Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Town of Clarkstown, Rockland County (Craig E. Johns, J.), entered August 13, 2012. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiffs the principal sum of $870.80.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, and the action is dismissed.

Plaintiffs commenced this small claims action to recover the principal sum of $870.80. The evidence at a nonjury trial established that plaintiffs had submitted an online membership agreement in connection with the enrollment of their son and daughter in defendant swim club, and had paid membership dues to defendant for both children. After defendant terminated the employment of plaintiffs' daughter's swimming coach, plaintiffs withdrew their daughter and enrolled her instead at the swimming club where her coach had gone to work. Plaintiffs seek in this action to recover the portion of their daughter's enrollment fees allocable to the period after they had withdrawn their daughter. Following the trial, the Justice Court found in favor of plaintiffs and awarded them judgment in the principal sum of $870.80.

Online contracts, such as the membership agreement plaintiffs electronically "signed" in connection with the enrollment of their daughter in defendant club, and their submerged terms, are enforceable (see Jesmer v Retail Magic, Inc., 55 AD3d 171, 183 [2008] Moore v Microsoft Corp., 293 AD2d 587, 588 [2002]). The membership agreement plainly stated, in pertinent part, that enrollment was on an annual basis; that membership fees were non-refundable even if a swimmer quit the program; and that pro-rating of membership dues was not permitted. It did not include any representations as to who would coach plaintiffs' daughter. The agreement was complete, clear and unambiguous on its face, and reasonably susceptible of only one meaning (see Greenfield v Philles Records, 98 NY2d 562, 569-570 [2002]). Consequently, we conclude that the Justice Court's award of a refund to plaintiffs based on factors extrinsic to the membership agreement failed to render substantial justice between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see UJCA 1804, 1807).

On appeal, plaintiffs argue for the first time that the membership agreement was unenforceable because it failed to comply with the requirements of General Business Law § 394-b, which governs "certain contracts for instruction or use of physical or social training facilities." Without reaching the issue of whether defendant's membership agreement was subject to the provisions of General Business Law § 394-b, we note that General Business Law § 394-b is a consumer protection statute. Arguments based on consumer protection statutes are improperly raised for the first time on appeal (American Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v Haber, 295 AD2d 159 [2002]), and we thus do not consider plaintiffs' contentions with respect to that statute.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the action is dismissed.

Nicolai, P.J., LaSalle, and Marano, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: January 29, 2014