| Superior Sleep Servs., Inc. v Diana Brodstein, Attorney at Law, P.C. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 50223(U) [42 Misc 3d 142(A)] |
| Decided on February 7, 2014 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County
(Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered January 3, 2012. The judgment, after a nonjury trial,
awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,000.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
In this commercial claims action, plaintiff seeks to recover the sum of $2,000, representing the amount plaintiff allegedly overpaid defendant for legal services which, plaintiff claims, defendant never performed. After a nonjury trial, the Civil Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,000, and defendant appeals.
Our review is limited to determining whether "substantial justice has not been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (CCA 1807-A). The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that its conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). The determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992] Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510 [1991]). The deference accorded to a trial court's credibility determinations applies with even greater force to judgments rendered in the Commercial Claims Part of the court, given the limited standard of review (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125 [2000]).
As a matter of public policy, courts pay particular attention to fee arrangements between attorneys and their clients (see Jacobson v Sassower, 66 NY2d 991, 993 [1985]), and even where it is the client who commences an action to recover a portion of the attorney's fees paid, it is the attorney who must shoulder the burden of demonstrating the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered (id.; see also Seth Rubenstein, P.C. v Ganea, 41 AD3d 54, 64 [2007]). In the instant case, plaintiff submitted to the court a $2,500 check dated August 25, 2009, which plaintiff had given to defendant in order to retain her services in securing a Medicaid provider number. The only documentation shown to the court to demonstrate the work done by defendant was a rather sparsely completed application form allegedly submitted by defendant on plaintiff's behalf but returned as incomplete in February 2010. Although defendant's invoice purported to itemize the time spent by defendant in attempting to secure the Medicaid provider number, the defense witness was unable to offer to the court any invoices earlier than one dated October 28, 2010, despite the fact that, according to her, the attorney-client relationship had ended in March [*2]2010.
Defendant's contention on appeal, that defense counsel was prevented by the Civil Court from fully cross-examining plaintiff's witnesses, is not supported by the record. Moreover, although the defense witness claimed that defendant had been retained by plaintiff's former president individually, the retainer agreement referred to defendant's representation of plaintiff, and the $2,500 check was drawn from plaintiff's account.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the judgment in favor of plaintiff rendered substantial justice between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see CCA 1807-A). Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
Aliotta, J.P., Pesce and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 07, 2014