see CPLR 105[b])"].)

Contrary to Petitioners' contentions, JPMC and Marcy Tower have sufficiently complied with CPLR 1014 by submitted a proposed pleading. (See Affirmation of Jon Hollis in Support of Motion to Intervene and to Partially Vacate Arbitration Award, Appendix A, Proposed Intervenors' Verified Response to Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award). The fact that the proposed pleading has not been verified may be overlooked, and, in any event, may be corrected in the absence of any prejudice to any party. (See CPLR 2001.) Petitioners fail to demonstrate any prejudice as a result of lack of verification of the proposed pleading.

Petitioners' contentions that they are somehow prejudiced by any delay in JPMC's and Marcy Tower's motion to intervene is disingenuous, at best, in light of their own lengthy delay in seeking confirmation of the Second Award. Petitioners' contention that JPMC and Marcy Tower could have sought intervention at any time prior to the issuance of the Second Award is also without merit since there is nothing in the First Award that specifically addressed the property at 519 Marcy Avenue. Moreover, Petitioners fail to set forth any prejudice as a result of any delay. Indeed, the instant motion is being heard contemporaneously with Petitioners' application to confirm and Respondents' cross motion. In any event, any delay or resultant prejudice as a result of intervention is outweighed by JPMC's and Marcy Tower's demonstrated real and substantial interests in the outcome of the proceeding (cf. Matter of Pier v Bd. of Assessment, 209 AD2d 788, 789 [3d Dept 1994].)

Accordingly, the branch of JPMC's and Marcy Tower's motion seeking intervention in this special proceeding is GRANTED.

JPMC and Marcy Tower also contend that as intervenor respondents that they are entitled to an order, pursuant to CPLR 7511(b)(2), modifying the Second Award to delete the 519 Marcy Provisions. "[W]hen an intervenor becomes a party to an action, whether as of right or in the court's discretion, he or she becomes an original party for all intents and purposes." (Love v Perales, 222 AD2d 661, 662 [2d Dept 1995] see also Matter of Crabtree v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 294 AD2d 287, 290 [1st Dept 2002] Jeffer v Jeffer, 28 Misc 3d 1238[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51631[U], *5 [Sup Ct, Kings County, 2010].) [*7]

CPLR 7511(b)(2)(ii) provides that "[t]he award shall be vacated on the application of a party who neither participated in the arbitration nor was served with a notice of intention to arbitrate if the court finds that . . . a valid agreement to arbitrate was not made". As such, the court "may properly vacate those portions of" an award that affects nonparties to the arbitration agreement who did not participate in the arbitration. (See Matter of Grasso, 72 AD3d 1463, 1465 [3d Dept 2010]["Supreme Court properly vacated those portions of the award which required (petitioner nonparties to arbitration) to issue stock or provide an accounting"] Hirsch v Hirsch, 4 AD3d 451, 453 [2d Dept 2004] ["since Osterman was not a party to the arbitration agreement, and he did not authorize the Bais Din to dispose of his property, the award deprived him of his property without due process and was not binding on him"].) A judgment cannot be entered "against a stranger to the arbitration agreement and proceedings". (Matter of Little Neck Computers, Inc. v Guido, 217 AD2d 659, 660 [2d Dept 1995] see also Levovits v Yeshiva Beth Henoch, Inc., 120 AD2d 289, 296 [2d Dept 1986].)

CPLR 7511(c) provides that the "court shall modify the award if . . . (2) the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues submitted".

The Court has not been cited to, and in its own research has not found, any authority that a nonparty to an arbitration that is permitted to intervene on a petition to confirm the arbitration award may seek rejection or modification of the award. The most relevant appellate decision is that of the Second Department in Hirsch v Hirsch (4 AD3d 451). There, a husband and wife submitted certain matrimonial claims to beth din arbitration in accordance with Jewish law. In addition to custody and visitation that could not, because of public policy, be determined by arbitration, and a child support determination that did not comply with a governing statute, the beth din directed that the marital residence, which was owned by the wife's father, be sold and that the husband receive 50% of the proceeds.

Since the wife's father was not a party to the arbitration, the provision of the award that purported to affect his ownership of the martial residence was "invalid". (See Hirsch v Hirsch, 4 AD3d at 453.) Since the provisions of the award that were properly made were "intertwined with the issues of the husband's child support obligation and the disposition of the martial residence", "Supreme Court properly vacated the entire award." (See id.) There is no indication in the Second Department's decision that the wife's father was even a party to the Article 75 proceeding to confirm the award.

JPMC and Marcy Tower sufficiently demonstrate that the 519 Marcy Provisions purport to encumber or attempt to encumber with a $1,800,000 mortgage property owned by Marcy Tower, and to give such mortgage lien priority over a mortgage lien held by JPMC. Since neither Marcy Tower nor JPMC were parties to the arbitration, the subject matter of the 519 Marcy Provisions was not properly submitted to the Rabbinical Court, and those provisions of the award are "invalid" (see Hirsch v Hirsch, 4 AD3d at 453.) [*8]

Neither Petitioners nor Respondents make any showing that the 519 Marcy Provisions are "intertwined" with the other provisions of the Second Award (see Hirsch v Hirsch, 4 AD3d at 453), or that deletion of the 519 Marcy Provisions would affect the merits on any of the other issues determined by the Rabbinical Court (see CPLR 7511[c].)

The Court recognizes that it has given collateral estoppel effect to the Second Award insofar as it addressed issues that were the subject of Mendel Brach's and Moshe Roth's counterclaims in the Mew Equity Action. However, none of Brach's and Roth's counterclaims in the Mew Equity Action appear related to the property at 519 Marcy Avenue, and, therefore, the Court did not, and had no reason to, give collateral estoppel effect to the 519 Marcy Provisions. (See Mew Equity LLC v Sutton Land Services, 37 Misc 3d 1225[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 52161, *3 ["Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants sufficiently demonstrate that the Second Award resolves in their favor all of the counterclaims"].) As such, deletion of the 519 Marcy Provisions from the Second Award does not impact this Court's prior determination to give collateral estoppel effect to other portions of the Second Award that did not affect the interests of nonparties to the arbitration.

The Court has considered whether a judgment might properly be drafted short of modification of the Second Award and determined that, at the least, the possibilities of confusion are such as to threaten the interests of JPMC and Marcy Tower. By instituting the Mew Equity Action, Petitioners implicitly recognize that the issues reflected in the 519 Marcy Provisions are appropriately resolved in that action.

Accordingly, the branch of JPMC's and Marcy Tower's motion to modify the Second Award so as to delete the 519 Marcy Provisions is GRANTED.

Respondents' Cross-Motion

In their cross-motion to dismiss the petition or vacate the Second Award, Respondents point to a portion of this Court's Decision, Order and Judgment dated September 21, 2011, in which this Court stated, "Respondents have asserted other grounds for vacating the decision of the Bais Din, but hopefully they will be resolved by the rehearing being ordered, or resolution will at least be aided by further consideration of the Beth Din." (See Matter of Wydra [Brach], 32 Misc 3d 1241 [A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51664 [U], at *19.) Even so, Respondents appealed this Court's Decision, Order and Judgment, which resulted in the Second Department's Decision and Order. Even though this Court did not rule on the other grounds raised by Respondents to vacate the First Award, the Second Department found that Respondents' "remaining contentions are without merit" (see Matter of Wydra [Brach], 108 AD3d at 776.)

"An appellate court's resolution of an issue on a prior appeal constitutes the law of the case and is binding on the Supreme Court as well as the appellate court, and operates to foreclose reexamination of the question absent a showing of subsequent evidence or change in the law." (Sicuranza v McDonald, 102 AD3d 762, 762 [2d Dept 2013] [internal quotation marks, brackets, [*9]and citations omitted].)

The Second Department's Decision and Order forecloses this Court from reexamining any question that was raised before the Second Department. (See id.) In support of their cross-motion, Respondents provide a copy of their appellate brief (see Exhibit P), which demonstrates that a litany of contentions raised by Respondents in their cross-motion were also raised before, and rejected by, the Second Department. These contentions include claims that the Rabbinical Court was partial and biased; that the arbitrator impermissibly modified the award; that the Rabbinical Court exceeded its authority under the arbitration contract and master agreement; that the Rabbinical Court refused to afford Respondents the minimum rights under Article 75; that the Rabbinical Court improperly reserved ongoing jurisdiction; and that by commencing the Mew Equity Action, Petitioners waived their right to arbitration before the Rabbinical Court.

This Court's Decision and Order dated November 27, 2012 in the Mew Equity Action addressed Respondents' contentions, including that the Rabbinical Court deprived them of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the rehearing of the arbitration proceedings prior to the issuance of the Second Award, and that the Rabbinical Court violated an order of this Court in the Decision, Order and Judgment as to how to proceed in the rehearing. Indeed, the Court stated that its "remand to the Rabbinical Court for a rehearing' could not be fairly and reasonably understood as a direction to the Rabbinical Court as to the manner in which it might proceed." (Mew Equity LLC v Sutton Land Services, 37 Misc 3d 1225[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 52161 [U], at *9.) For the same reasons as stated in the November 27, 2012 Decision and Order, this Court again rejects Respondents' contentions that they were deprived of a full and fair opportunity to litigate at the rehearing.

Respondents' contentions challenging the propriety of the 519 Marcy Provisions have been rendered moot by reason of this Court's resolution of Marcy Tower's and JPMC's motion. Again, Respondents make no showing that deletion of the 519 Marcy Provisions would have any effect on any other portion of the Second Award so as to justify either vacating the entire award or remanding back to the Rabbinical Court for further proceedings.

Respondents' contention that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them because the instant Petition and application seeking confirmation of the Second Award was served on their attorneys is without merit. CPLR 7502(a)(iii) provides that "[n]otwithstanding the entry of judgment, all subsequent applications [arising out of an arbitrable controversy] shall be made by motion in the special proceeding or action in which the first application was made." (See generally Matter of Gleason, 96 NY2d 117, 121 [2001].) Here, Petitioners appropriately filed and served the instant Petition and application in the same special proceeding in which their first application was made, and Petitioners appropriately served papers upon Respondents' attorneys (see CPLR 2103[b]["papers to be served upon a party in a pending action shall be served upon the party's attorney"].) The case cited by Respondents, Matter of Star Boxing, Inc. v DaimlerChrysler Motors. Corp. (17 AD3d 372, 372-73 [2d Dept 2005]), is clearly inapposite, since it involved the "first application arising out of the arbitrable controversy", not the second [*10]application as herein.

The Court has not ignored the extensive additional contentions of Brach and Roth with respect to the proceedings before the Rabbinical Court in support of their position that they did not have a full and fair opportunity to address the disputes placed before the beth din, but, as this Court has stated before in both this special proceeding and the Mew Equity Action, Respondents' complaints can be traced for the most part to their own decisions on whether or how to proceed before the Rabbinical Court, apparently exacerbated by their own failure to advise themselves as to how the beth din would or might proceed on particular questions. Ten separate written agreements, executed over a period of seven years, provide for arbitration before this Rabbinical Court. (See Matter of Wydra [Brach] 2011 NY Slip Op 51664[U], at *19.)

Petitioners' Application

In light of this Court's determination to modify the award, Petitioners' application to confirm the Second Award is granted only to the extent that the Second Award be confirmed as modified. (See CPLR 7510 ["The court shall confirm an award upon application of a party made within one year after its delivery to him, unless the award is vacated or modified upon a ground specified in section 7511"] CPLR 7511 (e) ["Upon the granting of a motion to modify, the court shall confirm the award as modified"].)

Summary

The branch of JP Morgan Chase, N.A.'s and Marcy Tower LLC's motion seeking to intervene is granted to the extent that within thirty (30) days after the date of this Decision, Order & Judgment, they serve a properly verified pleading in the form of the Proposed Intervenors' Verified Response to Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award, which is attached as Appendix A to the Affirmation of Jon Hollis in Support of Motion to Intervene and to Partially Vacate Arbitration Award. A copy of the Decision, Order & Judgment is being mailed to all parties on this day.

The branch of JP Morgan Chase, N.A.'s and Marcy Tower LLC's motion seeking to partially vacate the Second Award is granted. The cross-motion of Respondents seeking to vacate the Second Award in its entirety is denied, and the application of Petitioners to confirm the Second Award is granted only to the extent that the Second Award is confirmed as modified. The Second Award shall be modified to delete the following provisions:

"f. The Rabbinical Court further finds that the March 2, 2005 Letter from Martin Wydra to whom it may concern' did not effectively release 519 Marcy Avenue from the lien created by the $1,800,000 Mortgage and that 519 Marcy Avenue has not been released from the lien created by the $1,800,000 Mortgage."

* * *

"1. The 519 Marcy Lien

i)420 Marcy LLC, 519 Marcy LLC a/k/a 519 Marcy Avenue LLC, Frankwink Properties, LLC, 222 Skillman LLC, 189 Spencer LLC and 416 Bedford Avenue, L.L.C. are deemed obligated and encumbered, as the case may be, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the $1,800,000 Mortgage as if timely and duly perfected.

ii)Defendants Brach and Roth are hereby directed to act with all reasonable dispatch and take or authorize all lawful actions, at their own expense, to cause the records of the clerk of the County of Kings, New York, to reflect and effectuate the foregoing finding."

Petitioners,

-and-Index No. 27286/10

MENDEL BRACH, MOSHE ROTH a/k/a MOZES ROTH, NEW

HEWES TENANT LLC, HEWES STANDING LLC, HEWES

STANDING LLC and LODGE ROAD LLC, a joint venture,

HEWES STANDING 2 LLC, HEWES VIEWS LLC, 4217-4223

NU, LLC a/k/a NEW UTRECHT LLC, CIMARRON LAKE

ESTATES LLC, QUALITY ESTATES, LLC, FRANSKILL

DEVELOPMENT LLC, FLUSHING PLACE INC. a/k/a

FLUSHING PLACE, L.L.C., BEDFORD PLACE, INC. a/k/a

BEDFORD PLACE L.L.C., 405 BEDFORD AVENUE

DEVELOPMENT CORP., HEWES VIEWS INC., 222

SKILLMAN LLC, 222 SKILLMAN 1 LLC, 652 PARK LLC, 420 [*12]

MARCY LLC a/k/a 420 MARCY AVENUE, LLC,

FRANKWINK PROPERTIES, LLC, 189 SPENCER LLC, 416

BEDFORD AVENUE, L.L.C. a/k/a 401 BEDFORD LLC and 519

MARCY LLC a/k/a 519 MARCY AVENUE, LLC,

Respondents.

-and-

MARCY TOWER, LLC AND JPMORGAN

CHASE, N.A.

Intervenors/Respondents. ———————————
51;———————————& #151;——————————-

x

Judgment shall be entered on the petition, confirming the Decision, Ruling and Award of the Rabbincial Court of Kollel Harabbonim, dated August 2012, as modified by this Decision, Order, and Judgment.

January 30, 2014____________________

Jack M. Battaglia

Justice, Supreme Court