The following papers, numbered 1 to 5 were considered on plaintiff's motion to compel and for sanctions and defendant's cross-motion to dismiss:

PapersNumbered

Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause - Affidavits - Exhibits................................1, 2

Answering Affidavits - Exhibits ..............................................................................5

Reply Affirmation....................................................................................................

Cross-Motion[ X ] Yes [ ] NO _____________________________3, 4

LING-COHAN, J.:

Pro se plaintiff, Jennifer Cangro ("Cangro"), commenced this action against defendant Mary Rosado ("Rosado"), plaintiff's former Article 81 guardian, based upon defendant's alleged misrepresentation of plaintiff, in connection with a court-appointed guardianship. See Matter of Reitano, 89 AD3d 535 (1st Dept 2011). Defendant was discharged from her appointment as guardian, on or about January 17, 2006, approximately eight (8) years ago.

Despite defendant's discharge eight (8) years ago, incredibly, this is plaintiff's third lawsuit against defendant, pertaining to defendant's alleged inappropriate actions, as plaintiff's guardian. [*2]Moreover, in addition to suing her guardian many times, plaintiff has commenced numerous other lawsuits against other victims including the attorney hired by Rosado, Phyllis Solomon (Cangro v. Solomon, Index Number 106491/2010; Cangro v. Solomon, Index Number 114547/2007 ^[FN1]), and the attorney who represented plaintiff's ex-husband, in the couple's divorce proceeding ( Cangro v. Marangos, Index Number 111339/2009).^[FN2] Including the within case, this Part has handled three (3) of the many cases commenced by Cangro (Cangro v. Solomon, Index Number 114547/2007 and Cangro v. Marangos, Index Number 111339/2009).

Orders Enjoining Commencement of Lawsuits

Significantly, as detailed below, a series of orders have been issued in numerous cases against plaintiff for her abuse of the judicial system.^[FN3] As detailed below, at least two Departments of the Appellate Division have issued or affirmed sanction orders rendered against Cangro. Fourteen years ago, in the divorce proceeding between plaintiff and her ex-husband (Cangro v. Cangro, Index Number 5660/2001, Supreme Court, Richmond County), an order was issued by Judge Ponterio (dated August 30, 2000) enjoining Cangro from commencing any action in any state court in New York, arising out of the matrimonial action, without prior written court approval by the Administrative Judge. Such decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division, Second Department. Cangro v. Cangro, 288 AD2d 417 (2nd Dept 2001).

Additionally, a further injunction was issued in the case of Cangro v. Solomon, Index Number 106491/2010, by order dated July 23, 2010, by the Hon. Carol Edmead, enjoining Cangro from commencing any future lawsuits in the Unified Court System against attorney Solomon, without prior approval by the appropriate Administrative Judge.

Most recently, by order dated November 7, 2013, based upon plaintiff's "extraordinary history of frivolous and abusive litigation, including [the prior] meritless action against her former guardian [Rosado] (see e.g. Cangro v. Cangro, 288 AD2d 417 [2d Dept 2001]; Cangro v. Solomon, 2010 NY Slip Op 31980U [Sup Ct NY County 2010], vacatur denied 2011 NY Slip Op 87844U [1st Dept 2011], appeal dismissed, lv dismissed 19 NY3d 990 [2012])", the Appellate Division, First Department issued an order, restraining plaintiff from "commencing further proceedings against [defendant Rosado] without prior judicial permission". Cangro v. Rosado, 111 AD3d 442 (1st Dept 2013). In such Appellate Division order, in addition to issuing the restraint, the First Department dismissed plaintiff's appeal of an order dated August 16, 2012, by the Hon. Debra A. James, which denied plaintiff's motion for reargument in the case of Cangro v. Rosado, Index No. 104562/2010. In such decision, Justice James admonished plaintiff, for her racial slurs and "baseless allegations of criminality against defendant [Rosado] and other participants in the [*3]justice system". Cangro v. Rosado, Index 104562/2010, Motion Sequence number 004, Decision dated August 6, 2012, Cross-Motion Exhibit.

Plaintiff's Motion and Defendant's Cross-Motion

Before the court is plaintiff's motion to compel defendant to comply with a demand for a bill of particulars, and defendant's cross- motion to dismiss and for, inter alia, sanctions pursuant to Part 130. In seeking dismissal of the within case, defendant argues that this case is barred by collateral estoppel and that the complaint fails to state a claim. Specifically, defendant maintains that, based upon the proceedings in the cases of In the Matter of Reitano et al, Index Number 500173/2002 (89 AD3d 535 (1st Dept 2011) and Cangro v. Rosado, Index Number 104562/2010, aff'd. 111 AD3d 422 (1st Dept 2013), this case is barred. This court agrees.

Significantly, all of the issues in the within lawsuit were previously asserted and dismissed and, therefore, may not be pursued herein. See Ginerzra Assoc. LLC v. Ifantopoulos, 70 AD3d 427, 429 (1st Dept 2010)("[t]he doctrine of res judicata holds that a final judgment bars further actions between the same parties on either the same cause of action or any claim related to the same course of conduct, unless the requisite elements and proof required for the new claim vary materially from those of the claim in the prior action"). Moreover, no evidence of any wrongdoing has ever been established in the prior actions with respect to defendant Rosado. In fact, the Appellate Division, First Department, in Matter of Reitano et al. (89 AD3d 535 (1st Dept 2011), in affirming the trial court's award to Rosado of her commissions for her work as Cangro's guardian, specifically stated that "the record contains no evidence of wrongdoing". Matter of Reitano et al, 89 AD3d at 535. In Matter of Reitano, the First Department held that "[t]he court properly exercised its discretion in awarding a fee to Rosado for extraordinary services in light of the significant time and effort she spent on [Cangro's] behalf...Moreover, the sums were appropriately charged to Cangro since her baseless accusations necessitated [such] additional proceeding". Id. 535-36 (citations omitted). Thus, defendant's cross-motion to dismiss is granted.

Additionally, it is noted that much of the within complaint is incoherent and contains inappropriate references to the race/color of the prior judges presiding over the many cases, in which plaintiff was a party.

Defendant also cross-moves for sanctions pursuant to Part 130 and to enjoin and restrain plaintiff from commencing any further actions against defendant in the New York State Unified Court System, without further order of the appropriate Administrative Judge, and for other and further relief as may be just and proper. Part 130 of the Rules of the Chief Administrator permits courts to sanction an attorney and/or a party for engaging in frivolous conduct. Conduct is considered to be frivolous if it is: (1) "completely without merit in law or fact"; (2) "undertaken primarily to... harass or maliciously injure another"; or (3) "asserts material factual statements that are false". See 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 [c]; Grayson v New York City Dept. of Parks and Recreation, 99 AD3d 418 (1st Dept 2012); Tavella v Tavella, 25 AD3d 523, 524 (1st Dept 2006). In determining whether conduct was frivolous, "the court shall consider, among other issues the [*4]circumstances under which the conduct took place, including the time available for investigating the legal or factual basis of the conduct, and whether or not the conduct was continued when its lack of legal or factual basis was apparent, should have been apparent, or was brought to the attention of counsel or the party". Tavella, 25 AD3d at 524-525.

Here, given plaintiff's extensive litigation history, the court concludes that she is a knowledgeable litigator and is familiar with court orders and rules, including Rule 130, particularly given the various sanction motions brought against her in previous cases. Furthermore, proceeding pro se is not a license to ignore court orders or rules (see Couri v Siebert, 48 AD3d 370 (1st Dept 2008). Moreover, plaintiff was on notice that her claims were without merit and specifically warned about the possibility of sanctions in prior litigation and from defendant's cross-motion seeking, inter alia, sanctions, and, nevertheless, plaintiff continued this action, and did not withdraw her motion.

Previously, Justice James, in her decision dated March 14, 2012, declined to impose sanctions upon plaintiff, but, plaintiff was specifically put "on notice that further baseless accusations' may lead to the imposition of restraints on bringing further suits in addition to monetary penalties". See Cangro v. Rosado, Index Number 104562/2010, Decision dated March 14, 2012, Exhibit to Notice of Cross-Motion. Nonetheless, plaintiff has continued the use of derogatory language and baseless claims, by commencing and continuing this meritless lawsuit, subsequent to such warning by Justice James, and the affirmance and restraint issued by the Appellate Division, First Department.

Thus, the court exercises its discretion to impose sanctions and costs on the plaintiff, in accordance with 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1(a), for bringing and continuing this action, as it is completely without merit in law and undertaken primarily to harass or maliciously injure defendant Rosado (see 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1[c][1], [2]), and, as a policy, frivolous and baseless litigation and flagrant abuse of the court system will not be tolerated by the courts.

Given plaintiff's flagrant disregard of court orders, abuse of the court system and continued derogatory, racist language ^[FN4], defendant's request that sanctions be imposed against plaintiff is granted to the extent to the extent that plaintiff is ordered to pay defendant's attorneys' fees and the costs associated with this lawsuit.^[FN5] Justice dictates that plaintiff be held responsible for defendant's fees. [*5]

That portion of defendant's motion which specifically seeks an order enjoining plaintiff from commencing any future actions against defendant without prior approval of the appropriate administrative judge is deemed moot, as such an injunction was granted by the Appellate Division, First Department, in its recent decision. Cangro v. Rosado, 111 AD3d 422 (1st Dept 2013). However, given plaintiff's continued abuse of the judicial system, which has only served to harass numerous individuals and has wasted considerable judicial resources, to the detriment of other litigants, plaintiff is clearly a vexatious litigant (see Seldon v Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith, LLD, 2012 NY Slip Op 32867[U]) and accordingly, is barred from filing any case/motion without prior permission from the administrative judge. See Dimery v Ulster Savings Bank, 82 AD3d 1034 (2nd Dept 2011) ("Public policy generally mandates free access to the courts . . . [h]ere, however, the record reflects that the plaintiff forfeited that right by abusing the judicial process through vexatious litigation. Accordingly, it was not improper for the Supreme Court to enjoin the plaintiff from bringing any further motions regarding the subject matter of the instant action without its permission"). In these times of diminishing judicial resources, plaintiff's baseless and frivolous actions affect the rights of other litigants to have their claims addressed in a prompt fashion. Further, plaintiff is ordered to supply the Clerk's office with a copy of this order and the Appellate Division order dated November 7, 2013, in any future filing/application/motion to the court. Plaintiff is on notice that failure to so provide will be sanctionable.^[FN6]

In exercising its discretion to impose sanctions and costs herein, this court does not do so lightly, in that it has given the imposition of sanctions much thought and consideration. However, in this case, plaintiff was given ample notice and opportunity to withdraw her claims to avoid sanctions and an injunction, and, nonetheless, continued her abusive conduct, after it was apparent that a legal basis to do so was lacking (see Fowler v Conforti, 194 AD2d 394, 394 [1st Dept 1993] ["the imposition of the maximum sanction of $10,000 for frivolous conduct was appropriate in this circumstance since plaintiff was forewarned about the dubious nature of this action and further because the plaintiff has repeatedly engaged in vexatious litigation"]). As indicated, this is plaintiff's third lawsuit against her former Article 81 guardian who was discharged eight (8) years ago and she has inappropriately sued other litigants and has been sanctioned. Further, the sheer volume of plaintiff's vexatious litigation tactics, demands such action by this court, as plaintiff's actions severely impact her victims and drain the already diminished judicial resources of the many courts in which she has commenced such frivolous litigation.

Based upon the above, plaintiff's motion to compel is deemed moot and denied.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that defendant's cross-motion to dismiss the complaint is granted, and the [*6]Clerk of the Court is directed to enter a judgment of dismissal in favor of defendant, with costs and disbursements; and it is further

ORDERED that the portion of defendant's cross-motion which seeks sanctions against plaintiff is granted to the extent that: (1) plaintiff shall pay defendant's attorneys' fees and costs associated with this lawsuit, as detailed above ; and (2) plaintiff is barred from filing any case/motion without prior permission from the administrative judge, as indicated above; and it is further

ORDERED that, within 30 days of entry of this order, defendant shall serve a copy upon plaintiff with notice of entry.

Dated: February 21, 2014

_____________________

Hon. Doris Ling-Cohan,J.S.C