Appeal from eight judgments of the District Court of Suffolk County, First District (Joseph Santorelli, J.), rendered December 5, 2011. The judgments convicted defendant, upon jury verdicts, of resisting arrest, obstruction of governmental administration in the second degree, driving while intoxicated, aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree, operating a motor vehicle while registration is suspended, two charges of failure to signal while turning, and failure to drive on the right side of the road, respectively. The appeal from the judgments of conviction brings up for review an order of the same court dated June 4, 2010, following a hearing, denying the branches of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the accusatory instruments on constitutional and statutory speedy trial grounds.

ORDERED that the judgments of conviction are reversed, on the law, so much of the order dated June 4, 2010 as denied the branch of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the accusatory instruments on constitutional speedy trial grounds is vacated, that branch of defendant's motion is granted, the accusatory instruments are dismissed, and the fine, if paid, is remitted.

On September 9, 2007, defendant was charged, in a felony complaint, with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [3] [a]), which charge was reduced, pursuant to CPL 180.50 (3) (a) (i), to the misdemeanor charge of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [2]); in three misdemeanor informations with resisting arrest (Penal Law § 205.30), obstruction of governmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law § 195.05), and driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]), respectively; and, in multiple simplified traffic informations, with various traffic infractions. On May 16, 2008, defendant moved to have the action removed from the Justice Court of the Town of Shelter Island to the District Court of Suffolk County. A removal order was issued by the County Court of Suffolk County on June 9, 2008.

On October 22, 2009, prior to trial, defendant moved to dismiss the accusatory instruments based on, among other things, constitutional and statutory speedy trial grounds (CPL 30.20, 30.30). The People opposed the motion. A hearing was held on the motion, at which the clerk of the Justice Court of the Town of Shelter Island testified that, despite the fact that she had received the removal order on June 13, 2008, she did not actually transfer the file to the District Court until a year later, on June 19, 2009. By order dated June 4, 2010, the District Court denied the branches of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the accusatory instruments on speedy trial grounds. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether defendant was denied his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial.

We agree with defendant that the District Court should have granted the branch of his motion seeking to dismiss the accusatory instruments on constitutional speedy trial grounds. In order to determine whether a defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.20, the following factors must be considered: "(1) the extent of the delay; (2) [*2]the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay" (People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445 [1975]). In evaluating a constitutional speedy trial claim, the court "must engage in a sensitive weighing process of the diversified factors present in the particular case" (Taranovich, 37 NY2d at 445), with "no one factor or combination of . . . factors . . . necessarily decisive or determinative of the speedy trial claim, but rather the particular case must be considered in light of all the factors as they apply to it" (id.).

Upon weighing the Taranovich factors in the case at bar, we find that defendant has established that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Defendant has demonstrated that there was a protracted delay in the prosecution of the case, that there was no justifiable reason for the delay, and that he was prejudiced thereby. Consequently, the branch of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the accusatory instruments on the ground that defendant was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial (CPL 30.20) should have been granted.

Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are reversed, so much of the order dated June 4, 2010 as denied the branch of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the accusatory instruments on constitutional speedy trial grounds is vacated, that branch of defendant's motion is granted, and the accusatory instruments are dismissed.

LaSalle, J.P., Nicolai and Iannacci, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: January 31, 2014